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Abstract
Nowadays, wired and wireless networks are used everywhere and everyday.
With the increasing popularity of multiuser communication systems, their op-
timal performance has become a crucial field of study during the last decades.
A factor that greatly determines such performance is the optimal allocation
of the resources available to the agents in the network. This dissertation
provides a set of optimization techniques applicable to rigorously address
and deeply analyze multiuser resource allocation problems in different areas,
ranging from signal processing, to communications and networking. More
specifically, this work focuses on the three main topics that we briefly de-
scribe next.
First, we study the maximum sum-utility achieved when a noncoopera-
tive approach is used to allocate the spectrum in a communication system
adopting a dynamic spectrum management framework. In particular, we
turn our attention to the case in which the users in the system are endowed
with infinite power budgets. This asymptotic analysis, based on the linear
complementarity problem theory, leads us characterize the behavior of the
system’s utility as the power budget is increased toward infinity, and thus
draw interesting conclusions on the efficiency of the Nash equilibrium and
the Braess-type paradox, among others.
Second, we propose a novel class of distributed algorithms for the op-
timization of nonconvex and nonseparable sum-utility functions subject to
convex coupling constraints. Even though, we focus on utility functions of
the Difference of Convex (DC) type, further generalizations are possible.
Moreover, the obtained iterative schemes are provable convergent to station-
ary points of such optimization problems. Among the different applications
of our Successive Convex Approximations based algorithms, we direct our
attention to a novel resource allocation problem in the emerging field of
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physical layer based security, and to the well-known MIMO (Multiple-Input-
Multiple-Output) Cognitive Radio sum-rate maximization problem. For the
former application, we develop a mathematically rigorous analysis of the
nondifferentiable and nonconvex game (of the generalized type) proposed to
optimally allocate the network resources in this context; and finally, we ap-
ply our algorithms to find relaxed equilibrium points of the mentioned game.
For the second application, our theory provides, for the first time, a provable
convergent algorithm.
The third major topic of this dissertation analyzes a multiuser maximiza-
tion problem where the utility function has a particular structure, namely, it
is the sum of continuous maximum functions, subject to private and coupling
constraints. We follow two different approaches in order to design provable
convergent algorithms to address this problem. These approaches are based
on “simpler” reformulations of the nondifferentiable and nonconcave opti-
mization problem of interest. A careful analysis relating such problems is also
developed. The cited results pave the way to devise (possibly distributed)
algorithms for different system designs in the context of physical layer based
security, ranging from the secrecy sum-rate maximization to the Max-Min
fairness problem. It is important to emphasize that, different from the sim-
ple networks models considered in the physical layer security literature, the
system designs studied in this dissertation involve networks composed of
multiple legitimate users and friendly jammers, and a single eavesdropper,
where the main users communicate over multiple (either orthogonal or non-
orthogonal) subchannels.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that most of the tools and results devel-
oped in this work are general enough to encompass applications in many
fields different from those described above. This dissertation highlights how
the introduction of optimization theory in different signal processing appli-
cations has motivated several significant developments in the former field, in
particular in the area of multiuser distributed optimization. Future research
directions are provided at the end of each chapter.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Preliminaries
In the last years, optimization theory has been widely used in a wide va-
riety of applications in signal processing, communications and networking.
Among the different areas of optimization theory adopted by the aforemen-
tioned communities, we can mention convex and nonconvex optimization
techniques [11], game theory [76, 80, 7], and more recently, the variational
inequality (VI) approach [28] has also been applied to deal with equilibrium
problems where classical methods may not be enough to address them; we
refer the interested reader to [98] for a general overview of these topics. The
mentioned optimization techniques have been extensively used to optimally
allocate (limited) resources in communication systems. The analysis of dif-
ferent resource allocation problems in multiuser systems and the design of
provable convergent algorithms attempting to solve them, conform the main
interests of this dissertation. Despite the fact that some of the algorithms
proposed in this work are centralized, our main interest is the design of dis-
tributed schemes, since there are several applications in the area of signal
processing in communications where the centralized approaches may be in-
feasible or too demanding.
In this work, we are primarily concerned with two different approaches
followed to optimally allocate resources in a multiuser system, namely:
i) the well-known Network Utility Maximization (NUM) framework (see,
Subsection 1.1.1); and,
ii) game theoretical models (see, Subsection 1.1.2).
Needless to say, there is a vast literature related to these subjects. In the
next two sections we briefly introduce them and point out relevant references
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to those readers interested in more details. These sections do not intend to
be a comprehensive study of the aforementioned topics but rather a quick
overview of them with the objective of setting the foundations necessary to
easily understand the forthcoming chapters. After these topics have been
introduced, we also set the context of the applications in signal processing
to communications that are studied along this dissertation; this is covered in
Subsection 1.1.3.
1.1.1 Network Utility Maximization
Since the introduction of the concept of NUM in the paper [49], it has been
generalized to encompass different applications, ranging form Internet con-
gestion control protocol to resource (such as power, bandwidth, rates, etc.)
allocation problems in either wired or wireless communication networks.
Let us introduce the concept of NUM formally. For that, consider a
multiuser system composed of I users. Each user i = 1, . . . , I makes de-
cision on his ni-dimensional real strategy vector xi ∈ Rni subject to some
local constraints represented by the closed (nonempty) set Xi ⊆ Rni . Let
the Cartesian structured set X , ∏Ii=1Xi denote the set of private con-
straints. Suppose also, that there are nc coupling constraints of the form
h(x) , (hj(x))ncj=1 ≤ 0, where hj : X → R for all j = 1, . . . , nc. Assume that
every user obtains certain reward when choosing strategy xi, that is, each
user i = 1, . . . , I has an utility function Ui : Xi → R. Hence, a generalized
version of NUM is the problem of finding the strategy profile of all the users
in the system x , (xi)Ii=1 that maximizes the total utility of the system
U(x) ,
∑I
i=1 Ui(xi), the so-called sum-utility, subject to the set of private
and coupling constraints, i.e. we aim to solve
maximize
x,(xi)Ii=1
U(x) ,
I∑
i=1
Ui(xi)
subject to xi ∈ Xi ∀ i = 1, . . . , I (private constraints)
h(x) ≤ 0 (coupling constraints).
(1.1)
For the sake of notational simplicity, let Ξ , {x ∈ X : h(x) ≤ 0} denote
the feasible set of (1.1). It is worth remarking that many resource allocation
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problems can be formulated as a single constrained optimization problem of
the general form introduced in (1.1) that seeks to maximize some suitably
chosen utility function U .
There are also cases in which the utility of user i is assigned a particular
weight. For example, in situations where the system wants to prioritize some
users, then a weighted sum-utility function of the form Û(x) ,
∑I
i=1wi Ui(xi)
can be used instead, where the scalar wi represents the weight assigned to
user i. For the sake of simplicity, in what follows we stay with the objective
function in (1.1), that is, we let the weights wi = 1 for all i = 1, . . . , I.
So far, we have not impose any assumption with regard to the objective
function or the constraints of the program (1.1). The simplest case occurs
when such a resource allocation problem can be modeled by an utility func-
tion U that is concave on X , the set of private constraints X is convex and
there are no coupling constraints. A key characteristic of the sum-utility
function in (1.1) is that it is separable in each users’ variables, so is the set
of constraints X (due to its Cartesian structure). These features along with
the standard convexity assumptions mentioned above, significantly simplify
the analysis of (1.1), moreover, it is possible to design distributed algorithms
converging (under some mild conditions) to globally optimal solutions of the
NUM problem (1.1), see, e.g., [12].
When the constraint set is coupled, distributed schemes can still be devised
to solve (1.1). For example, under the same standard convexity assumptions
of the objective and private constraints of (1.1), if the coupling constraints
are in the separable form h(x) ,
∑I
i=1 hi(xi) ≤ 0 with each hi being convex
over Xi, then dual or primal decomposition techniques can be invoked to
design distributed algorithms. We refer the reader to [82, 83] for a detailed
analysis regarding decomposition methods for NUM.
A different and more general case is that of coupled sum-utility functions
U , that is, when the utility of the i-th user Ui is affected by the strategy
vector of the rest of users in the system x−i , (xj)j 6=i. This situation arises
naturally in systems with cooperation or competition between their agents.
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Under this assumption, the maximization problem (1.1) adopts the form
maximize
x∈Ξ
U(x) ,
I∑
i=1
Ui(xi,x−i), (1.2)
where we have both a coupled objective and coupling constraints. Assuming
that the objective function U is concave on X , and that the feasible set Ξ is
convex, it is possible to design distributed algorithms for solving (1.2); see,
for example, the results in [82, 107].
Notice that in the NUM problems introduced above we assumed the con-
cavity of the utility function U , as well as, the convexity of the feasible set Ξ.
These two features simplify their analysis and the design of either central-
ized or distributed algorithms converging to globally optimal solutions (under
some assumptions). However, not all the resource allocation problems sat-
isfy those strong assumptions. In particular, a great deal of applications
in signal processing to communications violate them. For example, and of
great interest to this work, is the so-called power allocation problem in com-
munication systems adopting a dynamic spectrum management framework
(see, Subsection 1.1.3), where the utility function corresponds to the sum
of the transmission rates of all users (i.e. the so-called sum-rate) which is
a nonconcave function. Furthermore, in the context of physical layer secu-
rity (refer to Subsection 1.1.3), the utility function is nonconcave and also
nondifferentiable. As a result, moving one step further, in this dissertation
we study resource allocation problems that can be cast into the form (1.2),
but the sum-utility function is nonconcave (refer to Chapter 3), or the ob-
jective function has the form of the sum of continuous max functions with a
particular structure (refer to Chapter 4), giving rise to nondifferentiable and
nonconcave utility functions.
1.1.2 Noncooperative Games
Since the introduction of game theory in [78] it has been adopted to ana-
lyze different problems in a wide variety of fields ranging from economics,
psychology to engineering. Roughly speaking, game theory is a set of mathe-
matical tools used to study and solve conflicts in scenarios in which different
agents (the so-called players) make interactive decisions. We refer the reader
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to [80, 78] for a comprehensive treatment of this topic. Of particular interest
to this dissertation is the area of game theory dealing with noncooperative
games, that is, the case where the players make their individual decisions
selfishly with the solely objective of optimizing their individual outcome.
This outcome is generally measured via an objective function in the player’s
individual optimization problem. Thus, practically speaking, as opposed to
the single optimization problem used in NUM to model a resource allocation
problem, in the game theoretical framework, the game consists of multiple
coupled optimization problems. It is worth mentioning that over the last
decade or so, noncooperative game theory has been successfully employed
to model different problems in signal processing and communications. This
relevance comes from the fact that, in modern communication networks, dis-
tributed approaches are desirable since centralized ones may be too expensive
or even infeasible to solve conflicts between their highly interactive entities.
In the rest of this section, we define and briefly introduce the following two
types of games:
i) the Nash Equilibrium Problems (NEP); and
ii) the Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problems (GNEP).
1.1.2.1 Nash Equilibrium Problems
Let us formalize the concept of noncooperative games or also known as Nash
equilibrium problems. Assume that there are I players denoted by the set
I , {1, . . . , I}. Each player i ∈ I makes his decision on a ni-dimensional
real strategy vector xi ∈ Xi ⊆ Rni . Let X ,
∏I
i=1Xi denote the admissible
strategy set, and let X−i ,
∏
j 6=iXj be the strategy set of the rest of players
distinct from player i. The outcome of each player i is measured through
an utility function Ui : X → R that depends on the strategies of all the
players in the game denoted by x , (xi,x−i) where xi ∈ Xi and x−i ∈
X−i. Let U(x) , (Ui(x))Ii=1 denote the vector utility function. Then, the
noncooperative game is the tuple G , (I,X ,U), where every player i ∈ I
aims to find the strategy vector xi ∈ Xi, given the strategies of the rest of
players x−i, that maximizes his utility function, i.e. anticipating x−i each
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player i solves the following optimization problem
maximize
xi
Ui(xi,x−i)
subject to xi ∈ Xi.
(1.3)
Note that the game G consists then in I coupled optimization problems of the
form (1.3). It is worth stressing that in (1.3), the i-the player determines his
strategy vector xi by solving his corresponding optimization problem while
considering the strategy vectors of the rest of players x−i exogenous, that is
fixed but arbitrary.
John Nash suggested in [76] that a solution to the game G is the feasible
tuple x? , (x?i )
I
i=1, the well-known Nash equilibrium (NE), with the char-
acteristic that no player can improve his utility by unilaterally changing his
decision, provided that the rest of players act according to it. The following
definition introduces this concept formally.
Definition 1.1 (NE). A strategy profile vector x? , (x?i )
I
i=1 is a Nash equi-
librium of the NEP G , (I,X ,U) if the following holds for all i ∈ I:
a) x?i ∈ Xi; and,
b) Ui(x
?
i ,x
?
−i) ≥ Ui(xi,x?−i) for all xi ∈ Xi.
The existence of a NE for the game G is, in general, not guaranteed.
The same holds with respect to its uniqueness. Both the NE existence and
uniqueness for games in the general form G have been studied extensively
in the related literature. The following two key observations have important
implications on the NE existence and uniqueness.
- Given any x−i ∈ X−i, let Ri(x−i) denote the best response of player
i, that is, the set of optimal solutions to the i-th player optimization
problem (1.3). Let R(x) ,∏Ii=1Ri(x−i) denote the best response map
of the game G. Then, it is clear that we can interpret the concept of
NE introduced in Definition 1.1 as a fixed-point of the best response
map R(x). More precisely, a strategy profile x? ∈ X is a NE of the
NEP G if and only if x? ∈ R(x?). This particular interpretation of the
NE leads directly to some existence and uniqueness results for the NE
of the game G; these results are discussed below.
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- A second approach that is useful to study the existence and uniqueness
of the NE, and also helpful to derive provable convergent algorithms to
compute it, is based on the reformulation of the game G as a variational
inequality (VI). If we assume that for every i ∈ I it holds that: first,
each set Xi is closed and convex; and, second, each utility function
Ui(xi,x−i) is continuously differentiable in x and concave in xi for every
fixed x−i, then the game G , (I,X ,U) is equivalent to the VI(X ,F),
where F , (−∇xUi(x))Ii=1.
Among the different NE existence results, an important one capitalizes on
the first observation above, i.e. on the interpretation of the NE concept as a
fixed-point of the best response map, and then it applies the widely explored
fixed-point theory to derive it. A second possible approach relies on the VI
reformulation of the NEP explained above; we refer the reader to [29] for a
more detailed insight. For our purpose, it is enough to recall the following
well-known result guaranteeing the existence of a NE for the game G; this is
stated formally in the theorem below, whose proof follows from Kakutani’s
fixed-point theorem [28, Thm. 2.1.19].
Theorem 1.1 (NE existence). Given the NEP G , (I,X ,U), suppose that,
for every i ∈ I, the following two conditions hold
a) each player’s strategy set Xi is convex and compact; and,
b) each player’s utility function Ui(xi,x−i) is continuous in x and concave
in xi for every fixed x−i.
Then, the NEP has a nonempty solution set.
With respect to the uniqueness of the NE for the game G, notice that,
under the assumptions ensuring the equivalence between the game G and
the VI(X ,F), it follows readily (from VI theory) that the NEP G admits
a single solution if the map F is strongly monotone over X ; refer to [29]
for sufficient conditions guaranteeing the required strong monotonicity of F.
Interestingly, the aforementioned condition is also sufficient to guarantee the
convergence of distributed algorithms of the Gauss-Seidel or Jacobi type [12]
to the unique NE of the game G. We recall that, in Gauss-Seidel schemes,
each player updates his strategy profile sequentially by solving the problem
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(1.3) given the strategies of the rest of players; while in the Jacobi schemes,
such updates are made in parallel. For the sake of clarity, we illustrate a
Jacobi-type algorithm, where given xν−i ,
(
xνj
)
j 6=i ∈ X−i each player i ∈ I
computes
xν+1i ∈ argmax
xi∈Xi
Ui(xi,x
ν
−i).
It is worth mentioning that, a similar uniqueness result can be obtained if
the best response map R(x) is a contraction in some norm; see, e.g., [28].
1.1.2.2 Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problems
So far we have restricted our discussion to games in which the coupling of
the players’ optimization problems occurs only at the level of their objective
functions. However, there are situations in which the strategy set of every
player depends on the strategies of the rivals i.e. the strategy set of user
i depends on x−i, hence we denote this dependency explicitly by writing
Xi(x−i). This is indeed the case in the physical layer based security appli-
cations discussed in Chapters 3 and 4 of this dissertation. This extended
notion of NEP is known as generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP);
we refer the interested reader to [27] for a detailed treatment of this topic.
Under the same setting of the NEP and using the same notation therein,
each player i seeks the strategy profile xi that maximizes his utility function,
given the strategy of the others x−i, that is, every player i ∈ I aims to solve
the following optimization problem
maximize
xi
Ui(xi,x−i)
subject to xi ∈ Xi(x−i).
(1.4)
The next definition introduces a solution concept for the GNEP described
above; as expected, this is a natural extension of that one in Definition 1.1.
Definition 1.2 (GNE). A strategy profile vector x? , (x?i )i∈I is a GNE of
the GNEP G , (I,X (x),U) if the following holds for all i ∈ I:
a) x?i ∈ Xi(x?−i); and
b) Ui(x
?
i ,x
?
−i) ≥ Ui(xi,x?−i) for all xi ∈ Xi(x?−i).
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The coupling in the feasible sets of the players introduced in the GNEP
makes its solution significantly harder than the NEP. Similarly, the existence
results for a GNE require, in general, more restrictive assumptions than the
ones for the NE (see, e.g., Theorem 1.1). Since, the GNEP in its general
form is almost intractable [98], different attempts have been proposed in the
literature to derive results for instances of the GNEP with some particular
structure; examples of those works are [31, 26].
In the applications section of Chapters 3 and 4, we study GNEPs where
the objective function of the players’ optimization problems is nonconcave
and nondifferentiable. These features coupled with its generalized type make
this sort of games challenging. However, by exploiting the structure of the
problem of interest we are still able to analyze it and thus, derive iterative
algorithms converging to relaxed equilibrium points of G.
In the next subsection, we briefly introduce the context for the applications
in signal processing to communication that are studied in this dissertation.
A more detailed discussion of each of those applications is given in their
respective chapters and in the cited references.
1.1.3 Spectrum Management
The demand experimented by either wired or wireless communication sys-
tems has increased dramatically in recent years. This proliferation of mul-
tiuser communication systems has motivated the study of different techniques
to optimize their performance. Among them, the optimal allocation of the
network resources is critical. For example, in wireless (e.g., ad-hoc networks)
and wired (e.g., Digital Subscriber Lines−DSL)) systems, multiple users aim
to communicate over a common medium causing interference among them.
Hence, the overall system performance can be greatly affected due to the
multiuser interference. These undesirable effects can be mitigated through
proper spectrum management techniques.
As an example of the interference problem, let us consider the case of DSL,
a broadband access technology, where multiple users obtain access to network
services by communicating with a central node over the local telephone lines,
thus sharing a common spectrum. The electromagnetic interference between
9
the cables, known as crosstalk, may cause signal distortion. As a result, if
the crosstalk is not mitigated, it can significantly limit the DSL system’s
performance. Indeed, in [120] the authors state that the crosstalk is pos-
sibly the major source of signal distortion in DSL. It is worth mentioning
that a similar multiuser interference problem is faced by wireless networks.
Consequently, it is evident that an adequate management of the spectrum
is mandatory in order to avoid the degradation in the performance of these
communication systems.
Basically, there are two different approaches for managing the spectrum,
namely, the static and the dynamic techniques. Next, we provide an overview
of both approaches.
Static Spectrum Management (SSM). SSM is the most basic and con-
ventional spectrum management technique. For example, two well-known
SSM approaches are: Frequency Division Multiple Access (FDMA) in which
the network users share a spectrum divided into non-overlapping subchan-
nels; and, similarly Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA), where the users
transmit over non-overlapping time slots (see, e.g.,[110]). Notice that, since
the users transmit over pre-assigned subchannels (or time slots), these cannot
be used by another network entity when they are idle. Moreover, such fixed
allocation policies may not be optimal. In the case of DSL systems, a common
approach consists in allocating the spectrum based upon a worst-case sce-
nario analysis; which may however reduce the achievable transmission rates.
Hence, it follows that, the SSM techniques may lead to a conservative and
restrictive network performance. The main reason of the inefficiency of the
SSM is that it does not take into account the high variability or dynamism
that every communication network faces.
Dynamic Spectrum Management (DSM). As a response to the sub-
optimal spectrum allocations that SSM techniques may produce, dynamic
spectrum management approaches have been proposed as a viable solution
to this problem; we refer the interested reader to [127] for a general survey
on this topic, and to [69] for an analysis from an optimization point of view.
The main idea behind DSM is to allocate the spectrum in such a way that it
adapts to the characteristics of the network while achieving some network’s
performance metric. For example, the interference problem can be mitigated
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through power control by DSM techniques if the users in the communica-
tion system are allowed to allocate their available power budget dynamically
across the entire shared spectrum, with the objective of maximizing the sys-
tems’ throughput. Clearly, optimization techniques are required in order to
obtain such optimal spectrum allocations that the DSM aims to find. The
DSM problems can be formulated either as:
i) a single network utility maximization (NUM) problem (see, Subsec-
tion 1.1.1) [69]; or,
ii) as a noncooperative game (see, Subsection 1.1.2).
Several algorithms have been proposed in the related literature following the
two aforementioned approaches; for example, we refer the reader to [45] for
a complete discussion on DSM algorithms in DSL systems. To this end,
it is worth emphasizing that, in this dissertation, we focus our attention on
communication systems adopting a DSM framework. Moreover, in Chapter 2
we contrast the NUM and the game theoretical DSM approaches by analyzing
the sum-utility obtained from a noncooperative game, when the power budget
in the system is increased toward infinity.
Basically, the DSM algorithms can be categorized in the following two
different classes:
• Centralized DSM Algorithms. Centralized schemes require coor-
dination among the entities in the network achieved via a central node.
This centralized authority is responsible of obtaining from the network
nodes the information required to compute the optimal allocation of
the spectrum, and then, communicate such an optimal policy to the
corresponding nodes. In general, centralized schemes are computation-
ally expensive, however the performance achieved by these schemes
may outperform the obtained from distributed approaches, since the
formers aim to compute globally optimal solutions. However, generally
speaking, this approach may be intractable for large-scale networks.
See, [45] for some examples.
• Distributed DSM Algorithms. In distributed schemes, there is no
need of a central authority to optimally allocate the spectrum. Thus,
the computations are decentralized across the network entities, and the
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level of coordination required among them is negligible. There are cases
in which some limited signaling (in the form of message passing) be-
tween the nodes is needed by the algorithms. Distributed schemes are
expected to be computationally less expensive than centralized algo-
rithms, but at the cost of a reduction in the achieved system’s perfor-
mance. Due to their reduced complexity, distributed DSM algorithms
are, in general, scalable and thus, suitable for communication systems
with a large number of users.
The DSM based on the maximization of the network’s utility function gives
rise to a centralized planned solution or social optimum. Unfortunately, if
we consider, for example, the single optimization problem formulation where
the objective is to maximize the sum-rate subject to individual power con-
straints, such a program is in general nonconcave and it has been shown to
be NP-hard [37]. Consequently, if devising DSM centralized algorithms is in
jeopardy, the design of distributed schemes reaching the social optimum is
even more challenging. However, different attempts have been introduced in
the literature to find suboptimal solutions of the aforementioned problem;
for example [65, 18, 19, 121] use a dual approach, while [44, 93] propose a
sequential decomposition scheme and, more recently [94] introduces a paral-
lel approach capitalizing on Successive Convex Approximation (SCA) tech-
niques (see, e.g., [72, 90, 94, 4]) to reach a stationary solution of the NUM
problem.
Under the same context, the DSM based on game theoretical models was
first proposed by Yu et al. in [120] and has been extensively studied in the
literature; we refer the reader to [98, 102, 20, 118, 68, 97, 96, 17, 54, 58], and
the references therein for some relevant works. In this case, each network
user is modeled as a selfish player that aims to maximize its information rate
while considering the power allocation of the others as measurable noise. The
resulting individual players’ optimization problem are concave, giving rise
to a Nash equilibrium problem. Contrary to the NUM approach described
above, the NEP leads directly to a distributed implementation obtained via
the well-known Iterative Waterfilling Algorithm (IWFA), see, e.g., [95]. It is
important to mention that the convergence of the IWFA to a NE of the so-
called power allocation game is not always guaranteed, see, e.g., [68, 96, 17]
for some sufficient conditions.
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Game theoretical models have been employed successfully to allocate the
spectrum dynamically in different communication models. In this disserta-
tion, we analyze some of those existing system designs and also introduce
novel models, such as the DSM in networks implementing physical layer
based security (refer to Chapters 3 and 4). In order to set the context of
the research proposed in this dissertation, we briefly revise some of the most
relevant system designs introduced in the literature.
In [86] the authors consider a noncooperative game in which each network
user is modeled as a player that aims to find the power allocation that satis-
fies a desired information rate (the so-called Quality of Service − QoS) with
the minimum possible power. Notice that, in this case, the objective is to
minimize the power rather than maximizing the transmission rate as in the
power allocation game described above. The idea of introducing QoS con-
straints arises as a need of overcoming the possibly unfair power allocations
obtained from the classical approach that tend to assign higher data rates
to those users with “better” channels. A totally different situation that can
happen in a communication network is the presence of malicious nodes that
aim to somehow disturb the normal operation of the system. The authors of
[33] studied such situation by introducing a power allocation game where an
antagonistic player (or also known as jammer) aims to disrupt the network
performance by minimizing the utility of the entire system.
The increasing demand of wireless services during recent years, along with
fixed spectrum allocation policies have brought as a negative consequence the
scarcity of the radio spectrum. Cognitive Radio (CR) has been introduced as
a possible solution to this problem; see, e.g., [99, 38] for two surveys on this
topic. Roughly speaking, the CR paradigm introduces a hierarchical struc-
ture in the communication system where the users can be classified into:
(i) primary users or the legacy spectrum holders, and (ii) secondary users
who are unlicensed spectrum holders with the ability to access the licensed
spectrum with the restriction of not degrading the primary users’ quality of
service. As expected, game theoretical models have been considered in or-
der to devise distributed resource allocation policies in this context. Among
the different works in this area, consider for example [87], where the opti-
mal power allocation of the secondary users is obtained via a noncooperative
game, in which a pricing mechanism is used to handle the coupling among
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the variables of all the players that the primary users’ interference constraints
impose. It is worth mentioning that, most of the analysis of this CR system
design relies on VI theory. A more complex CR system design was considered
in [85, 100]. In particular, the cited references take into account the fact that
the access to the licensed spectrum from the secondary users depends on their
capabilities to detect the so-called “spectrum holes” (i.e. unused spectrum
slots). This calls for a joint optimization of the power allocation along with
these detection parameters, giving rise to a noncooperative and nonconvex
game with side constraints. Interestingly, this game motivated the work in
[84] as a response to the lack of mathematical tools available in the literature
to analyze the aforementioned problem. In the cited work, a new concept
of equilibrium was introduced, namely, the quasi-Nash Equilibrium (QNE).
Essentially, a QNE is a solution of the VI obtained by aggregating the first
order optimality conditions of the players’ optimization problems while the
convex constraints are retained in the defining set of the VI. Whenever a
NE of the game exits, it must be a QNE under some constraint qualifica-
tions. This new concept opened the path to analyze the nonconvex CR game,
proving that such a game always admits a QNE. In this dissertation, we use
and extend the concept of QNE to encompass games where the objective
functions of the player’s optimization problems are besides nonconvex also
nondifferentiable.
With most of our daily transactions being done through the Internet, se-
curity is a major concern in today’s communication networks. Different from
current cryptographic techniques, used to guarantee security among the enti-
ties in the system, the objective of physical layer based security is, as expected
from its name, to exploit the physical characteristics of the communication
channel in pursuance of secure transmissions; see, e.g., [63, 61, 47] for recent
surveys on this topic. Since the seminal work of Aaron Wyner in [116], the
idea of physical layer security has been considered as a promising technique
to provide secure communications. Of interest to our work, is the so-called
Cooperative Jamming (CJ) paradigm (see, e.g., [24, 39, 59]), in which some
particular nodes in the network (known as friendly jammers) are introduced
into the communication system with the objective of generating judicious in-
terference in order to improve the secrecy rate, that is, roughly speaking, the
non-zero rate at which the legitimate users can communicate in a secure way.
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Again, different game theoretical models have been employed to dynamically
allocate the spectrum in this context, among them we can mention those in
[36, 35, 125, 115, 104]. There are two major weaknesses that all of these
works exhibit, first the network models analyzed are very simplistic, for ex-
ample, they are composed of a single transmitter-receiver pair and multiple
friendly jammers or multiple transmitter-receiver pairs but only one friendly
jammer; and second, those models ignore a nondifferentiability issue that is
inherent to every secrecy rate problem. In this dissertation, we overcome
both issues by introducing more general network models, and by analyzing
them carefully taking into account the nondifferentiability problem.
To conclude this section, it is important to emphasize that the resource
allocation problems considered in this dissertation focus on communication
systems adopting the DSM framework in two different contexts: (i) in the
most general setting of mitigating the interference problem through power
control; and, (ii) in the the emerging field of physical layer based security,
where, in contrast to the former case, the interference may be beneficial
to secure the transmissions between legitimate parties provided that it is
between acceptable thresholds and, of course, properly managed. Although,
we center the discussion in these applications, it is worth remarking that our
techniques and results can be readily applied to other resource allocation
problems in multiuser systems.
1.2 Research Synopsis
This dissertation is divided into three main chapters. These chapters are
independent, thus, the reader can read them in any order after going over
this introductory section. Let us briefly discuss each of them.
In Chapter 2, we present an analysis based on the Linear Complementarity
Problem (LCP) theory [21] of the dependance on the power budget of the
system sum-rate obtained from the outcome of a NEP used to dynamically
allocate the spectrum. More precisely, in favor of obtaining some insight
for the situation of relatively large but finite power budgets, we study the
case when the budget is increased toward infinity. This study led us to
draw some conclusions on the efficiency of the NE under the unbounded
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budget setting. Interestingly, we observed that the system sum-rate of NE
could be finite even in the presence of an infinite power budget, contrary to
the unbounded sum-rate obtained when a cooperative approach is used to
allocate the spectrum. Hence, the unboundedness of the power resource may
not be enough to overcome the users’ selfishness. Furthermore, this research
also led us to find, a particular case for which the presence of the well-known
Braess-type paradox [14] is ruled out in the interference channels.
In Chapter 3 we propose a decomposition method for the minimization of
a nonseparable sum-utility function of the Difference of Convex (DC) type,
subject to a set of convex coupling constraints. One of the main contribu-
tions of this chapter is the design of a class of (inexact) distributed algorithms
with provable convergence to stationary points of the DC problem. The pro-
posed algorithms are based on SCA-techniques, that is, a suitable convexi-
fied version of the original problem is solved at each iteration. Among the
different possible applications of our algorithms, we apply them to the solu-
tion of the following two problems: (i) the sum-rate maximization problem
in CR MIMO (Multiple-Input-Multiple-Output) systems, providing for the
first time a provable convergent algorithm to address such resource alloca-
tion problem; and (ii) to a power allocation game in the context of physical
layer security. This game faces the following difficulties: first, the objective
functions of the users’ optimization problems are nonconcave and nondiffer-
entiable; and second, there are also constraints coupling the strategies of the
users. In order to provide a rigorous mathematical analysis of this game, we
introduce a new relaxed equilibrium concept based on directional derivatives,
termed B-Quasi Generalized Nash Equilibrium (B-QGNE), which is shown
to be reachable applying the DC framework described above. Numerical re-
sults validating our theory and evaluating the performance of the proposed
algorithms are also provided.
Chapter 4 introduces a multiuser optimization problem where the nonsepa-
rable utility function is the sum of continuous max functions with a particular
structure. In order to develop provable convergent algorithms to address this
problem, we reformulate it in such a way that the obtained problems over-
come some of the main difficulties present in the original one, while still being
associated with it. We also study carefully the connections between those
“simpler” reformulations and the original problem. One of the mentioned
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reformulations arises from a (nontrivial) DC decomposition of the objective
function of such a problem, while the second approach is based on a smooth
reformulation of the problem. The former approach lead us to apply the well-
known DCA (Difference of Convex Algorithm) [108, 109, 5, 122, 53, 103], and
for the latter approach, SCA techniques are applicable. Our main interest in
studying this particular multiuser optimization problem lies in deriving prov-
able convergent algorithms for the allocation of resources in communication
systems implementing physical layer based security, where the users commu-
nicate over multiple subchannels, this last feature is the key distinction from
the system model considered in Chapter 3 and from those studied in the
literature. The proposed algorithms are tested numerically under different
settings for the aforementioned application.
Finally, Chapter 5 summarizes the overall discussion and draws the main
conclusion. Future research topics are discussed at the end of each chapter.
The overall main and unique contributions of this dissertation can be sum-
marized as follows:
1. A Linear Complementarity Problem based framework to analyze the
asymptotic behavior of the utility of a communication system, when
a noncooperative game is used to allocate the spectrum and when the
users’ power budgets are increased toward infinity.
2. A class of distributed algorithms with provable convergence to station-
ary solutions of multiuser optimization problems with smooth, non-
convex and nonseparable objective function subject to convex coupling
constraints.
3. A rigorous treatment of a game (of the generalized type) arising in a
novel resource allocation problem in the field of physical layer based
security, where the players’ optimization problems are characterized to
have a nonconvex and nondifferentiable objective function.
4. A set of provable convergent algorithms for addressing a sum-utility
maximization problem where the objective function is the sum of con-
tinuous max functions of a particular kind.
5. The development of (distributed) algorithms for the power allocation
problem in a multi-user, multi-friendly jammers and multi (orthogonal)
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subchannels communication system securing its transmission through
physical layer, ranging from the secrecy rate maximization problem to
the max-min fairness system design. Further extensions include the
case of a MIMO communication system.
This dissertation extends the current results in the literature in two ma-
jor areas: first, in the field of optimization techniques applied to address
multiuser resource allocation problems in either a centralized or distributed
fashion; and second, in the domain of signal processing, more precisely in the
power allocation problem faced by communication systems under DSM. For
the sake of clarity, Figure 1.1 illustrates the overall structure of this disser-
tation. This figure also highlights how each of the chapters outlined above
extend the current results in the related literature.
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Chapter 2
Dependence on the Power Budget of the
System Sum-Rate of Nash Equilibria1
2.1 Introduction
With the increasing popularity of multiuser communication systems, their
optimal performance is becoming a very important issue. In wired systems,
such as Digital Subscriber Lines (DSL), and wireless systems, like ad-hoc
networks, multiple users try to communicate over a common medium caus-
ing interference to each other. In this chapter, we model these interfering
networks as Gaussian Interference Channels (IC). Clearly, an adequate man-
agement of the interference is required to avoid the degradation of the overall
system’s performance.
In a dynamic spectrum management (DSM) framework, the aforemen-
tioned problem has been addressed through power control using two ap-
proaches. First, an approach based on the maximization of the so-called
“social-function” i.e. the sum of the transmission rates of all the users across
all subchannels (hereafter and for shortness, we will refer to it as system sum-
rate) subject to individual power constraints (see, e.g., [65, 18, 19, 121]).
Unfortunately, this approach leads to a centralized planned solution, and
the resulting optimization problem is in general nonconvex and has been
shown to be NP-hard [37]. A different solution approach that overcomes
these difficulties, first proposed by Yu et al. in [120] and further analyzed
in [102, 20, 118, 68, 97, 96, 17, 54, 58, 98], is based on game theoretical
models. In this case, each network user acts as a selfish player that aims
to maximize its information rate while considering the power allocation of
the others as measurable noise; giving rise to a noncooperative (Nash) game
[76]. This approach leads directly to a distributed implementation obtained
1This chapter is adapted from a manuscript being prepared for submission (Co-author:
Jong-Shi Pang).
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via the well-known Iterative Waterfilling Algorithm (IWFA), see, e.g., [95].
However, the convergence of the IWFA to a Nash Equilibrium (NE) of the
so-called power allocation game is guaranteed only under some conditions,
see, e.g., [68, 96, 17].
Based on the centralized and distributed solution schemes for the dynamic
power allocation problem, the main objective of this chapter is to study the
dependence on the power budget of the system sum-rate obtained from the
Nash equilibrium (NE). Ideally, if the power budget in the communication
system is increased, we would expect the system sum-rate of NE to increase
as well. However, according to [67, 3, 2] and further computational results,
this is not necessarily the case. Therefore, a Braess-type paradox may occur
in the Gaussian IC. Such a paradox, introduced in [14] in the context of a
traffic model, asserts that there are situations in which, if the users in the
system act selfishly, then an increase in the power budget do not necessarily
lead to an increase in the overall system’s performance. In the same vein, if
the power budget is unbounded we would expect that the system sum-rate
of NE to approach infinity as well. Again, a numerical example in [25] and
our simulation results show that this expectation is not always realized.
Motivated by the aforementioned scenarios, in this chapter, we focus on
the situation when the users are endowed with the same power budget that
tends to infinity; the cases when the users have budgets that tend to infinity
disproportionally or when some users have bounded budgets while others do
not, can be similarly analyzed but is omitted. In particular, since the opti-
mum centralized system sum-rate must be equal to infinity in this case, we
therefore study the limit of the system sum-rate of NE as the players’ bud-
gets become unbounded. Although the power budget is a bounded resource,
we consider the unbounded case in favor of studying situations with finite
but arbitrarily large power budget, with the former limiting case being an
approximation of the latter finite case. Furthermore, our interest in studying
this topic comes from the following two interesting cases that could happen
for such a limit: (a) it is bounded, and (b) it is infinite. The consequence
of case (a) is that it does not matter how much power budget the users in
the network have, the system sum-rate of NE will always be finite; thus the
endowment of infinite power budgets for all users may not be enough to over-
come their selfishness. In case (b), both the NE-based system sum-rate and
21
the optimum centralized one will approach infinity as the power budget is
increased toward infinity.
Different approaches have been proposed in the literature to study the
efficiency of the NE in the context of interference channels. One approach
is based on the concepts of price of anarchy (PoA) [52] and price of stability
(PoS) [6], defined as ratios between the optimal centralized solution and the
worst/best NE respectively; see, e.g., [73, 71] where the case of two users
is studied. More related to the present work, the paper [73] studies the
efficiency of the NE at high Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR) for the 2-users
case with the aid of the so-called high-SNR measures i.e. via the concepts
of high-SNR slope (see, e.g., [110, 46]) and high-SNR power offset [64]. A
more recent work that also touches the efficiency of the NE is [10], where the
approach is based on a (approximately) characterization of the “NE region”
of the 2-user (Gaussian) linear-deterministic IC [15]. Deviating from these
approaches and without restricting in the number of users and subchannels,
we capitalize on the Linear Complementarity Problem (LCP) theory [21] to
draw conclusions on the efficiency of the NE under the unbounded budget
setting described above. As a side note, LCP concepts will be freely employed
in the discussion, which can be found in the cited monograph.
In order to achieve the objectives stated above, we follow the approach
outlined next. First, we formulate an optimization problem that seeks to
maximize the system sum-rate over the set of NE, which, as shown in [68],
corresponds to the set of solutions to a certain LCP. For shortness this opti-
mization problem will be denoted by MSSRNE (Maximum System Sum-Rate
over the set of Nash Equilibria). Second, to study the limiting behavior of
this problem, as the power budget increases toward infinity, we introduce an
auxiliary optimization problem that is obtained by homogenizing the LCP
constraints of the MSSRNE; which we denote by HMSSRNE. Finally, we
develop sufficient conditions for the optimum objective values of these two
problems to coincide when the power budget goes to infinity.
The approach described above gives rise to our first contribution, a frame-
work for analyzing the dependance on the (unbounded) power budget of the
NE-based system sum-rate. Capitalizing on the HMSSRNE problem, a sec-
ond contribution is the characterization of the maximum attainable system
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sum-rate of NE, and that of the NE tuple that yields an infinite system sum-
rate of NE when the power budget is unbounded. Furthermore, we develop
a (theoretical) constructive test for verifying such condition. This analysis
gives rise to some special cases that yield sharper results. A third contribu-
tion lies in one of such cases, which we call the case of equi-noisy channels,
that eliminates the presence of the Braess-type paradox in the Gaussian IC.
We also provide sufficient conditions under which the set of NE is finite.
Finally, our numerical results show that it is possible to observe an asymp-
totically finite system sum-rate of NE (for different network’s parameters) as
the system’s power budget is increased toward infinity. Thus implying that
the cooperative approach outperforms the noncooperative one even when the
power is an unlimited resource. To the best of our knowledge, this chapter
proposes a novel line of asymptotic analysis for multiuser communication
systems over Gaussian IC built upon optimization theory. In addition, this
work introduces a new way of assessing the performance of these systems
when a game-theoretical approach is employed to dynamically allocate the
spectrum.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 introduces the
system model and the MSSRNE problem. Section 2.3 presents some numerical
examples that motivated the present work. In Section 2.4 we introduce the
proposed framework for analyzing the system sum-rate of NE as the power
budget goes to infinity. In Section 2.5 we derive a necessary and sufficient
condition on the NE tuple that yields an infinite system sum-rate for the
unbounded power budget case. Section 2.6 introduces some special cases and
Section 2.7 contrasts our findings with some numerical simulations. Finally,
Section 2.8 draws some conclusions and presents future research topics.
2.2 System Model and Problem Formulation
In this section, we describe the system model including the underlying as-
sumptions and notation to be used throughout this chapter. In Subsec-
tion 2.2.2, we formulate the problem to be analyzed in detail during the
discussion.
23
2.2.1 System model
We consider a Q-user N -parallel Gaussian interference channel. In this sys-
tem model, each user q = 1, . . . , Q is a single transmitter-receiver pair, where
each transmitter aims to communicate with its corresponding receiver over
the shared spectrum composed of the subchannels k = 1, . . . , N . Under basic
information theoretical assumptions and invoking the capacity expression for
the single user Gaussian channel (achievable using random Gaussian codes
from all the users), the maximum information rate on link q for a specific
power allocation profile is given by [22]
Rq(pq,p−q) ,
N∑
k=1
log
1 + |hqq(k)|2 pq(k)
N2q (k) +
∑
r 6=q
|hrq(k)|2pr(k)
 , (2.1)
where |hrq(k)|2 is the power gain of the channel between transmitter r and
receiver q over subchannel k; N2q (k) is the variance of the thermal noise over
subchannel k at receiver q; the vector pq , (pq(k))Nk=1 represents the power
allocation strategy of user q across all subchannels, and the vector p−q ,
(pr)r 6=q stands for the power allocation strategies of the rest of users in the
network. By lettingHrq(k) , |hrq(k)|2/|hqq(k)|2 and σ2q (k) , N2q (k)/|hqq(k)|2
for all q, r = 1, . . . , Q and all k = 1, . . . , N , (2.1) can be rewritten as follows
Rq(pq,p−q) =
N∑
k=1
log
 1 + pq(k)
σ2q (k) +
∑
r 6=q
Hrq(k) pr(k)
 . (2.2)
For the sake of simplicity, throughout the rest of the discussion, we will use
the normalized form of Rq(pq,p−q) given in (2.2).
2.2.2 Problem Formulation
Before introducing the main problem that will be studied in the subsequent
analysis, we briefly revisit the two basic approaches that have been pro-
posed in the literature to address the dynamic power allocation problem in a
communication system where users share a common spectrum; namely, the
centralized and decentralized solution schemes.
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- Centralized Approach: it consists in optimizing the system’s utility
function i.e. the sum of the information rate of every user across all
subchannels (system sum-rate) subject to individual power constraints
(see, e.g., [65, 18, 19, 121, 37]). Assuming each user q has a fixed power
budget B > 0 (and possibly some mask constraints), the sum-rate
maximization problem is given by
Rsysσ (B) , maximum
(pq)
Q
q=1≥0
Q∑
q=1
Rq(pq,p−q)
subject to
N∑
k=1
pq(k) ≤ B ∀ q = 1, . . . , Q.
(2.3)
Remark 2.1 (On the System Problem (2.3)). It is worth stressing
that Rsysσ (B) denotes the optimal objective value of the single mul-
tiuser optimization problem (2.3) for a power budget B (where the
dependance is made explicit) and for any tuple of noise variances σ ,(
σq ,
(
σ2q (k)
)N
k=1
)Q
q=1
. Hence, we refer to Rsysσ (B) as the centralized
maximum system sum-rate. Additionally, it is not difficult to show
that lim
B→∞
Rsysσ (B) = ∞ for any tuple σ. Hence, under the central-
ized regime, the maximum system sum-rate must be unbounded as
the users’ power budgets tend to infinity. In this “centralized regime”,
different approaches have been proposed in the literature to compute
stationary solutions of the nonconvex problem (2.3) in a distributed
way with some signaling among the users, see, e.g., [94] for a recent
work.
- Decentralized Approach: it is based on noncooperative game theory
(see, e.g., [120, 102, 20, 118, 68, 97, 96, 17, 54, 58, 98]). In this approach,
each user maximizes its own information rate by considering the power
allocation of the rival users as measurable Gaussian noise; thus, leading
directly to a distributed implementation where only local channel state
information is required by each user. More precisely, assuming each
user q has a given power budget B > 0 (and possibly some mask
constraints), the objective of user q is to maximize its information rate
Rq(pq,p−q); i.e. anticipating p−q each user q = 1, . . . , Q aims to solve
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the convex optimization problem
maximize
pq≥0
Rq(pq,p−q)
subject to
N∑
k=1
pq(k) ≤ B.
(2.4)
Remark 2.2 (Equivalent LCP Formulation). In [68, Prop. 1], the
authors established an equivalent LCP formulation for the noncooper-
ative (Nash) game where each user q solves (2.4). We remark that in the
cited proposition each player’s problem includes mask constraints, how-
ever the aforementioned result follows readily by setting those masks
equal to infinity. Let λq be the Lagrange multiplier corresponding
to the linear constraint in (2.4). Then, based on the Karush-Kuhn-
Tucker (KKT) optimality conditions for each user’s optimization prob-
lem (2.4), the equivalent LCP formulation of the mentioned game is
given by
LCP(b,M):

∀ q = 1, . . . , Q and ∀ k = 1, . . . , N
0 ≤ σ2q (k) +
Q∑
r=1
Hrq(k)pr(k)− λq ⊥ pq(k) ≥ 0
0 ≤ −B +
N∑
k=1
pq(k) ⊥ λq ≥ 0.
(2.5)
In (2.5) the complementarity notation 0 ≤ a ⊥ b ≥ 0 for scalars (or
vectors) a and b means a · b = 0, a ≥ 0 and b ≥ 0. For shortness, the
LCP in (2.5) will be denoted by the pair (b,M):
0 ≤ z ⊥ M z + b ≥ 0 (2.6)
where
z ,
 p , ( pq)Qq=1
λ , (λq )Qq=1
 ∈ RN
b ,
(
σ
−B 1Q
)
∈ RN, (2.7)
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and the matrix M ∈ RN×N is given by
M ,

IN Diag(H12) · · · Diag(H1Q)−1N
Diag(H21) IN · · · Diag(H2Q) −1N
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
Diag(HQ1)Diag(HQ2)· · · IN −1N
1TN
1TN
. . .
1TN

, (2.8)
where IN is the identity matrix of order N , 1N is the N -dimensional
vector of all ones, Hqr , (Hrq(k))Nk=1 for q 6= r, Diag(Hqr) is the
diagonal matrix whose entries are the components of Hqr, and the
dimension N , NQ+Q.
To conclude this section, we introduce an optimization problem that is the
cornerstone of the analysis to be developed in the following sections. Namely,
for a given power budget B > 0 and a tuple σ of noise variances, we define
the following optimization problem
MSSRNE :

RNEσ (B) , maximum
pq(k),λq
Q∑
q=1
Rq(pq,p−q)
subject to ∀ q = 1, . . . , Q and ∀ k = 1, . . . , N :
0 ≤ σ2q (k) +
Q∑
r=1
Hrq(k)pr(k)− λq ⊥ pq(k) ≥ 0
0 ≤ −B +
N∑
k=1
pq(k) ⊥ λq ≥ 0.
(2.9)
Notice that the constraints of the maximization problem above correspond
to the LCP(b,M). Since the solutions of the LCP(b,M) correspond to the
Nash equilibria set of the game whose q-th player optimization problem is
(2.4), the problem (2.9) is thus to seek a NE that maximizes the system
sum-rate. Thus, we refer to RNEσ (B) as the maximum system sum-rate of
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NE. Notice that, the dependence of the system sum-rate on the power bud-
get B is made explicit by defining the function RNEσ (B). The superscript
NE is attached to RNEσ (B) to distinguish it from the centralized maximum
system sum-rate Rsysσ (B) [cf. (2.3)]. Subsequently, we will be interested in
a homogenized version of (2.9) where the noise variances σ2q (k) are set equal
to zero for all q = 1, . . . , Q and all k = 1, . . . , N ; thus we also attach the
subscript σ in RNEσ (B) to denote the role of σ in the problem (2.9).
Remark 2.3 (About the MSSRNE). The MSSRNE problem belongs to the
class of MPCC - Mathematical Programs with Linear Complementarity Con-
straints [66], that has been studied extensively in the mathematical program-
ming literature. In this work, we are concerned mainly with a qualitative
property of the MSSRNE, namely, whether its optimum objective value will
be unbounded as the users’ power budgets tend to infinity. It is important
to mention that, in the case of a monotone game, i.e., when the resulting
LCP(b,M) is of the positive semidefinite type, the distributed algorithm
developed in [30] can be applied to compute a stationary solution, albeit
not necessarily a globally optimal solution of the MSSRNE. Details of these
algorithmic issues for solving (2.9) are outside the scope of this study.
2.3 Motivating Examples
In this section, we introduce two numerical examples that motivated most
of the analysis that is presented in the forthcoming sections. For the sake of
clarity, we use these examples to introduce and illustrate the main questions
that this chapter aims to answer.
Motivating Example 2.1. This numerical example, due to Z.Q. Luo in
[67], considers the power allocation game where each user solves (2.4) for a
system composed of Q = 2 users and N = 2 subchannels, with channel gain
coefficients H12(k) = H21(k) = 1, and noise variances σ
2
1(k) = σ
2
2(k) = 1 for
k = 1, 2. The relevance of this example is summarized in Table 2.1, from
which it can be observed that when the power budget is increased, then the
system sum-rate of NE decreases; thus showing the presence of the Braess-
type paradox in the IC. The key point lies in the choice of the (non-unique)
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NE tuple. In the first situation, the author chooses an orthogonal power
allocation profile; while, in the second case, the sum-rate decreases when a
uniform power allocation is used.
Table 2.1: The Braess-type paradox is present in the system described in Motivating Example 2.1.
Power Budget NE tuple (p1,p2) System Sum-Rate of NE (b/cu)
B = 1.5 p1 = (1.5, 0), p2 = (0, 1.5) 2.64
B = 2 p1 = (1, 1), p2 = (1, 1) 2.34
Based on the previous observations, a natural question to ask is: if among
the NE tuples in the power allocation game, we consider only those that
maximize the system sum-rate, is there any particular case that rules out the
presence of the Braess-type paradox in the IC? The answer to this question
is positive and it is analyzed in detail in Subsection 2.6.2, where we introduce
the case of equi-noisy channels that eliminates the presence of such a paradox
in this class of games.
Motivating Example 2.2. Lets examine a system composed of Q = 2 users
and N = 10 subchannels under two different sets of channel realizations:
(a) Consider the flat-fading example introduced in [25], where the channel
gain coefficients are H12(k) = H21(k) = 1/4, and the noise variances
are σ21(k) = σ
2
2(k) = 1 for k = 1, . . . , N . It is not difficult to show
that the unique NE for the power allocation game (2.4) corresponds
to the uniform power profile pq(k) =
B
N
for all q = 1, . . . , Q and all
k = 1, . . . , N . The authors of [25] observed that as B → ∞, the
transmission rates for each user q = 1, 2 approach N log2(5), thus, the
system sum-rate of NE approaches 2N log2(5).
(b) In contrast with the previous case, consider a more general setting
with noise variances σ21(k) = σ
2
2(k) = 0.5 for k = 1, . . . , N and channels
simulated as in Section 2.7 - Example 2.3 with path loss exponent γ = 2
and normalized interlink distance drq/dqq = 3.
The numerical results for both settings are summarized in Figure 2.1;
where, by increasing the power budget B (for all users) from -10dBm to
60dBm, we can distinguish two cases. As noted in [25], Figure 2.1(a) shows
that RNEσ (B) exhibits a finite asymptotic behavior i.e. there is a point from
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which increasing the power budget does not translate in any performance
improvement. On the contrary, Figure 2.1(b) illustrates that as the power
budget is increased so does RNEσ (B). It is important to emphasize that, in-
cidentally, the behaviors illustrated in this example were observed in many
numerical simulations neither restricted to the flat-fading case, nor to number
of users and subchannels (see, Section 2.7).
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Figure 2.1: Maximum system sum-rate of NE (RNEσ (B)) versus power budget (B) in a system composed
of Q = 2 users and N = 10 subchannels for two different sets of channel realizations (a) and (b) described
in Motivating Example 2.2.
The relevance of the two cases depicted in the previous example lies in
the following implications on the efficiency of the NE. The first case (in
Figure 2.1(a)) suggests that RNEσ (B) < ∞ as B → ∞, in other words, the
unboundedness of the power budget is not enough to compensate for the
selfishness of the players in the game. The second case (in Figure 2.1(b))
suggests that RNEσ (B) goes to infinity as B → ∞, just as Rsysσ (B) (in the
centralized approach) does (refer to, Remark 2.1).
This second example gives rise to the main questions that this chapter
aims to answer. In particular: what happens to the system sum-rate of NE
as the power budget is increased toward infinity? Can we characterize the
behaviors observed in the previous numerical example? Consequently, these
questions suggest the study of the limit lim
B→∞
RNEσ (B); which is introduced in
Section 2.4 and is studied along this chapter. More specifically, as the power
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budget goes to infinity, can we compute the finite asymptotic value of the
maximum system sum-rate of NE? can we characterize the NE that yields
an infinite system sum-rate of NE? Finally, can we draw some conclusions on
the efficiency of the noncooperative approach for solving the power allocation
problem? Indeed, in the following sections, we provide answers to each of
the aforementioned questions.
2.4 Modeling of the System when it is Endowed with
Unbounded Power Budgets
In order to answer the questions stated in the previous section we start by
describing the general approach that we will follow, this consists basically of
the two logical steps outlined next.
- An auxiliary problem: We start the analysis with the introduction of
a homogenized version of the MSSRNE optimization problem defined
in (2.9), which we term HMSSRNE. The latter problem models the
limiting behavior of the former one as the budget B goes to infinity.
The details of this step are given in Subsection 2.4.1.
- Relation between the MSSRNE and HMSSRNE problems : In Subsec-
tion 2.4.2 we present a proposition that summarizes the connections
between the MSSRNE and its homogenized version. This relation is
further explored along this chapter.
For the sake of clarity, in Figure 2.2 we illustrate the progression of our
presentation, highlighting the main questions to be answered during the dis-
cussion along with the principal results.
2.4.1 An Auxiliary Problem
To construct the HMSSRNE problem, we start by rewriting the objective
function of the optimization problem (2.9) in such a way that it depends
explicitly not only on the power allocation pq(k) but also on the Lagrange
multipliers λq. To do so, we begin by using the well-known fact that every
feasible solution to (2.9) must satisfy λq > 0 and therefore B =
N∑
k=1
pq(k)
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Figure 2.2: General overview of the chapter.
for all q = 1, . . . , Q i.e. at equilibrium, all users must exhaust their power
budget (see, e.g., [68]). Second, we apply the following simple result.
Proposition 2.1. For every pair (q, k), q = 1, . . . , Q and k = 1, . . . , N it
holds that
log
1 + pq(k)
σ2q (k) +
∑
r 6=q
Hrq(k) pr(k)
 = log λq − log (λq − pq(k)) , (2.10)
for all pairs (p,λ) feasible to the problem (2.9).
Proof. Notice that the identity (2.10) obviously holds if pq(k) = 0. If pq(k) >
0, then by complementarity we have:
σ2q (k) +
Q∑
r=1
Hrq(k) pr(k) = λq,
establishing (2.10) for all (q, k).
Therefore, using the two observations above, we can write the MSSRNE in
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(2.9) equivalently as:
MSSRNE :

RNEσ (B) , maximum
pq(k),λq
Q∑
q=1
N∑
k=1
[ log λq − log (λq − pq(k)) ]
subject to LCP(b,M) [cf. (2.5)].
(2.11)
Finally, we are ready to introduce the homogenization of the LCP(b,M)
[cf. (2.5)] obtained by setting the power budget of all users equal to unity,
and σ2q (k) = 0 for all q = 1, . . . , Q and all k = 1, . . . , N . Thus, the HMSSRNE
problem is defined by
HMSSRNE :

RNE(∞) , maximum
p∞q (k),λ∞q
Q∑
q=1
N∑
k=1
[
log λ∞q − log
(
λ∞q − p∞q (k)
)]
subject to ∀ q = 1, . . . , Q and ∀ k = 1, . . . , N :
0 ≤
Q∑
r=1
Hrq(k) p
∞
r (k)− λ∞q ⊥ p∞q (k) ≥ 0
0 ≤ −1 +
N∑
k=1
p∞q (k) ⊥ λ∞q ≥ 0.
(2.12)
Again, the constraints in the HMSSRNE correspond to a linear complemen-
tarity problem LCP(b0,M), where the matrix M remains unchanged as in
(2.8), and the particular constant vector has the form
b0 ,
 0NQ
−1Q
 ∈ RN, (2.13)
where 0NQ is the NQ-dimensional zero vector. It is important to highlight
that, intuitively, the LCP(b0,M) is obtained from the LCP(b,M) by nor-
malizing it by the power budget B and taking the limit as B → ∞. As a
result, the HMSSRNE is suitable to study the MSSRNE in the limit as the
power budget increases without bound.
2.4.2 Relation Between the MSSRNE and HMSSRNE problems
At this point in the discussion, a natural question to ask is: what is the
relation between the MSSRNE problem in (2.11) and its homogenized version
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(HMSSRNE) introduced in (2.12)? The following proposition gives a first
insight into the answer of this question.
Proposition 2.2. For any σ > 0, it holds that lim sup
B→∞
RNEσ (B) ≤ RNE(∞) ∈
[ 0,∞ ]. Moreover, if (2.12) has a unique feasible solution, then lim
B→∞
RNEσ (B) =
RNE(∞).
Proof. Let {Bν} ↑ ∞ be an arbitrary sequence of unbounded budgets. For
each ν, let (pν ,λν), where pν ,
(
(pνq (k))
N
k=1
)Q
q=1
and λν ,
(
λνq
)Q
q=1
, be an
optimal pair to (2.11). The normalized sequences
{
pνq (k)/B
ν
}
and
{
λνq/B
ν
}
are clearly bounded. By working with an appropriate subsequence, we may
assume without loss of generality that, for every pair (q, k),
lim
ν→∞
pνq (k)
Bν
= p∞q (k) and lim
ν→∞
λνq
Bν
= λ∞q .
The pair (p∞,λ∞), where p∞ ,
(
(p∞q (k))
N
k=1
)Q
q=1
and λ∞ ,
(
λ∞q
)Q
q=1
, is eas-
ily seen to be feasible to (2.12). It follows that lim sup
ν→∞
RNEσ (Bν) ≤ RNE(∞).
The second claim of the proposition follows readily from the above proof.
Notice that Proposition 2.2 relates the optimal objective values of the prob-
lems MSSRNE and HMSSRNE via the limit (superior) as the power budget B
is increased toward infinity. Thus, to characterize the limiting behavior of the
maximum system sum-rate of NE i.e. RNEσ (B) as B →∞, we can simply fo-
cus on the optimal objective value of the homogenized problem. Nevertheless,
the aforementioned proposition guarantees that the optimal objective values
of the MSSRNE as B goes to infinity coincides with that of the HMSSRNE,
whenever the set of NE of the homogenized problem is a singleton. Sufficient
conditions ensuring the uniqueness of the NE for the competitive power allo-
cation game have been derived in the literature; see e.g., [68, 97]. Here it is
important to highlight that the uniqueness conditions in the cited references
readily apply to the homogenized power allocation game (characterized by
the LCP(b0,M)), since they are independent of the noise variances σ and
the power budget B. Moreover, those conditions are also sufficient for the
convergence of the IWFA to the unique NE of the power allocation game.
An immediate consequence of Proposition 2.2 is the following corollary
that does not require a proof.
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Corollary 2.1. lim
B→∞
RNEσ (B) = ∞ if and only if two conditions hold: (a)
lim
B→∞
RNEσ (B) = R
NE(∞) and (b) RNE(∞) =∞.
In the rest of this chapter, we investigate conditions (a) and (b) separately.
In particular, condition (b) is examined in Section 2.5, and in Section 2.6 we
provide two more sufficient conditions for (a) to hold.
2.5 Characterizing the Condition RNE(∞) =∞
We begin this section by providing the next result that characterizes the
condition RNE(∞) = ∞ in terms of the existence of a NE tuple with a
particular form satisfying the constraints of the HMSSRNE problem. This
result is based on the fact that, similar to (2.11), for every pair (p∞,λ∞)
feasible to (2.12), we must have λ∞q > 0, and thus
N∑
k=1
p∞q (k) = 1 for all
q = 1, . . . , Q. As a result, each summand
[
log λ∞q − log
(
λ∞q − p∞q (k)
)]
in
the objective of RNE(∞) either takes on a finite nonnegative value or equals
to +∞, the latter occurring if and only if λ∞q = p∞q (k) > 0 for at least one
pair (q, k). This observation yields the following proposition which provides
a necessary and sufficient condition for the system sum-rate over the set of
NE to reach infinity in the HMSSRNE problem.
Proposition 2.3. RNE(∞) =∞ if and only if there exists a pair (p∞,λ∞)
feasible to (2.12) with at least one pair (q, k) satisfying
λ∞q = p
∞
q (k) > 0 = p
∞
r (k) for all r 6= q.
Proof. The “if” part is obvious. For the “only if” statement, suppose that
RNE(∞) =∞, thus, there must exist a feasible (hence optimal) pair (p∞,λ∞)
to (2.12) and a pair (q, k) such that λ∞q = p
∞
q (k) > 0. Consequently, by
complementarity
0 =
∑
r 6=q
Hrq(k) p
∞
r (k) ⇒ p∞r (k) = 0 for all r 6= q.
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Proposition 2.3 implies that if lim
B→∞
RNEσ (B) = R
NE(∞), for example, when
(2.12) has a unique feasible solution as stated in Proposition 2.2, equivalently,
when the homogenized game has a unique NE (refer to Section 2.6 for more
sufficient conditions). Then, when the power budget in the system increases
toward infinity, the maximum system sum-rate of NE will also approach
infinity if and only if there exists a user-subchannel pair such that this user
allocates power “exclusively” over the corresponding subchannel (i.e. an
interference free subchannel) in the homogenized game, which is independent
of the tuple σ. It is important to mention that, even though the case of
unbounded budgets is not directly considered in these references, the authors
of [92] and [73] observed that higher system sum-rates at the NE are achieved
when the users are limited to allocate power in an “exclusive” subchannel.
This was observed for the case of two users and two subchannels. Notice
that this agrees with our general result given in Proposition 2.3, for the case
of unbounded power budgets.
Remark 2.4 (On the flat-fading channels case). A case that is worth ex-
ploring is that of flat-fading channels [25] i.e. Hrq(k) = Hrq for all k and
all r 6= q, and white noise. When the flat-channel coefficients Hrq are suf-
ficiently small, the uniform power allocation (that is, pq(k) = pq(k
′) for all
k and k ′ and all q) happens to be the unique Nash equilibrium of the ho-
mogenized game (see, [25, Thm. 4]). Then, according to Props. 2.2 and 2.3
we must have lim
B→∞
RNEσ (B) = R
NE(∞) < ∞, i.e. the maximum attainable
system sum-rate of NE is finite even in the presence of unbounded power
budgets. Furthermore, this implies that we have an asymptotic infinite price
of stability, i.e. lim
B→∞
PoS(B) = ∞ where PoS(B) , Rsysσ (B)
RNEσ (B)
. In other words,
as the power budget increases toward infinity, the noncooperative solution
is “infinitely” worse than the one obtained from the cooperative approach.
Note that in this case, the price of stability and the price of anarchy coin-
cide (i.e. PoS(B) = PoA(B)) due to the uniqueness of the NE. This shows
the inefficiency of the NE for the particular case of flat-fading channels even
when the system’s power budget is unbounded. This result is in accordance
with [25] that observed the previously described phenomenon in a numerical
example for the simpler case of two users (refer to Section 2.3 - Motivating
Example 2.2).
In the remaining of this section, we develop a test for verifying the condi-
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tion RNE(∞) =∞ based on the the results of Proposition 2.3.
2.5.1 Checking the Condition RNE(∞) =∞
This section addresses the question of how to check the condition RNE(∞) =
∞ for any particular instance of the HMSSRNE problem in (2.12). We recall
that the HMSSRNE is a MPCC whose solvability is, in general, not a trivial
task (refer to Remark 2.3). In the intents of verifying such condition, we
develop a (theoretical) constructive test via the solution of LCPs. For each
pair (q, k), we define the LCP( b̂ q,k0 , M̂
q,k ):
0 ≤ ẑ q,k ⊥ M̂q,k ẑq,k + b̂ q,k0 ≥ 0
by carrying out the following 3 steps:
(1) Set λ∞q = p
∞
q (k) = 1−
∑
`6=k
p∞q (`) and substitute λ
∞
q into the expression:
Q∑
r=1
Hrq(`) p
∞
r (`)− λ∞q for ` 6= k, obtaining
Q∑
r=1
Hrq(`) p
∞
r (`)− λ∞q = 2p∞q (`) +
∑
` ′ 6=k
p∞q (`
′) +
∑
r 6=q
Hrq(`) p
∞
r (`)− 1.
(2) Set p∞r (k) = 0 for all r 6= q.
(3) Remove, for all r 6= q, the constraints:
0 ≤
Q∑
s=1
Hsr(k) p
∞
s (k)− λ∞r = Hqr(k) p∞q (k)− λ∞r
= Hqr(k)
(
1−
∑
`6=k
p∞q (`)
)
− λ∞r .
The variable ẑ q,k in the LCP( b̂ q,k0 , M̂
q,k ) has dimension N̂ , N−(Q+1) =
NQ− 1 and has components:
p̂ ,
(
p̂r , ( p∞r (`))` 6=k
)Q
r=1
∈ RQ(N−1) and
λ̂ , (λ∞r )r 6=q ∈ RQ−1.
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The matrix M̂ q,k and vector b̂ q,k0 are similarly structured as M and b0 [cf.
(2.8) and (2.13)] respectively, except for the block corresponding to player q.
For the sake of clarity, we illustrate the matrix M̂ q,k and the vector b̂ q,k for
the particular case (q, k) = (1, 1) as follows:
M̂ 1,1 ,

A Diag(Ĥ 112) · · · Diag(Ĥ 11Q)
Diag(Ĥ 121) IN−1 · · · Diag(Ĥ 12Q)−1N−1
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
Diag(Ĥ 1Q1) Diag(Ĥ
1
Q2) · · · IN−1 −1N−1
1TN−1
. . .
1TN−1

where M̂ 1,1 ∈ RN̂×N̂, Ĥ ksr , (Hrs(`))` 6=k for s 6= r, and A is the special
symmetric positive definite matrix
A , IN−1 + 1N−11TN−1 =

2 1 1 · · · 1
1 2 1 · · · 1
...
. . .
...
1 · · · 1 2 1
1 · · · 1 1 2

∈ R(N−1)×(N−1);
and
b̂ 1,10 ,


−1N−1
0N−1
...
0N−1

Q blocks
−1Q−1

∈ RN̂.
The following result connects the LCP(b0,M) and the so-constructed
LCP(b̂ q,k0 , M̂
q,k).
Proposition 2.4. For a given user-subchannel pair (q, k), if the tuple z is a
solution of the LCP(b0,M) such that p
∞
r (k) = 0 for all r 6= q, then
(a) λ∞r ≤ Hqr(k)
(
1−
∑
` 6=k
p∞q (`)
)
for all r 6= q; and
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(b) the tuple ẑ q,k is a solution of the LCP(b̂ q,k0 , M̂
q,k).
Conversely, if the tuple ẑ q,k is a solution of the LCP(b̂ q,k0 , M̂
q,k) satisfying
condition (a), then by letting p∞r (k) , 0 for all r 6= q and p∞q (k) = λ∞q ,
1−
∑
6`=k
p∞q (`), the tuple z is a solution of the LCP(b0,M).
Proof. Suppose that z is a solution of the LCP(b0,M) such that p
∞
r (k) = 0
for all r 6= q. We have, for any r 6= q,
λ∞r ≤
Q∑
s=1
Hsr(k) p
∞
s (k) = Hqr(k) p
∞
q (k) = Hqr(k)
(
1−
∑
`6=k
p∞q (`)
)
,
which establishes the first assertion of the proposition. Conversely, suppose
that ẑ q,k is a solution of the LCP(b̂ q,k0 , M̂
q,k) satisfying condition (a). To
establish the second assertion of the proposition, it suffices to show that∑
6`=k
p∞q (`) < 1. Assume the contrary, i.e
∑
` 6=k
p∞q (`) ≥ 1, but this contradicts
the complementarity condition
0 ≤ p∞q (`) ⊥ 2p∞q (`) +
∑
` ′ 6=k
p∞q (`
′) +
∑
r 6=q
Hrq(`) p
∞
r (`)− 1 ≥ 0,
which holds for all ` 6= k.
Finally, combining the results in Props. 2.3 and 2.4, we immediately de-
duce the following corollary that provides a constructive way to ascertain
the condition RNE(∞) =∞. Note also that this result leads us to verify the
condition lim
B→∞
RNEσ (B) = ∞, provided that there is no “gap” between this
limit and RNE(∞) as required by Corollary 2.1.
Corollary 2.2. RNE(∞) = ∞ if and only if there exists a pair (q, k) and
a solution ẑ q,k of the LCP(b̂ q,k0 , M̂
q,k) satisfying condition (a) of Proposi-
tion 2.4.
Based on the previous result, we summarize the test for checking the con-
dition RNE(∞) =∞ as follows.
Theoretical Constructive Test of the Condition RNE(∞) = ∞. For
each pair (q, k), solve the LCP(b̂ q,k0 , M̂
q,k) by any (distributed) algorithm
and check if the obtained solution satisfies condition (a) of Proposition 2.4.
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If affirmative, then RNE(∞) = ∞. If no solution of the LCP(b̂ q,k0 , M̂ q,k)
satisfies condition (a) of Proposition 2.4, then RNE(∞) <∞.
Notice that, under conditions for the convergence of the well-known IWFA,
the test above can be carried out in a distributed manner, by solving possibly
many LCPs of the kind (b̂ q,k0 , M̂
q,k), each of which corresponds to a certain
competitive power allocation game.
To conclude this section, we turn our attention to the particular case of
two users. Interestingly, in this simpler case, the condition RNE(∞) < ∞
can be checked by verifying the feasibility of a homogeneous system of linear
inequalities, as opposed to solving LCPs as described above for the general
case. The following proposition summarizes this result.
Proposition 2.5. Let Q = 2 and N be arbitrary. Consider the following
four statements:
(a) RNE(∞) <∞;
(b) for all solutions z∞ of the LCP(b0,M), p∞q (k) > 0 for all q = 1, 2 and
k = 1, . . . , N ;
(c) the LCP(b0,M) has a solution with p
∞
q (k) > 0 for all q = 1, 2 and
k = 1, . . . , N ;
(d) the homogenous equation M z∞ + b0 τ = 0 has a solution (τ, z∞) > 0.
It holds that (a) ⇔ (b) ⇒ (c) ⇒ (d), and (d) ⇒ (a) if the LCP(b0,M) has
a unique solution.
Proof. (a) ⇔ (b). By way of contradiction, suppose (b) is false, then there
exists a solution (p∞,λ∞) to (2.12) and a pair (q, k), say q = 2, such that
p∞2 (k) = 0. Therefore p
∞
1 (k) − λ∞1 ≥ 0, which implies p∞1 (k) ≥ λ∞1 > 0.
Hence, by complementarity, p∞1 (k) = λ
∞
1 . By Proposition 2.3, it follows that
RNE(∞) = ∞. Thus (a) ⇒ (b). Conversely, if (b) holds, then (a) holds by
Proposition 2.3.
(b) ⇒ (c). This is clear.
(c)⇒ (d). Under (c), it holds that the equation Mz∞+b = 0 has a solution
with z∞ > 0.
(d) ⇒ (a). This is also clear under the uniqueness assumption.
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Contrasting with Proposition 2.3, the significance of this last proposi-
tion lies in part (d) which offers a very simple way to verify the condition
RNE(∞) <∞ (via linear programming) under a uniqueness condition.
2.6 Two Special Cases
Proposition 2.2 provides a sufficient condition for lim
B→∞
RNEσ (B) = R
NE(∞),
which corresponds to the uniqueness of the NE. In this section, we derive two
more sufficient conditions under which equality holds between the optimal
objective value of the HMSSRNE problem and that of the MSSRNE as the
budget B grows toward infinity.
2.6.1 The Case of Finitely Many Nash Equilibria
Generalizing the case of a unique NE, we provide another sufficient condition
for lim
B→∞
RNEσ (B) = R
NE(∞); this condition also implies that the LCP(b,M)
[cf. (2.5)] admits only finitely many feasible solutions for all model inputs.
Such finiteness of the NE set coupled with a strict complementarity assump-
tion of the solutions of the homogenized LCP(b0,M) [cf. (2.8) and (2.13)]
provides the desired result. Before formally stating the main result, we in-
troduce some useful definitions and notation.
- We recall that a solution z of the LCP (2.6) is strictly complementary
if z + b + Mz > 0.
- A real square matrix is said to be nondegenerate if all its principal
submatrices are nonsingular. Notice that, the matrix M in (2.8) is
not nondegenerate because the lower right block (which is a principal
submatrix of M) is composed of only zero elements.
- A(k) ∈ RQ×Q denotes the matrix of channel gains organized by sub-
channels i.e. A(k) , [Hqr(k)]Qq,r=1 for all k = 1, . . . , N .
- A(k)αα ∈ R|α|×|α| denotes the principal submatrix of A(k) indexed by
α, where α ⊆ {1, . . . , Q}.
-
(
Â(k)
)
αα
∈ R|α|×|α| denotes the matrix inverse of A(k)αα, whenever
the latter is invertible.
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- A(k;α) ∈ RQ×Q denotes the matrix obtained by expanding the matrix(
Â(k)
)
αα
of order |α| into a Q×Q matrix by filling in with zeros those
entries whose indices are not in α.
- By convention, A(k)αα is the null matrix if α = ∅, and the correspond-
ing A(k;α) is the zero matrix.
Taking in consideration the concepts outlined above, we are now ready to
present the main result of this subsection.
Proposition 2.6. Under the following two assumptions:
(a) every solution of the LCP(b0,M) [cf. (2.8) and (2.13)] is strictly com-
plementary; and,
(b) for every k = 1, . . . , N the matrix A(k) is nondegenerate and the matrix
N∑
k=1
A(k;αk) is nonsingular for any αk ⊆ {1, . . . , Q} such that
N⋃
k=1
αk =
{1, . . . , Q},
it holds that lim
B→∞
RNEσ (B) = R
NE(∞). Moreover, condition (b) implies that
the problem in (2.11) has only finitely many feasible solutions for all tuples
σ and power budget B.
Proof. For the sake of clarity, we divide the proof in two parts.
- First, we show that under condition (b) the LCP(b,M) [cf. (2.5)] has
only finitely many feasible solutions. For this purpose, we consider a
principal rearrangement of the matrix M and we rewrite it in the form
M =

A(1) −IQ
A(2) −IQ
. . .
...
A(N) −IQ
IQ IQ · · · IQ

,
where IQ denotes the identity matrix of order Q. We are interested in
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principal submatrices of M, denoted by S(0), that are structured as
S(0) ,

A(1)α1α1 − (IQ)α1•
A(2)α2α2 − (IQ)α2•
. . .
...
A(N)αNαN − (IQ)αN•
(IQ)•α1 (IQ)•α2 · · · (IQ)•αN

,
where for each k = 1, . . . , N , αk is a subset of {1, . . . , Q} such that
N⋃
k=1
αk = {1, . . . , Q}, and where (IQ)•αk and (IQ)αk• are the submatrices
of the identity matrix IQ consisting of columns and rows indexed by
αk, respectively. We may write the matrix S
(0) as
S(0) =
[
A(1)α1α1 S
(0)
12
S
(0)
21 S
(0)
22
]
where
S
(0)
12 ,
[
− (IQ)α1•
]
,
S
(0)
21 ,

(IQ)•α1
 ,
S
(0)
22 ,

A(2)α2α2 − (IQ)α2•
. . .
...
A(N)αNαN − (IQ)αN•
(IQ)•α2 · · · (IQ)•αN
 .
Since S
(0)
11 , A(1)α1α1 is nonsingular by assumption, the Schur-complement
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of S
(0)
11 in S
(0) is given by
S(1) = S
(0)
22 − S(0)21
(
S
(0)
11
)−1
S
(0)
12
=

A(2)α2α2 − (IQ)α2•
. . .
...
A(N)αNαN − (IQ)αN•
(IQ)•α2 · · · (IQ)•αN (IQ)•α1 (A(1)α1α1)
−1 (IQ)α1•

=
[
A(2)α2α2 S
(1)
12
S
(1)
21 S
(1)
22
]
.
Using the definitions given at the beginning of Subsection 2.6.1, it is
clear that the right-bottom element in the matrix above can be rewrit-
ten simply as
S
(1)
22 = (IQ)•α1 (A(1)α1α1)
−1 (IQ)α1•
= (IQ)•α1
(
Â(1)
)
α1α1
(IQ)α1•
= A(1;α1) .
By the well-known Schur determinantal formula, it follows that S(0) is
nonsingular if and only if S(1) is nonsingular. Making a similar partition
as before and noting that S
(1)
11 , A(2)α2α2 is nonsingular, we have that
the Schur-complement of S
(1)
11 in S
(1) is given by
S(2) = S
(1)
22 − S(1)21
(
S
(1)
11
)−1
S
(1)
12
=

A(3)α3α3 − (IQ)α3•
. . .
...
A(N)αNαN − (IQ)αN•
(IQ)•α2 · · · (IQ)•αN A(1;α1) +A(2;α2)
 .
By the same argument, S(1) is nonsingular if and only if S(2) is non-
singular. Continuing this block pivoting procedure up to the N -th
block, we deduce that S(0) is nonsingular if and only if the following
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Schur-complement
S(N) = S
(N−1)
22 − S(N−1)21
(
S
(N−1)
11
)−1
S
(N−1)
12
=
N∑
k=1
A(k;αk)
is nonsingular, which is so by assumption. Therefore, any submatrix
of M of the type S(0) is nonsingular.
For any solution z of the LCP(b,M), there must exist a principal
submatrix of M of the type S(0) such that the positive components
of z must satisfy a square system of linear equations defined by S(0).
Since the latter matrix is nonsingular and there are only finitely many
principal submatrices of M of this type, it follows that the LCP(b,M)
has only finitely many solutions. Purely a consequence of assumption
(b), this finiteness result does not depend on the vector b.
- Second, we show that under conditions (a) and (b) it must hold that
RNE(∞) = lim
B→∞
RNEσ (B). The proof is based on the construction
of a solution for the LCP(b,M) from any optimal solution of the
HMSSRNE problem (whose objective value is possibly equal to ∞).
Let z∞ ,
(
p∞
λ∞
)
∈ RN be any such optimal solution. Let β ,
{(q, k) | p∞q (k) > 0} be the index set corresponding to the strictly
positive power allocations in z∞. Let β¯ be the complement of β in
{1, · · · ,N}. Using this pair of complementarity index sets β and β¯, we
construct the vector z ,
(
p
λ
)
∈ RN as the unique solution to the
following system of equations:
σ2q (k) +
Q∑
r=1
Hrq(k) pr(k)− λq = 0, ∀ (q, k) ∈ β
N∑
k=1
pq(k) = 0, ∀ q = 1, . . . , Q
pq(k) = 0, ∀ (q, k) 6∈ β,
(2.14)
whose unique solvability is ensured by the nonsingularity of the prin-
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cipal submatrix S(0). By the nondegeneracy assumption (a), we have
z∞β > 0 and (b + Mz
∞)β¯ > 0. Hence, a sufficiently large B > 0 can be
chosen such that for all B ≥ B,
( z +B z∞ )β ≥ 0 and ( b + M z +BM z∞ )β¯ ≥ 0.
Finally, it is easy to see that z + B z∞ ∈ RN is a solution of the
LCP(b,M). Therefore we have constructed a vector that is feasible to
the optimization problem in (2.11). Hence,
RNEσ (B) ≥
Q∑
q=1
N∑
k=1
[
log
(
λq +Bλ
∞
q
)− log ((λq +Bλ∞q )
− (pq(k) +Bp∞q (k))) ]
=
Q∑
q=1
N∑
k=1
[
log
(
λq
B
+ λ∞q
)
− log
((
λq
B
+ λ∞q
)
−
(
pq(k)
B
+ p∞q (k)
))]
.
Therefore, lim inf
B→∞
RNEσ (B) ≥ RNE(∞), establishing that equality holds,
by Proposition 2.2.
Remark 2.5 (On Proposition 2.6 condition (b)). Notice that αk for every
k = 1, . . . , N represent the set of users allocating power along subchannel
k; while
⋃N
k=1αk = {1, . . . , Q} enforces that every user q = 1, . . . , Q must
allocate power along at least one subchannel, since at equilibrium they ex-
haust their power budget. Thus, in essence, the key role of condition (b) in
Proposition 2.6 is to ensure the solvability of the system of linear equations
(2.14) for any index set αk corresponding to the positive power allocations
p∞q (k) > 0 in an optimal solution of the HMSSRNE problem. A more spe-
cialized condition that guarantees such solvability is the positive definiteness
of each tone matrix A(k), or more generally, the “uniform P-property” of
these matrices as expressed by condition (17) in [68, Prop. 2]; in turn, the
(more restrictive) latter property yields the uniqueness of the NE and the
convergence of the IWFA for computing such equilibria.
Furthermore, condition (b) in Proposition 2.6 has an important implication
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on the multiplicity of the NE. More precisely, under Proposition 2.6(b) the set
of NE is guaranteed to be finite. In [92], the authors studied the multiplicity
of the NE for the particular case of Q = 2 users and N = 2 subchannels.
Let us turn our attention to that particular case. Interestingly, using the
fact that the matrices A(k) are nondegenerate for k = 1, 2 (since they are
random matrices drawn from continuous distributions), it is not difficult to
show that the proposed matrix conditions in Proposition 2.6(b) simplifies
to the nonsingularity of the matrix
∑2
k=1A(k;αk) with α1 = α2 = {1, 2}.
Quite surprisingly, the aforementioned condition reduces to the channel gain
conditions previously observed in the proof of [92, Corollary 5], where the set
of NE (for the power allocation game with Q = 2 and N = 2) is shown to be
finite. As a result, the conditions in Proposition 2.6(b) are not stronger than
those proposed in the literature, at least for this particular case. Indeed, to
the best of our knowledge, aside from the cited reference and our result, not
much is known about the NE multiplicity of the power allocation game.
The combination of the results in Propositions 2.3 and 2.6 yields the fol-
lowing corollary that gives a lower bound on RNEσ (B) as B tends to infinity.
The further implications of this result are discussed in Remark. 2.6.
Corollary 2.3. Under the assumptions of Proposition 2.6, it holds that
lim
B→∞
RNEσ (B) =∞ if and only if lim inf
B→∞
RNEσ (B)
logB
≥ 1.
Proof. It suffices to show the “only if” part. Assume that lim
B→∞
RNEσ (B) =∞,
then RNE(∞) = ∞. Hence, by Proposition 2.3, the problem (2.12) has an
optimal solution z∞ ,
(
p∞
λ∞
)
∈ RN such that for some pair (q, k), we
have λ∞q = p
∞
q (k) > 0 = p
∞
r (k) for all r 6= q. Let z ,
(
p
λ
)
be obtained
from the system of linear equations (2.14). By the proof of Proposition 2.6,
ẑ , z +B z∞ ∈ RN is a solution of the LCP(b,M) for all B > 0 sufficiently
large. For this solution, we have pq(k) + Bp
∞
q (k) > 0 = pr(k) + Bp
∞
r (k) for
47
all r 6= q. Therefore,
RNEσ (B) ≥
Q∑
s=1
N∑
k=1
log
1 + ps(k) +Bp∞s (k)
σ2s(k) +
∑
r 6=s
Hrs(k) (pr(k) +Bp
∞
r (k))

≥ log
(
1 +
pq(k) +Bp
∞
q (k)
σ2q (k)
)
≥ log
(
Bp∞q (k)
σ2q (k)
)
= logB + log
(
p∞q (k)
σ2q (k)
)
,
from which the desired conclusion follows readily.
Remark 2.6 (On the high-SNR slope). Notice that in Corollary 2.3, the
quantity lim inf
B→∞
RNEσ (B)
logB
defines the so-called high-SNR slope (in the limit
inferior sense), see e.g., [46, 64], i.e. the slope of the maximum system sum-
rate of NE curve at high SNR, which quantifies the multiplexing gain of the
system. Thus, Corollary 2.3 shows that (under the assumptions of Proposi-
tion 2.6) the maximum system sum-rate of NE goes to infinity as B →∞ if
and only if the multiplexing gain of the system is at least one. Furthermore,
coupling this observation with Proposition 2.3, we have that: when there
exits a user-subchannel pair that operates interference free, then a system’s
multiplexing gain of at least one is achieved. It is worth mentioning that a
similar observation, for the simpler case of two users, is given in [73, Lemma
2]. Notice also that, the result in Corollary 2.3 provides a lower bound on the
rate at which RNEσ (B) goes to infinity. Specifically, under the assumptions of
Proposition 2.6, if RNEσ (B) tends to infinity as B → ∞, then RNEσ (B) tends
to infinity at least as fast as logB does.
2.6.2 The Case of Equi-Noisy Channels
In this subsection, we consider a more restrictive case where the normalized
noise variances satisfy the following property:
σ2q (k) = σ
2
q (k
′) = σ2q ∀ k, k′ = 1, . . . , N and ∀ q = 1, . . . , Q, (2.15)
which we call the case of equi-noisy channels. Despite its restrictiveness, the
aforementioned case has two important implications. First, we are able to
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provide another sufficient condition under which lim
B→∞
RNEσ (B) = R
NE(∞) for
any tuple σ satisfying the equi-noisy condition (2.15); this result is stated
formally in Proposition 2.7. Second, the presence of the Braess-type paradox
in the Gaussian IC (see, e.g., [3, 2]) is ruled out for this particular case; as
shown in Proposition 2.8. It is worth mentioning that the case of flat-fading
channels (Hrq(k) = Hrq for all k and all r 6= q) with white noise is an example
of the equi-noisy channels case.
Proposition 2.7. Under the equi-noisy channels condition (2.15), it holds
that lim
B→∞
RNEσ (B) = R
NE(∞). Moreover, lim
B→∞
RNEσ (B) = ∞ if and only if
lim inf
B→∞
RNEσ (B)
logB
≥ 1.
Proof. Let (p∞,λ∞) be an optimal pair to (2.12) (with the objective value
possibly equal to∞). Under (2.15), let λq(σ) , Bλ∞q +σ2q for all q = 1, . . . , Q.
It is not difficult to show that the pair
(
Bp∞,λ(σ) = (λq(σ))
Q
q=1
)
is feasible
to (2.9). Hence,
RNEσ (B) ≥
Q∑
q=1
N∑
k=1
log
 1 + B p∞q (k)
σ2q +B
∑
r 6=q
Hrq(k) p
∞
r (k)

=
Q∑
q=1
N∑
k=1
log
 1 + p
∞
q (k)
σ2q
B
+
∑
r 6=q
Hrq(k) p
∞
r (k)
 .
Therefore, lim inf
B→∞
RNEσ (B) ≥ RNE(∞), establishing that equality holds, by
Proposition 2.2. The above inequalities also establish the second conclusion
of the proposition, as in the proof of Corollary 2.3.
Note that Proposition 2.7 has also an important implication on the high-
SNR slope, as in Corollary 2.3 (see, Remark 2.6).
Interestingly, more can be said in the case of equi-noisy channels. Let us
turn our attention to the well-known Braess paradox in the context of the
Gaussian IC. It turns out that, for this particular case, the optimal objective
value RNEσ (B) is a nondecreasing function of the power budget B. As a
result, the presence of the Braess-type paradox is prohibited under condition
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(2.15). However, it is important to remark that the optimal solutions of the
MSSRNE problem are those NE that maximize the system sum-rate, thus the
Braess-type paradox is ruled out only for those tuples; refer to Section 2.7 -
Example 2.1 for an illustration of this idea. The next proposition summarizes
this important result.
Proposition 2.8. Under the equi-noisy channels condition (2.15), for any
power budgets B and B ′, it holds that: RNEσ (B
′) ≥ RNEσ (B) if B ′ > B.
Proof. Let (p,λ) and (p ′,λ ′) be optimal pairs to (2.9) with power budgets
B and B ′, respectively.
First, we show that (p̂, λ̂), where p̂ , B
′
B
p and λ̂q ,
B ′
B
λq+
(
1− B
′
B
)
σ2q
for all q = 1, . . . , Q, is feasible to (2.9) with power budget B ′. Clearly p̂ ≥ 0;
and, for all q = 1, . . . , Q and all k = 1, . . . , N we have that
σ2q +
Q∑
r=1
Hrq(k) p̂r(k)− λ̂q = B
′
B
(
σ2q +
Q∑
r=1
Hrq(k) pr(k)− λq
)
≥ 0,
where the inequality above and the orthogonality follow immediately by the
optimality of (p,λ) to (2.9) with budget B. Similarly, for all q = 1, . . . , Q
we have that
λ̂q =
B ′
B
(
λq − σ2q
)
+ σ2q ≥ 0,
because λq − σ2q =
Q∑
r=1
Hrq(k) pr(k)− λq ≥ 0 for all q = 1, . . . , Q. Finally,
−B ′ +
N∑
k=1
p̂q(k) = −B ′ + B
′
B
N∑
k=1
pq(k) = 0
where, similarly, the last equality follows from the optimality of (p,λ) to
(2.9) with budget B. Hence, we have shown that (p̂, λ̂) is feasible to (2.9)
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with budget B ′. As a result, we have that
RNEσ (B
′) ≥
Q∑
q=1
N∑
k=1
log
1 + p̂q(k)
σ2q +
∑
r 6=q
Hrq(k) p̂r(k)

(a)
=
Q∑
q=1
N∑
k=1
log
1 + pq(k)B
B ′
σ2q +
∑
r 6=q
Hrq(k) pr(k)

(b)
≥
Q∑
q=1
N∑
k=1
log
1 + pq(k)
σ2q +
∑
r 6=q
Hrq(k) pr(k)

= RNEσ (B),
where (a) follows by letting p̂ = B
′
B
p and (b) is a consequence of B
′
B
< 1.
2.7 Numerical Examples
In this section, we present some examples validating the theory developed
throughout this chapter. More specifically, we revisit Motivating Exam-
ples 2.1 and 2.2, so that we can contrast our findings with previous observa-
tions developed in the literature. The last example in this section illustrates
the likelihood of observing the behavior RNE(∞) < ∞ under practical set-
tings.
Example 2.1. Referring back to the setting of Motivating Example 2.1, it
is clear that this example pertains to the case of equi-noisy channels with
non-unique Nash equilibria. This example shows that the validity of Propo-
sition 2.8 is largely due to the fact that the quantity RNEσ (B) is defined as
the maximum of the system sum-rates among all such equilibria. This fact
can be observed from Table 2.2, where (in contrast to Table 2.1) an alterna-
tive NE for the case B = 2 is chosen, which corresponds to an orthogonal
power allocation that yields a higher data rate, indeed this corresponds to
the maximum system sum-rate among the NE. This affirms the monotonicity
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Figure 2.3: Maximum system sum-rate of NE (RNEσ (B)) versus power budget (B) for the equi-noisy
channels example in [67]. As claimed by Proposition 2.8, RNEσ (B) is a nondecreasing function of B.
of RNEσ (B) in the case of equi-noisy channels as claimed by Proposition 2.8.
Moreover, by Propositions 2.3 and 2.7 we have that lim
B→∞
RNEσ (B) =∞. Fig-
ure 2.3 illustrates these observations by showing the nondecreasing behavior
of RNEσ (B).
Table 2.2: System sum-rate of NE for the case of non-unique NE. The Braess-type paradox is present for
those NE that are not optimal solutions of the MSSRNE problem.
Power Budget NE (p1,p2) System Sum-Rate of NE NE (p?1,p
?
2) R
NE
σ (B)
B = 1.5 (1.5, 0), (0, 1.5) 2.64 (1.5, 0), (0, 1.5) 2.64
B = 2 (1, 1), (1, 1) 2.34 (2, 0), (0, 2) 3.17
Example 2.2. Consider the system described in Motivating Example 2.2(a),
where the authors of [25] pointed out that the distributed system sum-rate
approaches 2N log2(5) as B →∞. Note that this fact is in accordance with
our results since: first, from Proposition 2.2 or invoking the equi-noisy chan-
nels case (see, Proposition 2.7), it follows immediately that lim
B→∞
RNEσ (B) =
RNE(∞); and second, by solving the corresponding HMSSRNE problem, it
is not difficult to obtain that RNE(∞) = 2N log2(5), as observed in [25].
Clearly, the selfish behavior of the users degrades the performance of the
system. To overcome this issue, the authors of the cited paper suggest or-
thogonal power allocations rather than the uniform ones (obtained from the
NE), so that the system sum-rate tends to infinity as B → ∞. This choice
is consistent with the results in [37] that relates such a choice of power allo-
cations with the optimality of the maximum centralized sum-rate (2.3).
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Example 2.3. In Figure 2.4 we plot the percentage of cases observed where
RNE(∞) < ∞ versus the number of users Q for a fixed number of subchan-
nels N = 64. These percentages were calculated by solving the HMSSRNE
problem (via the IWFA) for 100 different channel realizations per number of
users. The channels were simulated as Finite Impulse Response (FIR) filters
of order L = 10, where the taps are independent and identically distributed
zero mean complex Gaussian random variables with variance 1/(dγrq(L+1)
2),
where drq denotes the distance between transmitter r and receiver q and γ
is the path loss exponent. We assumed drq = dqr for all q, r = 1, . . . .Q.
In these experiments, we only considered those channel realizations satisfy-
ing the NE uniqueness condition in [97][Thm. 2], which also guarantees the
convergence of the IWFA. The numerical results indicate that, except for
the cases of 2, 3 and 4 users, the phenomenon RNE(∞) < ∞ is observed
in 100% of the cases explored. Furthermore, since the NE is unique in all
the experiments considered, it happens that lim
B→∞
RNEσ (B) < ∞ holds (for
any tuple σ) as the number of users Q increases. In other words, it does
not matter how much we are able to increase the power budget in the sys-
tem, the maximum attainable sum-rate of NE will always be finite; which
implies that we have an asymptotic infinite price of stability/anarchy, i.e.
lim
B→∞
PoS(B) = lim
B→∞
PoA(B) =∞. Consequently, this puts in evidence (at
least for the experiments we simulated) the inefficiency of the noncooperative
approach for the dynamic power allocation problem, even when the users are
endowed with infinite power budgets.
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Figure 2.4: Percentage of cases where RNE(∞) <∞ versus number of users Q.
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2.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have considered the problem of maximizing the system
sum-rate over the set of NE and analyzed the dependence of this rate on
the power budget, in particular when the latter is unbounded. This study
touches on the Braess-type paradox and a limiting version of the price of
stability. The analysis was primarily based on an auxiliary optimization
problem, the HMSSRNE. We have derived sufficient conditions under which
the maximum system sum-rate of NE coincides with the optimal objective
value of the homogenized problem in the limit. Such conditions include the
uniqueness of the NE, the finiteness of the set of NE, and the special case
of equi-noisy channels. Furthermore, for the latter case we have shown that
the maximum distributed system sum-rate is a nondecreasing function of the
power budget, thus eliminating the presence of the Braess-type paradox. We
have further provided a necessary and sufficient condition for the set of NE
to reach an infinite system sum-rate when the power budget is unbounded.
Moreover, our numerical simulations put in evidence the inefficiency of the
noncooperative approach for the power allocation problem, even when the
users’ power budget is unbounded.
One question that is left open in the present work is a complete charac-
terization for the objective values of the MSSRNE and HMSSRNE to coin-
cide in the limit. An interesting future research topic is the extension of the
present analysis to the case where the users in the communication system are
equipped with multiple transmitters and receivers. A major question that
this chapter has not addressed is bounding the price of anarchy/stability;
this remains a challenging problem and we will continue to study it in our
future work.
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Chapter 3
A Decomposition Method for Multiuser
DC-Programming and its Applications1
3.1 Introduction
The resource allocation problem in multiuser systems generally consists of
optimizing the (weighted) sum of the users’ objective functions, also termed
a “social function”. In this chapter we address the frequent and difficult
case in which the social function is nonconvex and there are (convex) shared
constraints coupling the strategies of all the users. Our attention is mainly
focused on objective functions of the DC-type, i.e., the difference of two con-
vex functions. It is worth mentioning that DC programs are very common
in signal processing, communications, and networking. For instance, the
following resource allocation problems belong to the class of DC programs:
power control problems in cellular systems [88, 1, 113]; MIMO relay opti-
mization [50]; dynamic spectrum management in DSL systems [117, 111];
sum-rate maximization, proportional-fairness and max-min optimization of
SISO/MISO/MIMO ad-hoc networks [51, 93, 41, 94].
In the effort of (optimally) solving DC programs, a great deal of the
aforementioned works involves global optimization techniques whose solu-
tion methods are mainly based on combinatorial approaches (e.g., adap-
tations of branch and bound techniques [43]); the results are a variety of
centralized algorithms customized to the specific DC structure under consid-
erations [88, 117, 1, 113, 50]. However, centralized schemes are too demand-
ing in most applications (e.g., large-scale decentralized networks). This has
motivated a number of works whose effort has been finding efficiently high
quality (generally locally optimal) solutions of DC programs via easy-to-
1This chapter is adapted from [4] c©2014 IEEE. Reprinted, with permision, from A.
Alvarado, G. Scutari, and J.-S. Pang, A new decomposition method for multiuser DC-
programming and its applications, IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing, June 2014.
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implement distributed algorithms. Distributed ad-hoc schemes (with prov-
able convergence) for very specific DC formulations have been proposed in
[93, 51, 94, 111], mainly based on Successive Convex Approximation (SCA)
techniques [94, 90, 5]. In these works however the formulations contain only
private constraints (i.e., there is no coupling among the users’ strategies).
In this work, we move a step forward and consider the more general mul-
tiuser DC program, whose feasible set includes also coupling convex con-
straints. To the best of our knowledge, the design of distributed algorithms
for this class of problems is an open issue. Indeed, the nonconvexity of the
social function prevents the application of standard primal/dual decomposi-
tion techniques for convex problems, e.g., [12, 81]; the presence of coupling
constraints makes the distributed techniques developed in [93, 51, 94, 111, 90]
not directly usable; and standard SCA methods for DC programs [5] wherein
the concave part of the objective function is linearized would lead to central-
ized schemes (because the resulting convex function is generally not separable
in the users’ variables).
A first contribution of this study is to develop a novel distributed decompo-
sition method for solving such a class of multiuser DC problems. Capitalizing
on the SCA idea, the proposed novel technique solves a sequence of strongly
convex subproblems, whose objective function is obtained by diagonalization
plus off-diagonal linearization of the convex part of the original DC sum-
utility and linearization of the nonconvex part. Some desirable features of
the proposed approach are: i) Convergence to a stationary solution of the
original DC programming is guaranteed also if the subproblems are solved in
an inexact way; ii) Each convex subproblem can be distributively solved by
the users capitalizing on standard primal or dual decomposition techniques;
and iii) It leads to alternative distributed algorithms that differ from rate
and robustness of convergence, scalability, local computation versus global
communication, and quantity of message passing. All these features make
the proposed technique and algorithms applicable to a variety of networks
scenarios and problems.
Among the aforementioned applications of the proposed scheme, we show
how to customize the developed framework to 2 specific problems, namely:
1) A novel resource allocation problem in the emerging area of cooperative
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physical layer security.
2) The renowned sum-rate maximization of MIMO Cognitive Radio (CR)
networks.
In summary, the main contributions of this chapter are:
• A novel class of distributed decomposition algorithms with provable
convergence for multiuser DC problems with (convex) side constraints.
• A novel game theoretical formulation for the secrecy rate maximization
problem in multiple source-destination OFDMA networks with multi-
ple friendly jammers, and consequent algorithms to compute relaxed
equilibrium concepts of such game based on its nontrivial DC reformu-
lation.
• A class of provable convergent distributed primal/dual algorithms for
the CR MIMO sum-rate maximization problem.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 introduces
the proposed multiuser DC problem with coupling constraints. Section 3.3
presents a novel decomposition technique for computing stationary solutions
of the DC problem, which is suitable for a distributed implementation. Dis-
tributed algorithms building on primal and dual decomposition techniques
are discussed in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 customizes the proposed frame-
work to the applications in the context of physical layer security and the
CR MIMO sum-rate maximization problem. Finally, Section 3.6 draws some
conclusions.
3.2 Multiuser DC-Program with Side Constraints
We consider a multiuser system composed of I coupled users. Each user i
makes decision on his ni-dimensional real strategy vector xi ∈ Rni , subject
to some local constraints given by the set Xi ⊂ Rni . The joint strategy set
is denoted by X , ∏Ii=1Xi; x−i , (xj)j 6=i is the strategy vector of all users
except user i; X−i ,
∏
j 6=iXj; and x , (xi)Ii=1 denotes the strategy profile
of all the users. In addition to the private constraints, there are also nc
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side constraints of the form h(x) , (hj(x))ncj=1 ≤ 0. The system design is
formulated as a DC program in the following form:
minimize
x
θ(x) ,
I∑
i=1
(fi(x)− gi(x))
subject to xi ∈ Xi ∀ i = 1, . . . , I (private constraints)
h(x) ≤ 0 (coupling constraints).
(3.1)
Assumptions. We make the following blanket assumptions:
A1) The functions fi, gi for i = 1, . . . , I, and hj for j = 1, . . . , nc, are convex
and continuously differentiable on X .
A2) Each set Xi is (nonempty) closed and convex.
A3) The functions fi and gi have Lipschitz continuous gradients on Ξ with
constants L∇fi and L∇gi , respectively; where Ξ denotes the convex
feasible set of (3.1); let L∇θ ,
∑
i L∇fi +
∑
i L∇gi .
A4) The lower level set L(x0) , {x ∈ Ξ | θ(x) ≤ θ(x0)} of the objective
function θ is compact for some x0 ∈ Ξ.
A5) The convex coupling constraints are in the separable form: h(x) ,∑I
i=1 hi(xi) ≤ 0.
The assumptions above are quite standard and are satisfied by a large class
of practical problems. For instance, A4 guarantees that (3.1) has a solution
even when Ξ is not bounded; of course A4 is trivially satisfied if Ξ is bounded.
Instances of problem (3.1) appear in many applications, from signal pro-
cessing to communications and networking; see Section. 3.5 for some motivat-
ing examples. Our goal is to obtain distributed best-response-like algorithms
for the class of problems (3.1), converging to stationary solutions. This con-
fronts three major challenges, namely: i) the objective function is the sum
of differences of two convex functions, and thus in general nonconvex; ii) the
objective function is not separable in the users’ strategies (each function fi
and gi depends on the strategy profile x of all users); and iii) there are side
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constraints coupling all the optimization variables. We deal with these issues
in the following sections.
3.3 A New Best-Response SCA Decomposition
The standard SCA-based technique for DC programs applied to (3.1) would
suggest solving a sequence of convex subproblems whose objective function
is obtained by linearizing at the current iterate the nonconvex part of θ(x),
that is −∑i gi(x), while retaining the convex part ∑i fi(x); see, e.g., [5, 90].
However, notice that the resulting convexified function is not separable in
the users’ variables xi (each fi depends on the strategy vector of all users x);
therefore such SCA techniques will lead to centralized solution methods.
Here we introduce a new decomposition technique that does not suffer from
this drawback. To formally describe our approach, let us start rewriting each
function fi(x) as: given x
ν , (xνi )
I
i=1 ∈ Ξ and denoting xν−i ,
(
xνj
)
j 6=i, we
have
fi(x) = fi(xi,x
ν
−i) +
[
fi(xi,x−i)− fi(xi,xν−i)
]
. (3.2)
We now approximate the term in brackets using a first order Taylor expansion
at xν ,
fi(xi,x−i)− fi(xi,xν−i) ≈
∑
j 6=i
∇xjfi(xν)T (xj − xνj ),
and approximate (3.2) as
fi(x) ≈ f˜i(x; xν) , fi(xi,xν−i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
diagonalization
+
∑
j 6=i
∇xjfi(xν)T (xj − xνj )︸ ︷︷ ︸
off-diagonal linearization
(3.3)
yielding a diagonalization plus off-diagonal linearization of fi(x) at x
ν . To
deal with the nonconvexity of −gi(x), we replace the functions gi(x) with its
linearization at xν :
gi(x) ≈ g˜i(x; xν) , gi(xν) +
I∑
j=1
∇xjgi(xν)T (xj − xνj )︸ ︷︷ ︸
linearization
. (3.4)
Based on (3.3) and (3.4), the candidate approximation of the nonconvex
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sum-utility θ(x) at xν is:
θ˜(x; xν) ,
I∑
i=1
(
f˜i(x; x
ν)− g˜i(x; xν)
)
+
I∑
i=1
τi
2
‖xi − xνi ‖2, (3.5)
where we added a proximal-like regularization term with τi ≥ 0, whose nu-
merical benefits are well-understood; see, e.g., [12]. Rearranging the terms
in the above sum, it is not difficult to see that (3.5) can be equivalently
rewritten as
θ˜(x; xν) =
I∑
i=1
θ˜i(xi; x
ν), (3.6)
where
θ˜i(xi; x
ν) ,
[
fi(xi,x
ν
−i) +
∑
j 6=i
∇xifj(xν)T (xi − xνi )
]
−
[
gi(x
ν) +
I∑
j=1
∇xigj(xν)T (xi − xνi )
]
+
τi
2
‖xi − xνi ‖2.
Roughly speaking, the main idea behind the above approximations is to
use a proper combination of diagonalization and partial linearization on the
convex functions fi(x) [cf. (3.3)] together with a linearization of the non-
convex terms gi(x) [cf. (3.4)]. The diagonalization procedure fixes the non-
separability issue in θ(x) while preserving the convex part in θ(x), whereas
the linearization of gi(x) gets rid of the nonconvex part in θ(x). Indeed, this
procedure leads to the approximation function θ˜(x; xν) at xν that is separable
in the users’ variables xi (each θ˜i(xi; x
ν) depends only on xi, given x
ν) and
is strongly convex in x ∈ Ξ.
The proposed SCA decomposition consists then in solving iteratively (pos-
sibly with a memory) the following sequence of (strongly) convex optimiza-
tion problems: given xν ∈ Ξ,
x̂ (xν) , argmin
x∈Ξ
θ˜(x; xν). (3.7)
Proposition 3.1 summarizes the main properties of the best-response map
x̂(•) defined above. These properties are the key points in establishing the
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convergence of the proposed algorithm. Lemma 3.1 below is instrumental for
the proof of the aforementioned proposition.
Lemma 3.1. Under A1-A4, ∇θ˜(x; •) is uniformly Lipschitz on Ξ, that is,
for any given x ∈ Ξ,∥∥∥∇xθ˜(x; y)−∇xθ˜(x; z)∥∥∥ ≤ L∇θ˜ ‖z− y‖ ∀y, z ∈ Ξ, (3.8)
with L2∇θ˜ , 4 (L
2
∇θ + 2
∑I
i=1 L
2
∇fi + τ
max), where L∇θ and L∇fi are defined in
assumption A3, and τmax , maxi τ 2i .
Proof. Invoking the separability of θ˜, we have that∥∥∥∇xθ˜(x; y)−∇xθ˜(x; z)∥∥∥2 = I∑
i=1
∥∥∥∇xi θ˜i(xi; y)−∇xi θ˜i(xi; z)∥∥∥2 .
Now, rewriting ∇xi θ˜i(xi; y)−∇xi θ˜i(xi; z) as
∇xi θ˜i(xi; y)−∇xi θ˜i(xi; z) = (∇xiθ(y)−∇xiθ(z)) + τi (zi − yi)
+ (∇xifi(xi,y−i)−∇xifi(xi, z−i))
+ (∇xifi(z)−∇xifi(y)) ,
where we added and subtracted the terms ∇xifi(y) +∇xifi(z). By introduc-
ing the following definitions:
r , (ri)Ii=1 , (∇xiθ(y)−∇xiθ(z))Ii=1 ,
s , (si)Ii=1 , (zi − yi)Ii=1 ,
t , (ti)Ii=1 , (∇xifi(xi,y−i)−∇xifi(xi, z−i))Ii=1 ,
u , (ui)Ii=1 , (∇xifi(z)−∇xifi(y))Ii=1 ,
(3.8) can be rewritten as
∥∥∥∇xθ˜(x; y)−∇xθ˜(x; z)∥∥∥2 = I∑
i=1
‖ri + τisi + ti + ui‖2
≤ 4
I∑
i=1
(‖ri‖2 + τ 2i ‖si‖2 + ‖ti‖2 + ‖ui‖2) .
(3.9)
The desired result follows readily by substituting in (3.9) the upper bounds:
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‖r‖2 = ‖∇xθ(y)−∇xθ(z)‖2 ≤ L2∇θ ‖y − z‖2,
‖s‖2 = ‖y − z‖2 ,
‖t‖2 ≤ ‖y − z‖2
I∑
i=1
L2∇fi ,
‖u‖2 ≤ ‖y − z‖2
I∑
i=1
L2∇fi .
In the following result, we let
cτ , min
i=1,...,I
{
τi + inf
x−i∈X−i
cfi(x−i)
}
, (3.10)
where cfi(x−i) ≥ 0 is the largest constant such that
(zi −wi)T (∇xifi(zi,x−i)−∇xifi(wi,x−i)) ≥ cfi(x−i)‖zi −wi‖2,
for all zi,wi ∈ Xi and x−i ∈ X−i. Note that cfi(x−i) = 0 if fi(•,x−i) is
convex but not strongly convex.
Proposition 3.1. Given the DC program (3.1) under A1-A4, the map Ξ 3
y 7→ x̂(y) ∈ Ξ defined in (3.7) has the following properties:
(a) For every given y ∈ Ξ, the vector x̂(y)−y is a descent direction of the
objective function θ(x) at y:
(x̂(y)− y)T ∇xθ(y) ≤ −cτ ‖x̂(y)− y‖2, (3.11)
with cτ defined in (3.10).
(b) x̂(•) is Lipschitz continuos on Ξ, with constant Lx̂ , L∇θ˜/cτ , where
L∇θ˜ is defined in Lemma 3.1.
(c) The set of fixed points of x̂(•) coincides with the set of stationary
solutions of the optimization problem (3.1); therefore x̂(•) has a fixed
point.
Proof. (a) Given y ∈ Ξ, by definition, x̂(y) satisfies the minimum principle
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associated with (3.7): for all z , (zi)Ii=1 ∈ Ξ
(z− x̂(y))T ∇xθ˜(x̂(y); y) ≥ 0
I∑
i=1
(zi − x̂i(y))T
[
∇xifi(x̂i(y),y−i) +
∑
j 6=i
∇xifj(y)
−
I∑
j=1
∇xigj(y) + τi (x̂i(y)− yi)
]
≥ 0.
(3.12)
Letting zi = yi, and, adding and subtracting ∇xifi(y) in each term i of the
sum in (3.12), we obtain:
(y − x̂(y))T ∇xθ(y) ≥
I∑
i=1
(x̂i(y)− yi)T (∇xifi(x̂i(y),y−i)−∇xifi(y))
+
N∑
i=1
τi‖x̂i(y)− yi‖2 ≥ cτ ‖x̂(y)− y‖2,
(3.13)
where in the last inequality we used the definition of cτ . This completes the
proof of (a).
(b) Let y, z ∈ Ξ; by the minimum principle, we have
(v − x̂(y))T ∇xθ˜(x̂(y); y) ≥ 0 ∀v ∈ Ξ
(w − x̂(z))T ∇xθ˜(x̂(z); z) ≥ 0 ∀w ∈ Ξ.
Setting v = x̂(z) and w = x̂(y) and summing the two inequalities above,
after some manipulations, we obtain:
(x̂(z)− x̂(y))T
(
∇xθ˜(x̂(z); z)−∇xθ˜(x̂(y); z)
)
≤ (x̂(y)− x̂(z))T
(
∇xθ˜(x̂(y); z)−∇xθ˜(x̂(y); y)
)
.
(3.14)
The Lipschitz property of x̂(•), as stated in Proposition 3.1(b), comes from
(3.14) using the following lower and upper bounds:
(x̂(z)− x̂(y))T
(
∇xθ˜(x̂(z); z)−∇xθ˜(x̂(y); y)
)
≥ cτ ‖x̂(z)− x̂(y)‖2 (3.15)
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and
(x̂(y)− x̂(z))T
(
∇xθ˜(x̂(y); z)−∇xθ˜(x̂(y); y)
)
≤ L∇θ˜ ‖x̂(y)− x̂(z)‖ ‖z− y‖
(3.16)
where (3.15) is a direct consequence of the uniform strong convexity of θ˜,
whereas (3.16) follows from the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality and Lemma 3.1.
Combining (3.14), (3.15), and (3.16), we obtain the desired result.
(c) First, suppose that x∗ is a fixed point of the map x̂(y) i.e. x? = x̂(x?).
By definition, we have: for all z , (zi)Ii=1 ∈ Ξ,
I∑
i=1
(zi − x̂i(x?))T
[
∇xifi(x̂i(x?),x?−i) +
∑
j 6=i
∇xifj(x?)
−
I∑
j=1
∇xigj(x?) + τi (x̂i(x?)− x?i )
]
≥ 0.
Using in the above equation x̂(x?) = x?, we obtain
0 ≤
I∑
i=1
(zi − x?i )T
[
I∑
j=1
∇xifj(x?)−
I∑
j=1
∇xigj(x?)
]
= (z− x?)T∇xθ(x?),
implying that x? is a stationary solution of (3.1).
Now, suppose that x? is a stationary solution of (3.1). Notice that x? is an
optimal solution of minx∈Ξ θ˜(x; y) since it satisfies the minimum principle.
Moreover, x̂(x?) is the unique optimal solution of minx∈Ξ θ˜(x; y) with y = x?.
Therefore, x? = x̂(x?), i.e., x? is a fixed point of x̂(•).
The formal description of the proposed SCA technique is given in Algo-
rithm 3.1. Note that in Step 3 of the algorithm we allow a memory in the
update of the iterate xν in the form of a convex combination via γν ∈ (0, 1]
(this guarantees xν+1 ∈ Ξ).
The convergence of the algorithm above is studied in the next theorem.
Theorem 3.1. Given the DC program (3.1) under A1-A4, suppose that
τ , (τi)Ii=1 and {γν} are chosen so that one of the two following conditions
are satisfied:
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Algorithm 3.1: SCA Algorithm for the DC Program (3.1)
Data: τ , (τi)Ii=1 ≥ 0, {γν} > 0 and x0 ∈ Ξ. Set ν = 0.
(S.1): If xν satisfies a termination criterion, STOP.
(S.2): Compute x̂ (xν) [cf. (3.7)].
(S.3): Set xν+1 , xν + γν ( x̂ (xν)− xν ).
(S.4): ν ← ν + 1 and go to (S.1).
(a) Constant step-size rule:
γν = γ ∈ (0, 1] ∀ ν ≥ 0 and 2 cτ > γL∇θ. (3.17)
with cτ defined in (3.10).
(b) Diminishing step-size rule:
cτ > 0, γ
ν ∈ (0, 1], γν → 0, and ∑∞ν=0 γν = +∞. (3.18)
Then, the sequence {xν} generated by Algorithm 3.1 converges in a finite
number of iterations to a stationary solution of (3.1) or every limit point of
the sequence (at least one such point exists) is a stationary solution of (3.1).
Proof. (a) Under assumptions A1-A4, let γν = γ ∈ (0, 1] for every ν ≥ 0, and
let 2cτ > γL∇θ. Combining the iteration defined in Step 3 of Algorithm 3.1
with the Descent Lemma [12, Prop. A.32] we obtain: for every ν ≥ 0
θ(xν+1) ≤ θ(xν) + γ∇xθ(xν)T (x̂(xν)− xν) + γ
2 L∇θ
2
‖x̂(xν)− xν‖2
≤ θ(xν)− γcτ‖x̂(xν)− xν‖2 + γ
2L∇θ
2
‖x̂(xν)− xν‖2
= θ(xν)− γ
(
cτ − γ L∇θ
2
)
‖x̂(xν)− xν‖2
where the second inequality follows from Proposition 3.1(a). Therefore, since
by assumption θ is bounded below on Ξ and cτ >
γ
2
L∇θ, then the sequence
{θ(xν)} converges and
lim
ν→∞ ‖x̂(x
ν)− xν‖ = 0. (3.19)
Finally, by assumption A4, the sequence {xν} is bounded, thus it has at
least one limit point, let it be x∞ ∈ Ξ. Moreover, from Proposition 3.1(b)
65
we know that the map x̂(•) is continuous over Ξ, and from (3.19), we must
have that x∞ = x̂(x∞). By Proposition 3.1(c) we have that the set of fixed
points of x̂(•) coincides with the set of stationary solutions of (3.1), hence
x∞ is a stationary solution of (3.1).
(b) The proof follows from [94, Th.3] and Proposition 3.1, which establishes
the main properties of the best-response map Ξ 3 y 7→ x̂(y) ∈ Ξ defined in
(3.7), as required by [94, Th.3].
Remark 3.1 (On Algorithm 3.1). The algorithm implements a novel SCA
decomposition technique: at each iteration ν, a separable (strongly) convex
function θ˜(x; xν) is minimized over the convex set Ξ. The main difference
from the classical SCA techniques (e.g., [43, 5, 90]) is that the approximation
function θ˜(x; xν) is separable across the users. In Section 3.4, we show that
such a structure leads naturally to a distributed implementation of Algo-
rithm 3.1. A practical termination criterion in Step 1 is to stop the iterates
when |θ(xν) − θ(xν−1)| ≤ δ, where δ is a prescribed accuracy. Finally, it is
reasonable to expect the algorithm to perform better than classical gradient
algorithms applied directly to (3.1) at the cost of no extra signaling, because
the structure of the objective function θ(x) is better explored.
On the choice of the parameters. Theorem 3.1 offers some flexibility
in the choice of τ and γν , while guaranteeing convergence of Algorithm 3.1,
which makes it applicable in a variety of scenarios. More specifically, one can
use a constant or a diminishing rule for the step-size γν .
Constant step-size rule: This rule resembles analogous constant step-size
rules in gradient algorithms: convergence is guaranteed either under “suf-
ficiently” small step-size γ (given τ ) or “sufficiently” large τi’s (given γ ∈
(0, 1]), such that (3.17) is satisfied. A special case that is worth mentioning
is: γ = 1 and 2 cτ > γL∇θ, which leads to a SCA-based iterate with no
memory: given xν ∈ Ξ, xν+1 , x̂ (xν). In this particular case, we can relax
a bit the convergence condition (3.17) and require the Lipschitz continuity
of the gradients of fi only. The result is stated next.
Theorem 3.2. Let {xν} be the sequence generated by Algorithm 3.1, in the
setting of Theorem 3.1 where however we relax A3 by assuming that fi have
Lipschitz gradients with constants L∇fi . Suppose that γ
ν = 1 for all ν and
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τ > 0 is such that τmin , mini τi > 2
∑I
i=1 L∇fi ; then, the conclusions of
Theorem 3.1 hold.
Proof. By induction, since xν ∈ Ξ, we have
I∑
i=1
[fi(x
ν)− gi(xν)] ≥
I∑
i=1
[(
fi(x
ν+1
i ,x
ν
−i) +
∑
j 6=i
∇xjfi(xν)T (xν+1j − xνj )
)
−
(
gi(x
ν) +
I∑
j=1
∇xjgi(xν)T (xν+1j − xνj )
)
+
τi
2
‖xν+1i − xνi ‖2
]
=
I∑
i=1
[(
fi(x
ν+1
i ,x
ν
−i) +
∑
j 6=i
∇xjfi(xν)T (xν+1j − xνj )
)
− (gi(xν) +∇xgi(xν)T (xν+1 − xν))+ τi
2
‖xν+1i − xνi ‖2
]
≥
I∑
i=1
[(
fi(x
ν+1
i ,x
ν
−i) +
∑
j 6=i
∇xjfi(xν)T (xν+1j − xνj )
)
−gi(xν+1) + τi
2
‖xν+1i − xνi ‖2
]
,
where the last inequality follows by convexity of each function gi for i =
1, . . . , I. After adding and subtracting the terms fi(x
ν+1) for i = 1, · · · , I in
the right hand side of the last inequality we obtain
θ(xν) ≥ θ(xν+1) +
I∑
i=1
[(
fi(x
ν+1
i ,x
ν
−i)− fi(xν+1)
)
+
∑
j 6=i
∇xjfi(xν)T (xν+1j − xνj ) +
τi
2
‖xν+1i − xνi ‖2
]
= θ(xν+1) +
I∑
i=1
[(
fi(x
ν+1
i ,x
ν
−i)− fi(xν)
)
+
(
fi(x
ν)− fi(xν+1)
)
+
∑
j 6=i
∇xjfi(xν)T (xν+1j − xνj )
+
τi
2
‖xν+1i − xνi ‖2
]
.
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By invoking the convexity of each fi (i = 1, . . . , I) we have that
fi(x
ν+1
i ,x
ν
−i)− fi(xν) ≥ ∇xifi(xν)T (xν+1i − xνi )
and fi(x
ν)− fi(xν+1) ≥ ∇xfi(xν+1)T (xν − xν+1).
As a result,
θ(xν) ≥ θ(xν+1) +
I∑
i=1
[
(∇xifi(xν)T (xν+1i − xνi ))+ (∇xfi(xν+1)T (xν − xν+1))
+
∑
j 6=i
∇xjfi(xν)T (xν+1j − xνj ) +
τi
2
‖xν+1i − xνi ‖2]
= θ(xν+1)−
I∑
i=1
[(∇xfi(xν+1)−∇xfi(xν))T (xν+1 − xν)
−τi
2
‖xν+1i − xνi ‖2
]
(a)
≥ θ(xν+1)−
I∑
i=1
[‖∇xfi(xν+1)−∇xfi(xν)‖ ‖xν+1 − xν‖
−τi
2
‖xν+1i − xνi ‖2
]
(b)
≥ θ(xν+1)−
I∑
i=1
[
L∇fi ‖xν+1 − xν‖2 −
τi
2
‖xν+1i − xνi ‖2
]
(c)
≥ θ(xν+1) +
(
τmin
2
−
I∑
i=1
L∇fi
)
‖xν+1 − xν‖2
where: (a) follows by Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, (b) is a direct consequence
of the Lipschitz continuity of the gradients of each function fi, and (c) follows
by taking τmin , mini τi. Therefore, since by assumption θ is bounded below
on Ξ and τ > 0 is chosen such that τmin > 2
∑N
i=1 L∇fi , then the sequence
{θ(xν)} converges and
lim
ν→∞
‖xν+1 − xν‖ = 0.
By the minimum principle, we have for every ν ≥ 0 and for all x ∈ Ξ
(
x− xν+1)T ∇xθ˜(xν+1; xν) = I∑
i=1
(
xi − xν+1i
)T ∇xi θ˜(xν+1i ; xν) ≥ 0 (3.20)
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where
∇xi θ˜(xν+1i ; xν) = ∇xifi(xν+1i ,xν−i) +
∑
j 6=i
∇xifj(xν)−
I∑
j=1
∇xigj(xν)
+ τi
(
xν+1i − xνi
)
.
Finally, by assumption A4, the sequence {xν} is bounded. Thus, it has at
least one limit point, let it be x∞ , (x∞i )
I
i=1; then passing the limit ν →∞
along an appropriate subsequence (in (3.20)) we get, for all x ∈ Ξ
0 ≤
I∑
i=1
(xi − x∞i )T
[
I∑
j=1
(∇xifj(x∞)−∇xigj(x∞))
]
=
I∑
i=1
(xi − x∞i )T ∇xiθ(x∞) = (x− x∞)T ∇θ(x∞)
i.e. x∞ is a stationary solution of (3.1).
Diminishing step-size rule: The application of a constant step-size rule re-
quires the knowledge of the Lipschitz constants L∇fi and L∇gi , which may
not be available. One can use a (conservative) estimate of such values (e.g.,
using upper bounds), but in practice this generally leads to “large” values of
cτ satisfying (3.17), which reasonably slows down the algorithm. In all these
situations, a valid alternative is to use a diminishing step-size in the form
(3.18); examples of such rules are [94]: given γ0 = 1,
Rule 1: γν = γν−1 (1−  γν−1) , ν = 1, . . . , (3.21)
Rule 2: γν = γ
ν−1+β1
1+β2ν
, ν = 1, . . . , (3.22)
where  ∈ (0, 1) and β1, β2 ∈ (0, 1) are given constants such that β1 ≤ β2.
3.3.1 Inexact implementation of x̂ (xν)
We can reduce the computational effort of Algorithm 3.1 by allowing inexact
computations of the solution x̂ (xν). The convergence of the resulting al-
gorithm is still guaranteed under more stringent conditions on the step-size
and some requirements on the computational errors. The inexact version of
Algorithm 3.1 is formally described in Algorithm 3.2 below, where Step 2
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of Algorithm 3.1, the exact computation of x̂ (xν), is replaced now with its
inexact version, that is find a zν such that ‖zν − x̂ (xν) ‖ ≤ εν , with εν being
the accuracy in the computation of x̂ (xν) at iteration ν.
Algorithm 3.2: Inexact version of Algorithm 3.1
Data: τ ≥ 0, {γν} > 0, {εν} ↓ 0, and x0 ∈ Ξ. Set ν = 0.
(S.1): If xν satisfies a termination criterion, STOP.
(S.2): Find a zν such that ‖zν − x̂ (xν) ‖ ≤ εν .
(S.3): Set xν+1 , xν + γν ( zν − xν ).
(S.4): ν ← ν + 1 and go to (S.1).
Convergence is guaranteed if the error sequence {εν} and the step-size {γν}
are properly chosen, as stated in Theorem 3.3. The proof of this result is
based on the application of Proposition 3.1 and [94, Th. 4], and is omitted.
Theorem 3.3. Let {xν} be the sequence generated by Algorithm 3.2 in
the setting of Theorem 3.1, where however A4 is strengthened by assuming
that θ is coercive on Ξ, and with the additional assumption that ∇xθ is
bounded on Ξ. Suppose that {γν} and {εν} are chosen so that the following
conditions are satisfied: i) γν ∈ (0, 1]; ii) γν → 0; iii) ∑∞ν=0 γν = +∞; iv)∑∞
ν=0 (γ
ν)2 < +∞; and v) ∑∞ν=0 εν γν < +∞. Then, the conclusions of
Theorem 3.1 hold.
Note that the steps-size rule in (3.21) satisfies the square summability con-
dition in Theorem 3.3. As expected, in the presence of errors, convergence of
Algorithm 3.2 is guaranteed if εν → 0, meaning that the sequence of approxi-
mated problems (3.7) is solved with increasing accuracy. Note that Theorem
3.3(v) imposes also a constraint on the rate by which εν goes to zero, which
depends also on {γν}. An example of an error sequence satisfying condition
(v) is εν ≤ α γν , where α is any finite positive constant. Interestingly, such
a condition can be enforced in Algorithm 3.2 using classical error bound re-
sults in convex analysis; see, e.g., [28, Ch. 6]. Two examples of error bounds
are given in Lemma 3.2 below, where we introduced the following residual
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quantities:
rΞ(z; x
ν) ,
∥∥∥ΠN (z,Ξ)(−∇xθ˜(z; xν)) +∇xθ˜(z; xν)∥∥∥
lΞ(z; x
ν) ,
∥∥∥z− ΠΞ (z−∇xθ˜(z; xν))∥∥∥
with ΠN (z,Ξ)(y) [resp. ΠΞ(y)] denoting the Euclidean projection of y onto
the normal cone N (z,Ξ) , {y ∈ Rn : yT (x− z) ≤ 0, ∀x ∈ Ξ} (resp. Ξ).
Lemma 3.2. Given the optimization problem (3.7) under assumptions A1-
A4, the following hold:
(a) A (finite) constant ξ1 > 0 exists such that
‖z− x̂ (xν) ‖ ≤ ξ1 rΞ(z; xν), z ∈ Ξ;
(b) A (finite) constant ξ2 > 0 exists such that
‖z− x̂ (xν) ‖ ≤ ξ2 lΞ(z; xν), z ∈ Rn.
Proof. This proof is similar to that of [28, Prop. 6.3.1, Prop. 6.3.7]. As a
technical note, referring to the cited propositions and using the same notation
therein, we emphasize that the proof of the aforementioned propositions can
be easily extended to the case of non-Cartesian set K but strongly monotone
VI functions F. For the sake of completeness, we state and prove both
extensions (see, Propositions 3.2 and 3.3 below). Results (a) and (b) of
Lemma 3.2 are direct consequences of applying Propositions 3.2 and 3.3
respectively, to the VI(Ξ,∇xθ˜(z; xν)), z ∈ Ξ.
Proposition 3.2. Consider the VI(K,F). Let K ⊂ Rn be a closed and
convex set. Let the map F : Rn → Rn be continuous and strongly monotone
on K with constant η > 0 i.e. (F(x)− F(y))T (x − y) ≥ η‖x − y‖2 for all
x,y ∈ K. Let x? be the unique solution of the VI(K,F). Then, there exists
ξ > 0 such that
‖x− x?‖ ≤ ξ ∥∥ΠN (x;K)(−F(x)) + F(x)∥∥ ∀x ∈ K,
where N (x;K) , {d ∈ Rn : dT (y − x) ≤ 0, ∀y ∈ K} denotes the normal
cone.
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Proof. Let x ∈ K be given, and let d , ΠN (x;K)(−F(x)). By definition of
the normal cone N (x;K) we have that
(y − x)Td ≤ 0 ∀y ∈ K.
Since x? ∈ K, we can let y = x? in the equation above, to obtain
(x? − x)T (d + F(x)− F(x)) ≤ 0. (3.23)
Since x ∈ K, we also have
F(x?)T (x? − x) ≤ 0. (3.24)
After adding equations (3.23) and (3.24), and rearranging terms it is easy to
obtain
(x? − x)T (F(x?)− F(x)) ≤ (x− x?)T (d + F(x))
≤ ‖x− x?‖ ‖d + F(x)‖ , (3.25)
where the last inequality follows from Cauchy-Schwarz inequality. By invok-
ing the strong monotonicity of F we have:
(F(x?)− F(x))T (x? − x) ≥ η‖x? − x‖2. (3.26)
The desired error bound follows readily from equations (3.25) and (3.26) i.e.
‖x− x?‖ ≤ 1
η
‖d + F(x)‖.
Proposition 3.3. Consider the VI(K,F). Let K ⊂ Rn be a closed and
convex set. Let the map F : Rn → Rn be strongly monotone on Rn with
constant η > 0 i.e. (F(x)− F(y))T (x − y) ≥ η‖x − y‖2 for all x,y ∈ Rn.
Suppose also that F is Lipschitz continuos with constant LF. Let x
? be the
unique solution of the VI(K,F). Then, there exists ξ > 0 such that
‖x− x?‖ ≤ ξ ‖FnatK (x)‖ ∀x ∈ Rn,
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where FnatK (x) , x− ΠK (x− F(x)) denotes the natural map.
Proof. Let x ∈ Rn be given, and let v = x − ΠK (x− F(x)). By the varia-
tional principle for the Euclidean projection, we have
(y − x + v)T (F(x)− v) ≥ 0 ∀y ∈ K.
Since x? ∈ K, we can let y = x? in the equation above, to obtain
(x? − x + v)T (F(x)− v) ≥ 0. (3.27)
Since x? is the unique solution of the VI(K,F) and the vector (x − v) ∈ K
we also have
F(x?)T (x− v − x?) ≥ 0. (3.28)
After adding equations (3.27) and (3.28), and rearranging terms it is easy to
obtain
(x− x?)T (F(x)− F(x?)) ≤ vT (F(x)− F(x?))− ‖v‖2 + (x− x?)T v
(a)
≤ ‖v‖ ‖F(x)− F(x?)‖+ ‖x− x?‖ ‖v‖
(b)
≤ (LF + 1)‖v‖ ‖x− x?‖ (3.29)
where (a) follows from Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, and (b) follows by the
Lipchitz continuity of F. By invoking the strong monotonicity of F we have:
(F(x)− F(x?))T (x− x?) ≥ η‖x− x?‖2. (3.30)
The desired error bound follows readily from equations (3.29) and (3.30) i.e.
‖x− x?‖ ≤ LF + 1
η
‖v‖ = LF + 1
η
‖FnatK (x)‖.
Note that, for a non-polyhedral finitely representable (convex) set Ξ and
z, the computation of lΞ(z; x
ν) amounts to solving a convex optimization
problem; whereas in the same case if z ∈ Ξ satisfies a suitable Constraint
Qualification (CQ), the computation of rΞ(z; x
ν) reduces to solving a convex
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quadratic program. Thus rΞ(z; x
ν) is computationally easier than lΞ(z; x
ν)
to be obtained but, contrary to lΞ(z; x
ν), it can be used only to test vectors
z belonging to Ξ. Using the error bounds in Lemma 3.2 and given a step-size
rule {γν}, the termination criterion in Step 2 of the algorithm becomes then
rΞ(z; x
ν) ≤ α˜ γν or lΞ(z; xν) ≤ α˜ γν , for some α˜ > 0.
3.3.2 Generalizations
So far we have restricted our attention to optimization problems in the DC
form. However, it is worth mentioning that the proposed analysis and re-
sulting algorithms (also those introduced in the forthcoming sections) can
be readily extended to other sum-utility functions not necessarily in the DC
form, such as θ̂(x) ,
∑
`∈If f`(x), where the set If , {1, . . . , If} may be dif-
ferent from the set of users {1, . . . , I}, and each function f` is not necessarily
expressed as the difference of two convex functions. It is not difficult to show
that in such a case the candidate approximation function θ˜(x; xν) still has
the form in (3.6), where each θ˜i(x; x
ν) is now given by
θ˜i(x; x
ν) ,
∑
j∈Ci
fj(xi, x
ν
−i) +
∑
j /∈Ci
∇xifj(xν)T (xi − xνi ) +
τi
2
‖xi − xνi ‖2
where Ci is any subset of Si ⊆ If , with
Si , {j ∈ If :fj(•,x−i) is convex on Xi,∀x−i ∈ X−i} .
In θ˜i(x; x
ν) each user linearizes only the functions outside Ci while preserving
the convex part of the sum-utility. The choice of Ci ⊆ Si is a degree of freedom
useful to explore the tradeoff between signaling and convergence speed.
3.4 Distributed Implementation
In general, the implementation of Algorithms 3.1 and 3.2 requires a coordina-
tion among the users; the amount of network signaling depends on the specific
application under consideration. To alleviate the communication overhead of
a centralized implementation, it is desirable to obtain a decentralized version
of these schemes. Interestingly, the separability structure of the approxima-
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tion function θ˜(x; xν) resulting from the proposed convexification method
(cf. Section 3.3) as well as that of the coupling constraints (cf. A5) lends
itself to a parallel decomposition of the subproblems (3.7) across the users
in the primal or dual domain. The proposed distributed implementations of
Step 2 of Algorithms 3.1 (and Algorithm 3.2) are described in the next two
subsections.
3.4.1 Distributed Dual-Decomposition based Algorithms
The subproblems (3.7) can be solved in a distributed way if the side con-
straints h(x) ≤ 0 are dualized (under zero-duality gap). The dual problem
associated with each (3.7) is: given xν ∈ Ξ,
maximize
λ≥0
{
d(λ; xν) , min
x∈X
{
θ˜(x; xν) + λTh(x)
}}
. (3.31)
Note that, under A1-A5, the inner minimization in (3.31) has a unique solu-
tion, which will be denoted by x̂(λ; xν) , (x̂i(λ; xν))Ii=1, that is
x̂i(λ; x
ν) , argmin
xi∈Xi
{
θ˜i(xi; x
ν) + λThi(xi)
}
. (3.32)
Before proceeding, let us introduce the following assumptions.
A6) The side constraint vector function h(•) is Lipschitz continuous on X ,
with constant Lh.
A7) For each subproblem (3.7), there is zero-duality gap, and the dual prob-
lem (3.31) has a non-empty solution set.
We emphasize that the above conditions are generally satisfied by many
practical problems of interest. For example, A7 holds if some CQ is satisfied,
e.g., (generalized) Slater’s CQ, or the feasible set Ξ is a polyhedron.
The next lemma summarizes some desirable properties of the dual function
d(λ; xν), which are instrumental to prove convergence of dual schemes.
Lemma 3.3. Under A1-A5 we have the following:
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(a) d(λ; xν) is differentiable on Rnc+ , with gradient
∇λd(λ; xν) = h (x̂(λ; xν)) =
∑
i
hi (x̂i(λ; x
ν)) . (3.33)
(b) If, in addition, A6 holds, then ∇λd(λ; xν) is Lipschitz continuous on
Rnc+ with constant L∇d , L2h
√
nc/cτ .
Proof. (a) It is a consequence of Danskin’s theorem [12, Prop. A.43].
(b) The statement follows from
‖∇d (λ; x̂ (λ; xν))−∇d(λ; x̂(λ′; xν))‖ ≤ Lh ‖x̂ (λ; xν)− x̂(λ′; xν)‖
≤ Lxˆ ‖λ− λ′‖,
where in the last inequality we used the uniformly Lipschitz property of
x̂(•; xν), as proved in the lemma below.
Lemma 3.4. Under A1-A6, x̂(•; xν) is uniformly Lipschitz continuous on
Rnc+ , with constant Lxˆ , Lh
√
nc/cτ .
Proof. To simplify the notation, let us write xλ , x̂ (λ; xν) and xλ′ ,
x̂ (λ′; xν). By the minimum principle, we have that
(xλ′ − xλ)T ∇xL(xλ,λ) ≥ 0
(xλ − xλ′)T ∇xL(xλ′ ,λ′) ≥ 0,
where L(x,λ) , θ˜(x; xν) +∑ncj=1 λjhj(x) denotes the Lagrangian function.
Adding these two inequalities, we obtain
(xλ − xλ′)T [∇xL(xλ′ ,λ′)−∇xL(xλ,λ′) +∇xL(xλ,λ′)−∇xL(xλ,λ)] ≥ 0,
which leads to
cτ ‖xλ′ − xλ‖2 ≤ (xλ′ − xλ)T [∇xL(xλ′ ,λ′)−∇xL(xλ,λ′)]
≤ (xλ − xλ′)T [∇xL(xλ,λ′)−∇xL(xλ,λ)] ,
where the first inequality follows by the uniform strong convexity of L(•,λ′)
(with constant cτ ). Then, it is not difficult to see that
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cτ ‖xλ′ − xλ‖
(a)
≤ ‖∇xL(xλ,λ′)−∇xL(xλ,λ)‖
(b)
≤
nc∑
j=1
∣∣λ′j − λj∣∣ ‖∇xhj(xλ)‖
(c)
≤
nc∑
j=1
∣∣λ′j − λj∣∣ Lh = Lh ‖λ′ − λ‖1
(d)
≤ Lh√nc ‖λ′ − λ‖
where: (a) follows by Cauchy-Schwartz inequality, (b) is a consequence of the
triangle inequality, (c) is a direct consequence of the Lipschitz continuity of
the h, and (d) follows by the equivalence of the norms.
The dual-problem can be solved, e.g., using well-known gradient algorithms
[11]; an instance is given in Algorithm 3.3, whose convergence is stated in
Theorem 3.4. In (3.34) [•]+ denotes the Euclidean projection onto R+, i.e.,
[x]+ , max(0, x).
Algorithm 3.3: Dual-based Distributed Implementation of Step 2 of Algo-
rithm 3.1
Data: λ0 ≥ 0, xν , {αt} > 0; set t = 0.
(S.2a): If λt satisfies a suitable termination criterion: STOP.
(S.2b): The users solve in parallel (3.32): for all i = 1, . . . , I, compute
x̂i(λ
t; xν).
(S.2c): Update λ according to
λt+1 ,
[
λt + αt
I∑
i=1
hi
(
x̂i(λ
t; xν)
)]+
. (3.34)
(S.2d): t← t+ 1 and go back to (S.2a).
Theorem 3.4. Given the DC program (3.1) under A1-A5, suppose that one
of the two following conditions are satisfied:
(a) A6 holds and {αt} is chosen such that 0 < αt = αmax < 2/L∇d, for all
t ≥ 0;
(b) ∇λd(•; xν) is uniformly bounded on Rnc+ , and {αt} is chosen such that
αt > 0, αt → 0, ∑t αt =∞, and ∑t(αt)2 <∞.
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Then, under A7, the sequence
{
λt
}
generated by Algorithm 3.3 converges
to a solution of (3.31), and the sequence {x̂(λt; xν)} converges to the unique
solution of (3.7).
Proof. This result is a direct consequence of Lemma 3.3 and standard con-
vergence results of gradient projection algorithms; refer to [105, Thm. 3.2]
and [11, Prop. 8.2.6] for the conclusions stated under assumptions (a) and
(b), respectively.
Remark 3.2 (On the distributed implementation). The distributed imple-
mentation of Algorithms 3.1 and 3.2 based on Algorithm 3.3 leads to a double-
loop scheme with communication between the two loops: given the current
value of the multipliers λt, the users can solve in a distributed way their sub-
problems (3.32); once the new value x̂(λt; xν) is available, the multipliers are
updated according to (3.34). Note that when nc = 1 (i.e., only one shared
constraint), the update in (3.34) can be replaced by a bisection search, which
generally converges quite fast. When nc > 1, the potential slow convergence
of gradient updates (3.34) can be alleviated using accelerated gradient-based
update; see, e.g., [77]. Note also that the size of the dual problem (the di-
mension of λ) is equal to nc (the number of shared constraints), which makes
Algorithm 3.3 scalable in the number of users.
As far as the communication overhead needed to implement the proposed
scheme is concerned, the signaling among the users is in the form of message
passing and, of course, is problem dependent; see Section 3.5 for specific ex-
amples. When the networks has a cluster-head, the update of the multipliers
can be performed at the cluster, and then broadcast to the users. In fully
decentralized networks, the update of λ can be done by the users themselves,
by running consensus based algorithms to locally estimate
∑
i hi
(
x̂i(λ
t; xν)
)
.
This in general requires a limited signaling exchange among neighboring
nodes.
3.4.2 Distributed Implementation via Primal-Decomposition
Algorithm 3.3 is based on the relaxation of the side constraints into the
Lagrangian, resulting in general in a violation of these constraints during
the intermediate iterates. In some applications, this may prevent the on-line
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implementation of the algorithm. In this section, we propose a distributed
scheme which does not suffer from this issue; we cope with side constraints
using a primal decomposition technique.
Introducing the slack variables t , (ti)Ii=1, with each ti ∈ Rnc , (3.7) can
be rewritten as
minimize
(xi,ti)Ii=1
I∑
i=1
θ˜i(xi; x
ν),
subject to xi ∈ Xi, ∀i = 1, . . . , I,
hi(xi) ≤ ti, ∀i = 1, . . . , I,
I∑
i=1
ti ≤ 0,
(3.35)
When t = (ti)
I
i=1 is fixed, (3.35) can be decoupled across the users: for each
i = 1, . . . , I, solve
minimize
xi
θ˜i(xi; x
ν),
subject to xi ∈ Xi,
hi(xi)
µi(ti;x
ν)
≤ ti,
(3.36)
where µi(ti; x
ν) is the optimal Lagrange multiplier associated with the in-
equality constraint hi(xi) ≤ ti. Note that the existence of µi(ti; xν) is guar-
anteed if (3.36) has zero duality gap (e.g., when some CQ hold) [11, Prop.
6.5.8], but µi(ti; x
ν) may not be unique. Let us denote by x?i (ti; x
ν) the
unique solution of (3.36) given t =(ti)
I
i=1. The optimal slack t
? , (t?i )Ii=1
of the shared constraints can be found solving the so-called master (convex)
problem (see, e.g., [81]):
minimize
t
P (t; xν) ,
I∑
i=1
θ˜i(x
?
i (ti; x
ν); xν)
subject to
I∑
i=1
ti ≤ 0.
(3.37)
Due to the non-uniqueness of µi(ti; x
ν), the objective function in (3.37) is
nondifferentiable; problem (3.37) can be solved by subgradient methods. A
subgradient of P (t; xν) at t is
∂tiP (t; x
ν) = −µi(ti; xν), i = 1, . . . , I.
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We refer to [11, Prop. 8.2.6] for standard convergence results of subgradient
projection algorithms.
3.5 Applications and Numerical Results
The DC formulation (3.1) and the consequent proposed algorithms are gen-
eral enough to encompass many problems of practical interest in different
fields. Here we focus on two specific applications that can be casted in the
DC-form (3.1), namely: i) a new secrecy rate maximization game; and ii)
the sum-rate maximization problem over MIMO CR networks.
3.5.1 Case Study 1: A New Secrecy Rate Game
Physical layer security has been considered as a promising technique to
prevent illegitimate receivers from eavesdropping on the confidential mes-
sage transmitted between intended network nodes; see, e.g., [47] and refer-
ences therein. Recently, cooperative transmissions using trusted relays or
friendly jammers to improve physical layer security has attracted increasing
attention [24, 39, 59, 115, 104, 36, 119, 60]. There are mainly three re-
laying/jamming protocols for the cooperative secure transmission: amplify-
and-forward, decode-and-forward, and cooperative (friendly) jamming. Of
particular interest to this work is the Cooperative Jamming (CJ) paradigm
(see, e.g., [24, 39, 59]): friendly jammers create judicious interference by
transmitting noise (or codewords) so as to impair the eavesdropper’s ability
to decode the confidential information, and thus, increase secure communi-
cation rates between legitimate parties. The interference from the jammers
however might also reduce the useful rate of the legitimate links; therefore
the maximization of the users’ secrecy rate calls for a joint optimization of
the power allocations of the sources and the jammers.
Here we address such a joint optimization problem. We consider a network
model composed of multiple transmitter-receiver pairs, multiple friendly jam-
mers, and a single eavesdropper. Note that previous works studied simpler
system models, composed of either one source-destination link (and possibly
multiple jammers) or multiple sources but one jammer. We formulate the
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system design as a game wherein the players−the legitimate users−maximize
their own secrecy rate by choosing jointly their transmit power and (the op-
timal fraction of the) power of the friendly jammers. The resulting secrecy
game faces two main challenges, namely: i) the players’ objective functions
are nonconcave and nondifferentiable; and ii) there are side (thus coupling)
constraints. All this makes the analysis of the proposed game a difficult
task; for instance, a Nash Equilibrium may not even exist. Capitalizing on
recent results on nonconvex games with side constraints [84, 85], we intro-
duce a novel relaxed equilibrium concept for the nonconvex nondifferentiable
game, named (restricted) B-Quasi Generalized Nash Equilibrium (B-QGNE).
Roughly speaking a B-QGNE is a solution of the first order aggregated sta-
tionarity conditions (based on directional derivatives) of the players’ opti-
mization problems. Aiming to devise distributed algorithms computing a
(B-)QGNE, we establish a connection between (a subclass of) such equilibria
and the stationary solutions of a suitably defined differentiable DC program
with side constraints, for which we can successfully use the DC framework
developed in this this chapter. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
attempt toward a rigorous characterization of the nondifferentiability issue in
secrecy rate multiuser resource allocation problems. We conclude our analysis
with some numerical experiments, which show that the proposed distributed
algorithms yield secrecy sum-rates that are better than those achievable by
centralized schemes (attempting to compute stationary solutions of the DC
program), and comparable to those achievable by computationally expensive
techniques attempting to obtain globally optimal solutions.
3.5.1.1 System Model and Problem Formulation
Consider a wireless communication system composed ofQ transmitter-receiver
pairs−the legitimate users−J friendly jammers, and a single eavesdropper;
see Figure 3.1. We assume OFDMA transmissions for the legitimate users
over flat-fading and quasi-static (constant within the transmission frame)
channels. We denote by HSDqq the channel gain of the legitimate source-
destination pair q, by HJDjq the channel gain between the transmitter of jam-
mer j and the receiver of user q, by HJEje the channel gain between the trans-
mitter of jammer j and the receiver of the eavesdropper, and by HSEqe the
channel between the source q and the eavesdropper. We assume CSI of the
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eavesdropper’s (cross)-channels; this is a common assumption in PHY secu-
rity literature; see, e.g., [47, 24, 39, 59, 115, 104, 119, 36, 60]. CSI on the
eavesdropper’s channel can be obtained when the eavesdropper is active in
the network and its transmissions can be monitored. For instance, this hap-
pens in networks combining multicast and unicast transmissions wherein the
users work as legitimate receiver for some signals and eavesdroppers for oth-
ers. Another scenario is a cellular environment where the eavesdroppers are
also users of the network; in a time-division duplex system, the base station
can estimate the users’ channels based on the channel reciprocity.
Figure 3.1: System model composed of the legitimate users, friendly jammers and a single eavesdropper.
The arrows illustrate the channel gains for the q-th user and the eavesdropper.
In the setting above, we adopt the CJ paradigm: the friendly jammers
cooperate with the users by introducing a proper interference profile “mask-
ing” the eavesdropper. The (uniform) power allocation of source q is denoted
by pq; p
J
jq is the fraction of power of friendly jammer j requested by user q
(allocated by jammer j over the channel used by user q); the power profile
allocated by all the jammers over the channel of user q is pJq , (pJjq)Jj=1.
Each user q has power budget pq ≤ Pq, and likewise each jammer j, that
is
∑Q
q=1 p
J
jq ≤ P Jj , for all j = 1, . . . , J . Under basic information theoretical
assumptions, the maximum achievable rate on link q is
rqq
(
pq,p
J
q
)
, log
(
1 +
HSDqq pq
σ2 +
∑J
j=1H
JD
jq p
J
jq
)
. (3.38)
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Similarly, the rate on the channel between source q and the eavesdropper is
rqe
(
pq,p
J
q
)
, log
(
1 +
HSEqe pq
σ2 +
∑J
j=1H
JE
je p
J
jq
)
. (3.39)
The secrecy rate of user q is then (see, e.g., [47]):
rsq
(
pq,p
J
q
)
,
[
rqq(pq,p
J
q) − rqe(pq,pJq)
]+
. (3.40)
Problem Formulation. We formulate the system design as a game where
the legitimate users are the players who cooperate with the jammers to max-
imize their own secrecy rate. More formally, anticipating (pJr)r 6=q, each user
q seeks together with the jammers the tuple
(
pq,p
J
q
)
solving the following
optimization problem:
G :
maximize
(pq ,pJq)≥0
rsq
(
pq,p
J
q
)
subject to:
pq ≤ Pq,
Q∑
r=1
pJjr ≤ P Jj , ∀ j = 1, . . . , J.
 , Pq(pJ−q)
(3.41)
Note that the feasible set Pq(pJ−q) of (3.41) depends on the jammers’ power
profile pJ−q , (pJr)r 6=q allocated over the other users’ channels. When needed,
we will denote each tuple (pq,p
J
q) by xq , (pq,pJq). The game whose q-th
optimization problem is given by (3.41) will be termed as secrecy game G.
The secrecy game G is an instance of the so-called Generalized Nash Equi-
librium problem (GNEP) with shared constraints; see, e.g., [27]. A solution
of G is the Generalized Nash Equilibrium (GNE), defined as follows.
Definition 3.1 (GNE). A strategy profile (p?q,p
J?
q )
Q
q=1 is a GNE of the GNEP
G if the following holds for all q = 1, . . . , Q: (p?q,pJ?q ) ∈ Pq(pJ?−q) and
rsq(p
?
q,p
J?
q ) ≥ rsq(pq,pJq), ∀(pq,pJq) ∈ Pq(pJ?−q). (3.42)
The (distributed) computation of a GNE of G is a challenging if not an
impossible task, due to the following issues:
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1. The nondifferentiability of the player’s objective functions.
2. The nonconcavity of the players’ objective functions.
3. The presence of coupling constraints.
Toward the practical resolution of G coping with the aforementioned issues,
we follow the 3 logical steps outlined next.
- A smooth-game formulation: We start dealing with the nondifferen-
tiability issue by introducing a smooth restricted (still nonconcave)
version of the original game G, termed game Gsm, and establishing the
connection with G in terms of GNE;
- Relaxed equilibrium concepts : To deal with the nonconcavity of the
players’ objective functions we introduce relaxed equilibrium concepts
for both games G and Gsm, and establish their connections. The com-
parison shows that the smooth game Gsm preserves (relaxed) solutions
of G of practical interest while just ignoring those yielding zero secrecy
rates for the players.
- Algorithmic design: We then focus on the computation of the relaxed
equilibria of Gsm, casting the problem into a multiuser DC program in
the form (3.1), which can be distributively solved using the machinery
introduced earlier in this chapter.
3.5.1.2 A Smooth-Game Formulation
We introduce a restricted smooth-game wherein the max operator in the
objective function of each player’s optimization problem (3.41) is relaxed via
linear constraints. This formulation is a direct consequence of the following
fact: rqq
(
pq,p
J
q
) ≥ rqe (pq,pJq) if and only if either pq = 0 or
HSDqq
σ2 +
∑J
j=1 H
JD
jq p
J
jq
≥ H
SE
qe
σ2 +
∑J
j=1H
JE
je p
J
jq
.
Clearly, the latter inequality is equivalent to:
J∑
j=1
(
HSDqqH
JE
je −HSEqeHJDjq
)
pJjq +
(
HSDqq −HSEqe
)
σ2 ≥ 0. (3.43)
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Note that if (3.43) holds with equality, then rsq
(
pq,p
J
q
)
= 0 for any pq ≥ 0.
These observations lead to the restricted smooth game, which we call Gsm,
where each player q anticipating pJ−q solves the following differentiable, albeit
nonconcave, maximization problem:
Gsm :
maximize
(pq ,pJq)≥0
r˜sq(pq,p
J
q) , rqq(pq,pJq) − rqe(pq,pJq)
subject to:
pq ≤ Pq,
constraint (3.43),
Q∑
r=1
pJjr ≤ P Jj ,∀ j = 1, . . . , J,
 , P
sm
q (p
J
−q)
(3.44)
where we denoted by Psmq (pJ−q) the feasible set of the optimization problem.
For notational convenience, we also introduce the joint strategy set P defined
as:
P ,
 (pq,p
J
q))
Q
q=1 ≥ 0 : pq ≤ Pq and (3.43) holds, ∀q = 1, . . . , Q,∑Q
r=1
pJjr ≤ P Jj , ∀ j = 1, . . . , J
 .
It turns out from the above discussion that, solution-wise, the main differ-
ence between the smooth game Gsm and the original one G is that Gsm ignores
the feasible players’ strategy profiles of G violating (3.43) (and thus outside
P). But such tuples yield zero secrecy rate of the players and thus are of
little significance, since the players’ goals are to attempt the maximization
of their secrecy rates. We can then focus on strategy profiles in the set P ,
without any practical loss of optimality. The next proposition makes formal
the aforementioned connection between G and Gsm.
Proposition 3.4. Given G and Gsm, the following hold.
(a) A GNE of G always exists;
(b) A GNE of Gsm exists provided that P 6= ∅;
(c) [G → Gsm]: If x? is a GNE of G satisfying the constraints (3.43) for all
q = 1, . . . , Q, then x? is a GNE of Gsm.
(d) [Gsm → G]: If x? is a GNE of Gsm, then x? is a GNE of G.
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Proof. (a) It is not difficult to check that G is an exact potential game with
potential function Φ(p,pJ) ,
∑
q r
s
q(pq,p
J
q). It turns out that any optimal
solution of the associated multiplayer maximization problem:
maximize
(p,pJ)≥0
Φ(p,pJ)
subject to:
pq ≤ Pq, ∀q = 1, . . . , Q
Q∑
r=1
pJjr ≤ P Jj , ∀ j = 1, . . . , J,
(3.45)
is a GNE of G. Since (3.45) has a solution, there must exist a GNE for G.
(b) The proof is based on similar arguments as those in (a).
(c) Suppose that x? ,
(
p?q,p
J?
q
)Q
q=1
is a GNE of G satisfying (3.43) for all
q = 1, . . . , Q. Then, for every q, we have:
(
p?q,p
J?
q
) ∈ Psmq (pJ?−q) and
r˜sq
(
p?q,p
J?
q
)
= rsq
(
p?q,p
J?
q
) ≥ rsq (pq,pJq) = r˜sq (pq,pJq) ,
for all
(
pq,p
J
q
) ∈ Psmq (pJ?−q). Therefore, (p?q,pJ?q ) is a solution of (3.44), with
pJ−q = p
J?
−q.
(d) Suppose that x? ,
(
p?q,p
J?
q
)Q
q=1
is a GNE of Gsm. Then, for each q,(
p?q,p
J?
q
) ∈ Pq(pJ?−q) and
rsq
(
p?q,p
J?
q
)
= r˜sq
(
p?q,p
J?
q
) ≥ r˜sq (pq,pJq) = rsq (pq,pJq) ,
for all
(
pq,p
J
q
) ∈ Psmq (pJ?−q). Since rsq (pq,pJq) = 0 for all (pq,pJq) ∈ Pq(pJ?−q) \
Psmq (pJ?−q) , we have
rsq
(
p?q,p
J?
q
) ≥ rsq (pq,pJq) , ∀ (pq,pJq) ∈ Pq(pJ?−q).
Therefore,
(
p?q,p
J?
q
)
is a solution of (3.41), with pJ−q = p
J?
−q.
The first important result stated in Proposition 3.4 is that the two games
have a solution (Gsm under P 6= ∅). Note that a sufficient condition guaran-
teeing P 6= ∅ is HSDqq ≥ HSEqe for all q [cf. (3.43)], implying that the channel
gains of the legitimate users cannot be worse than those between the sources
and the eavesdropper. For instance, this happens if the legitimate receivers
are much closer to their intended transmitters than the eavesdropper’s re-
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ceiver. Conversely, if (3.43) is violated for some q (implying P = ∅), there
exists no feasible user/jammer power allocation yielding a positive secrecy
rate for user q. Note that this is in agreement with current results in the
literature; see, e.g., [36, 104].
Proposition 3.4 also establishes the connection between the GNE of G and
Gsm. In particular, statement (d) justifies the focus on the smooth (and thus
more affordable) game Gsm rather than the nonsmooth G without any prac-
tical loss of generality. The computation of a GNE of Gsm however remains
a difficult task, because of the nonconcavity of the players’ objective func-
tions r˜sq. To obtain practical solution schemes, we introduce next a relaxed
equilibrium concept, whose computation can be done using the framework
proposed in the first part of this chapter.
3.5.1.3 Relaxed Equilibrium Concepts
Based on the concept of B(ouligand)-derivative [28] we define next a relaxed
notion of equilibrium for the nonsmooth nonconvex game G.
Definition 3.2 (B-QGNE). A strategy profile x? , (x?q , (p?q,pJ?q ))Qq=1 is
a B-Quasi GNE (B-QGNE) of G if the following holds for all q = 1, . . . , Q:
(p?q,p
J?
q ) ∈ Pq(pJ?−q) and
rsq
′(x?q; xq − x?q) ≤ 0 ∀xq ∈ Pq(pJ?−q), (3.46)
where rsq
′(x?q; xq −x?q) denotes the directional derivative of the function rsq at
x?q along the direction xq − x?q.
In words, a B-QGNE is a stationary solution of the GNEP, where the
stationary concept is based on the directional derivative. Of course the B-
QGNE can be defined also for the smooth game Gsm; in such a case, the
directional derivative rsq
′(x?q; xq−x?q) in (3.46) reduces to∇xq r˜sq(x?q)T (xq−x?q),
because r˜sq(•) is differentiable; thus, in the following, we will refer to it just
as QGNE of Gsm. Note that the B-QGNE is an instance of the Quasi-Nash
Equilibrium introduced recently in [84, 85] to deal with the nonconvexity of
the players’ optimization problems.
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It is worth mentioning that since the players’ optimization problems in
G and Gsm have polyhedral feasible sets, every GNE of G (resp. Gsm) is a
B-QGNE (resp. QGNE), but the converse is not necessarily true.
As already observed for the GNE, the subclass of quasi-solutions of G of
practical interest are those associated with the strategy profiles belonging to
the set P . We can capture this feature introducing the concept of restricted
B-QGNE of G, which are B-QGNE “over the set P”; hence, ignoring those
feasible tuples of (3.41) that yield zero secrecy rates.
Definition 3.3 (Restricted B-QGNE). A strategy x? , (x?q , (p?q,pJ?q ))Qq=1
is a restricted B-QGNE of G if the following holds for all q = 1, . . . , Q:
(p?q,p
J?
q ) ∈ Psmq (pJ?−q) and
rsq
′(x?q; xq − x?q) ≤ 0, ∀xq ∈ Psmq (pJ?−q),
with Psmq (pJ?−q) defined in (3.44).
A natural question now is whether the connection between the GNE of G
and Gsm as stated in Proposition 3.4 is somehow preserved also in terms of
quasi-equilibria (which in principle is not guaranteed). The answer is stated
next.
Proposition 3.5. Given G and Gsm, the following hold.
(a) A B-QGNE of G always exists;
(b) A QGNE of Gsm (resp. restricted B-QGNE of G) exists provided that
P 6= ∅;
(c) [G → Gsm]: If x? is a (restricted) B-QGNE of G satisfying (3.43) for all
q = 1, . . . , Q, then x? is a QGNE of Gsm;
(d) [Gsm → G]: If x? is a QGNE of Gsm, then x? is a restricted B-QGNE of
G.
Proof. (a) It follows from Proposition 3.4(a) that a GNE of G always exists;
since the players’ optimization problems in G have polyhedral sets, every
GNE of G is also a B-QGNE. Therefore a B-QGNE of G exists.
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(b) It follows from Proposition 3.4(b) and similar arguments as in the proof
of (a).
(c) This proof is based on the following fact, regarding the directional deriva-
tive of the plus function [13, Eq. 2.124]:
rsq
′(z; y − z) = [max(0, r˜sq(•))]′(z; y − z)
=
{
max
(
0,∇xq r˜sq(z)T (y − z)
)
, if r˜sq(z) = 0
∇xq r˜sq(z)T (y − z), if r˜sq(z) > 0.
(3.47)
Let x? ,
(
x?q
)Q
q=1
be a (restricted) B-QGNE of G satisfying (3.43) for all
q = 1, . . . , Q, with x?q ,
(
p?q,p
J?
q
)
. Then, for every q, based on (3.47),
consider the following two cases:
Case I : r˜sq(x
?
q) > 0. For all xq ∈ Psmq (pJ?−q) we have
0 ≥ rsq ′(x?q; xq − x?q) = ∇xq r˜sq(x?q)T
(
xq − x?q
)
.
Case II : r˜sq(x
?
q) = 0. For all xq ∈ Psmq (pJ?−q) we have
0 ≥ rsq ′(x?q; xq − x?q) ≥ ∇xq r˜sq(x?q)T
(
xq − x?q
)
.
The desired result follows readily from the above two cases.
(d) Let x? ,
(
x?q
)Q
q=1
be a QGNE of Gsm, with x?q ,
(
p?q,p
J?
q
)
. Consider an
arbitrary q. Clearly, x?q ∈ Psmq (pJ?−q). Based on (3.47), consider the following
two cases:
Case I : r˜sq(x
?
q) > 0. For all xq ∈ Psmq (pJ?−q) we have
rsq
′(x?q; xq − x?q) = ∇xq r˜sq(x?q)T
(
xq − x?q
) ≤ 0
Case II : r˜sq(x
?
q) = 0. For all xq ∈ Psmq (pJ?−q) we have
rsq
′(x?q; xq − x?q) = max
(
0,∇xq r˜sq(x?q)T
(
xq − x?q
))
= 0
The desired result comes readily from the above two cases.
The above proposition paves the way to the design of numerical methods
to compute a B-QGNE of G. Indeed, according to statement (d), one can
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compute a B-QGNE of G (which is a solutions of practical interest) via a
QGNE of Gsm. This last task is addressed in the next subsection.
3.5.1.4 Algorithmic Design
With the goal of computing a QGNE of Gsm in mind, we capitalize on the
potential structure of Gsm and construct the following multiplayer linearly
constrained optimization problem:
(P) :
maximize
(p,pJ)
r(p,pJ) ,
∑Q
q=1
r˜sq(xq)
subject to
(
p,pJ
) ∈ P (3.48)
The above nonconcave maximization problem is smooth, thus the standard
definition of stationary solutions is applicable.
The connection between the social problem (P) in (3.48) and the games G
and Gsm is given in the next proposition.
Proposition 3.6. Given Gsm, and the social problem (P) in (3.48), the fol-
lowing hold.
(a) If P 6= ∅, then (P) has an optimal solution;
(b) [(P ) → Gsm]: If x? is an optimal solution of (P), then x? is a GNE of
Gsm;
(c) [(P ) → Gsm]: If x? is a stationary solution of (P), then x? is a QGNE
of Gsm;
(d) [Gsm → (P )]: If x? is a QGNE of Gsm and there exists common mul-
tipliers of the shared constraints
∑Q
r=1 p
J
jr ≤ P Jj j = 1, . . . , J for all
players, then x? is a stationary solution of (P).
Proof. (a) This is clear.
(b) Since the game Gsm is of the potential type, the desired result follows
immediately.
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(c) For notational simplicity, generalizing (3.48), consider the following ab-
stract optimization problem with separable, differentiable, objective function:
maximize
x,(xq)Qq=1
Q∑
q=1
ψq(xq)
subject to: x ∈ X ,∏Qq=1Xq, Q∑
q=1
Aqxq ≤ b,
}
, Ξ̂
(3.49)
where each xq ∈ Rnq , Xq ⊂ Rnq is a polyhedron, Aq is a matrix of order
Rm×nq , b is a m-dimensional vector, and Ξ̂ denotes the feasible set of (3.49).
Let x? ,
(
x?q
)Q
q=1
be a stationary solution of (3.49). By definition, this
means that x? ∈ Ξ̂ and ∑Qq=1 (xq − x?q)T ∇xqψq(x?q) ≤ 0, for all x ∈ Ξ̂. In
particular, for every xq ∈ Xq such that: Aqxq +
∑
r 6=q Ar x
?
r ≤ b, we have(
xq − x?q
)T ∇ψq(x?q) ≤ 0, which establishes that x?q is a stationary solution
of the optimization problem:
maximize
xq∈Xq :Aqxq+
∑
r 6=qAr x?r≤b
ψq(xq)
Hence x? is a QGNE of the game where each player q, anticipating (xr)r 6=q,
solves the optimization problem:
maximize
xq∈Xq :Aqxq+
∑
r 6=qAr xr≤b
ψq(xq)
Thus, the desired conclusion follows easily by applying this general result to
the secrecy rate game Gsm.
(d) This result follows readily under the common multipliers assumption.
Figure 3.2 summarizes the main results and relationship between G, Gsm
and the social problem (P), as stated in Propositions 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6.
Based on Proposition 3.6, one can now design distributed algorithms for
computing a (Q)GNE of Gsm (and thus a restricted B-QGNE of the original
game G): it is sufficient to solve the social problem (P). Such a problem
is nonconcave; stationary solutions however can be computed efficiently ob-
serving that (P) is an instance of the DC program (3.1), under the following
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Figure 3.2: Connections between the games G, Gsm and the social problem (P).
identifications:
fq
(
pq,p
J
q
)
,− log
(
σ2 +HSDqq pq +
J∑
j=1
HJDjq p
J
jq
)
− log
(
σ2 +
J∑
j=1
HJEje p
J
jq
)
gq
(
pq,p
J
q
)
,− log
(
σ2 +HSEqe pq +
J∑
j=1
HJEje p
J
jq
)
− log
(
σ2 +
J∑
j=1
HJDjq p
J
jq
)
.
Then, we can compute efficiently a stationary solution of (P) using any of
the distributed algorithms introduced in Section 3.4. For instance, Algorithm
3.1 based on a dual decomposition loop (cf. Algorithm 3.3) specialized to
(P) is given in Algorithm 3.4, where in (3.51), we let
Xq ,
{
xq , (pq,pJq) ≥ 0 : pq ≤ Pq and (3.43) holds
}
and
θ˜q(xq; x
ν
q ) , fq (xq)−
∂gq(x
ν
q )
∂pq
pq −
J∑
j=1
∂gq(x
ν
q )
∂pJjq
pJjq +
τq
2
‖xq − xνq‖2, (3.50)
with
∂gq(xq)
∂pq
, − H
SE
qe
σ2 +HSEqe pq +
∑J
j=1H
JE
je p
J
jq
∂gq(xq)
∂pJjq
, − H
JE
je
σ2 +HSEqe pq +
∑J
j=1H
JE
je p
J
jq
− H
JD
jq
σ2 +
∑J
j=1 H
JD
jq p
J
jq
, j = 1, . . . , J.
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Algorithm 3.4: DC-based Algorithm for (P)
Data: τ , (τq)Qq=1 ≥ 0, {γν} > 0, {αt} > 0 and x0 , (p0,pJ,0) ∈ P . Set
ν = 0.
(S.1): If xν , (pν ,pJ,ν) satisfies a termination criterion, STOP.
(S.2a): Choose λ0 , (λ0j)Jj=1 ≥ 0. Set t = 0.
(S.2b): If λt , (λtj)Jj=1 satisfies a termination criterion, set x̂ (xν) =
(pν, tq ,p
J, ν, t
q )
Q
q=1 and go to (S.3).
(S.2c): The legitimate users q = 1, . . . , Q compute in parallel (p ν, tq ,p
J, ν, t
q )
given by
(p ν, tq ,p
J, ν, t
q ) , argmin
xq,(pq ,pJq)∈Xq
{
θ˜q(xq; x
ν
q ) + λ
tTpJq
}
. (3.51)
(S.2d): Update λ , (λj)Jj=1: for all j = 1, . . . , J ,
λt+1j ,
[
λtj + α
t
(
Q∑
q=1
pJ, ν, tjq − P Jj
)]+
. (3.52)
(S.2e): Set t← t+ 1 and go back to (S.2b).
(S.3): Set xν+1 = xν + γν ( x̂ (xν)− xν ).
(S.4): ν ← ν + 1 and go to (S.1).
If the sequences {γν} > 0 and {αt} > 0 are chosen according to one of the
rules stated in Theorems 3.1 and 3.4, respectively, Algorithm 3.4 converges
to a stationary solution of the social problem (P) (in the sense of Theorem
3.1), and thus to a QGNE of Gsm [cf. Proposition 3.6(c)], which is also a
restricted B-QGNE of G [cf. Proposition 3.5(d)].
Remark 3.3 (On the implementation of Algorithm 3.4). Once the CSI is
available at the users’ sides, Algorithm 3.4 can be implemented in a dis-
tributed way, with limited signaling only between the legitimate users and
the friendly jammers (no communications among the users or the eavesdrop-
per is required). Indeed, in the inner loop of the algorithm, given the current
value of the price λ, all the users simultaneously update the power profiles
(pq,p
J
q) solving locally a strongly convex optimization problem. Then, they
communicate to the friendly jammers the amount of power they need result-
ing from the optimization. Given the power requests from the users, the
jammers update in parallel and independently their price λj performing an
inexpensive scalar projection [cf. (4.38)], and then broadcast the new price
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value to the legitimate users. We remark that the proposed scheme requires
the same CSI and communication overhead than CJ approaches proposed in
the literature (see, e.g., [36, 104]).
Remark 3.4 (More general formulation). For the sake of simplicity, in the
previous sections, we assumed uniform power allocation over the spectrum
(still to optimize) from the users and the friendly jammers. We remark
however that game G in (3.41) [game Gsm in (3.44) and problem (P) in (3.48)]
can be generalized to the case of nonuniform power allocations (over flat-
fading channels) and the proposed algorithms extended accordingly.
3.5.1.5 Numerical Results
In this subsection, we present some experiments validating our theoretical
findings. We compare our Algorithm 3.4 with centralized and applicable
decentralized schemes existing in the literature (adapted to our formulation).
System Setup. All the experiments are obtained in the following setting,
unless stated otherwise. All the users and jammers have the same power
budget, i.e. Pq = P
J
j = P , and we set snr = P/σ
2 = 10dB. The position of
the users, jammers, and eavesdropper are randomly generated within a square
area; the channel gains HSDqq , H
SE
qe , H
JD
jq and H
JE
je are Rayleigh distributed with
mean equal to one and normalized by the (square) distance between the
transmitter and the receiver; our results are collected only for the channel
realizations satisfying condition (3.43). When present, there are J = bQ/2c
jammers. Algorithm 3.4 is initialized by choosing the zero power allocation,
and it is terminated when the absolute value of the difference of the System
Secrecy Rate (SSR) in two consecutive iterations becomes smaller than 1e-5.
Similarly, the inner loop is terminated when the difference of the norm of the
prices in two consecutive rounds is less than 1e-2.
Example 3.1. Comparison with Decentralized Schemes. In Fig-
ure 3.3(a), we plot the average SSR (taken over 50 independent channel
realizations) versus the number Q of legitimate users achieved by our Algo-
rithm 3.4 (blue-line curves) and by solving the SSR maximization game while
assuming i) uniform power allocation for the jammers (black-line curves); or
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ii) no friendly jammers available (red-line curve). In Figure 3.3(b) we plot
the average SSR versus the snr for the case of 10 main users; the rest of the
setting is as in Figure 3.3(a). The figures show that the proposed approach
yields much higher SSR than that achievable by the other schemes, and the
gain becomes more significant as the number of users or the snr increases.
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Figure 3.3: Average system secrecy rate (SSR) versus (a) number Q of legitimate users; (b) snr, for
Q = 10.
Example 3.2. Comparison with Centralized Schemes. Since Algo-
rithm 3.4 converges to a stationary solution of the social problem (3.48), it is
natural to compare our scheme with available centralized methods attempt-
ing to compute locally or globally optimal solutions (but without rigorously
verifying their optimality). More specifically, we consider two schemes: i)
the NEOS server [23] based on MINOS solver and PSwarm; and ii) the stan-
dard centralized SCA algorithm for DC programs (see, e.g., [5, 90]). Even
thought these algorithms are computationally very demanding and not im-
plementable in a distributed network, they represent a good benchmark to
test our distributed algorithm. In Figure 3.4(a) we plot the probability that
the SSR exceeds a given value SSR versus SSR, whereas in Figure 3.4(b) we
report the average SSR versus the number of legitimate users. All the curves
are computed running 100 independent experiments. The figures show that
our Algorithm 3.4 outperforms MINOS, and quite surprisingly it has the
same performance of PSwarm and SCA schemes. This means that, at least
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for the experiments we simulated, Algorithm 3.4 provides in a distributed
way solutions of (3.48) that are very close to those obtained by centralized
methods.
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Figure 3.4: Comparison between our (distributed) Algorithm 3.4 and centralized approaches.
Example 3.3. Convergence Speed. Figure 3.5 shows the average num-
ber of inner and outer iterations required by Algorithm 3.4 to converge versus
the number of legitimate users, when Rules 1 and 2 [c.f. (3.21) and (3.22)] are
used for the step-size γν . The parameters in the two rules are set as β1 = 1e-
6, β2 = 1e-4, and  = 1e-5. This average has been taken over 50 independent
channel realizations. Notice that, when Rule 2 is used, the number of outer
iterations is greatly reduced in comparison to that obtained performing Rule
1. Note also that, the average number of inner iterations per outer iteration
is slightly increased in the former case; however, overall, Algorithm 3.4 with
Rule 2 seems to be faster than the same algorithm based on Rule 1. As far
as the quality of the achieved SSR is concern, we observed results consistent
to Figure 3.4.
3.5.2 Case Study 2: Design of CR MIMO Systems
Current wireless communication systems are characterized by fixed spectrum
assignment policies. However, such fixed policies are known to be very inef-
ficient since the utilization of the licensed bandwidth is highly variant. This
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Figure 3.5: Average number of outer iterations and inner iterations per outer iteration in Algorithm 3.4
for different choices of diminishing step-size rules.
issue, coupled with the recent increasing demand of wireless services, has orig-
inated a problem of scarcity of the radio spectrum. Based on the dynamic
nature of the spectrum’ usage, Cognitive Radio (CR) has been proposed as
a solution to the cited scarcity problem. Roughly speaking, the main idea
behind Cognitive Radio is to share the utilization of the spectrum between
licensed and unlicensed spectrum holders, by providing the network entities
with the ability to adapt their transmission parameters dynamically in re-
sponse to the current state of the system [99]; we refer the interested reader
to [38, 127, 99] and the references therein for more information about this
topic. The CR paradigm introduces a hierarchical structure in the network,
where the licensed spectrum holders, also known as Primary Users (PUs),
allow the so-called Secondary Users (SUs), i.e. the unlicensed spectrum hold-
ers, to access the licensed spectrum dynamically with the condition of not
degrading their performance.
In the context described above, we consider the sum-rate maximization
of CR MIMO systems, subject to coupling interference constraints. Special
cases of such a nonconvex problem have been widely studied in the literature.
The analysis is mainly limited to local interference constraints (see [93, 124]
and references therein), with the exception of [51, 126] where coupling con-
straints are considered. However the theoretical convergence of algorithms
in [51, 126] is up to date an open problem. Since the general optimization
problem is an instance of DC programs with shared constraints, we can apply
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the framework developed in the first part of this chapter and obtain for the
first time a class of distributed (primal/dual-based) algorithms with provable
convergence.
3.5.2.1 System Model and Problem Formulation
Consider a hierarchical MIMO CR system composed of P primary users
sharing the licensed spectrum with I secondary users; the network of SUs
is modeled as a I-user vector Gaussian interference channel. Each SU i is
equipped with nTi and nRi transmit and receive antennas, respectively, and
PUs may have multiple antennas. Let Hji ∈ CnRj×nTi (resp. Gpi) be the
cross-channel matrix between the secondary transmitter i and the secondary
receiver j (resp. primary receiver p). Under basic information theoretical
assumptions, the transmission rate of SU i is
ri(Qi,Q−i) , log det
(
I + HHiiRi(Q−i)
−1HiiQi
)
(3.53)
where Qi is the transmit covariance matrix of SU i (to be optimized), Q−i ,
(Qj)j 6=i, Ri(Q−i) , Rni +
∑
j 6=i HijQjH
H
ij with Rni  0 being the covariance
matrix of the noise plus the interference generated by the active PUs. Each
SU i is subject to the following local constraints
Qi ,
{
Qi  0 : tr(Qi) ≤ P toti , Qi ∈ Zi
}
, (3.54)
where P toti is the total transmit power and Zi ⊆ Cni×ni is an abstract closed
and convex set suitable to accommodate (possibly) additional local con-
straints, such as: i) null constraints UHi Qi = 0, with Ui being nTi × rUi
(with rUi < nTi), which prevents SUs to transmit along some prescribed “di-
rections” (the columns of Ui); and ii) soft and peak power shaping constraints
in the form of tr(THi QiTi) ≤ Iavei and λmax(FHi QiFi) ≤ Ipeaki , which limits to
Iavei > 0 and I
peak
i > 0 the total average and peak average power allowed to be
radiated along the range space of matrices Ti ∈ CnTi×nGi and Fi ∈ CnTi×nFi ,
respectively. Adopting the spectrum underlay architecture, the interference
power at the primary receivers is regulated by imposing global interfer-
ence constraints to the SUs, in the form of
∑
i tr(G
H
piQiGpi) ≤ Itotp for all
p = 1, . . . , P, where Itotp > 0 is the interference threshold imposed by PU p.
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The design of the CR system can be formulated as
maximize
Q1,...,QI
θ(Q) ,
I∑
i=1
ri(Qi,Q−i)
subject to Qi ∈ Qi, i = 1, . . . , I,
I∑
i=1
tr(GHpiQiGpi) ≤ Itotp , p = 1, . . . , P.
(3.55)
We remark that special cases of the nonconvex sum-rate maximization
problem (3.55) have already been studied in the literature, e.g., in [51, 126].
However the theoretical convergence of current algorithms is up to date an
open problem. Since (3.55) is an instance of (3.1), we can capitalize on the
framework proposed in this chapter and obtain readily a class of distributed
algorithms with provable convergence.
3.5.2.2 DC-based Decomposition Algorithms
We cast first (3.55) into (3.1) (in the maximization form). Exploring the DC-
structure of the rates ri(Qi,Q−i), the sum-rate θ(Q) can indeed be rewritten
as the sum of a concave and convex function, namely:
θ(Q) =
I∑
i=1
(fi(Q)− gi(Q)) ,
where
fi(Q), log det
(
Rni +
∑
j=1 HijQjH
H
ij
)
gi(Q−i), log det
(
Rni +
∑
j 6=i HijQjH
H
ij
)
.
We can now use the machinery developed in Section 3.3. It is not difficult
to show that the approximation function θ˜(x; xν) in (3.5) (to be maximized)
becomes (up to a constant term)
θ˜(Q; Qν) ,
I∑
i=1
θ˜i(Q; Q
ν),
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with
θ˜i(Q; Q
ν) , ri(Qi,Qν−i)− 〈Πi(Qν),Qi−Qνi 〉 −
τi
2
‖Qi −Qνi ‖2F (3.56)
where Qν , (Qνi )Ii=1 with each Qνi  0, 〈A,B〉 , Re
{
tr(AHB)
}
, ‖•‖F is
the Frobenius norm, and
Πi(Q
ν) ,
∑
j∈Ni
HHji R˜j(Q
ν
−j) Hji, (3.57)
with Ni denoting the set of neighbors of user i (i.e., the set of users j’s which
user i interferers with), and
R˜j(Q
ν
−j) , Rj(Qν−j)−1 − (Rj(Qν−j) + HjjQνjHHjj)−1.
Therefore a stationary solution of (3.55) can be efficiently computed using
any of the distributed algorithms introduced in Section 3.4; one just needs
to replace θ˜(x; xν) with θ˜(Q; Qν) (and the minimization with the maximiza-
tion). For instance, Algorithm 3.1 based on a dual decomposition loop (cf.
Algorithm 3.3) can be written in the form of Algorithm 3.5. Convergence (in
the sense of Theorem 3.1) is guaranteed if the step-size sequences {γν} and
{αn} > 0 are chosen according to one of the rules stated in Theorems 3.1
and 3.4, respectively.
Remark 3.5 (On the Implementation of Algorithm 3.5). This algorithm is
a double loop scheme in the sense described next.
Inner loop: In this loop, at every iteration t:
i) First, all SUs solve in parallel their strongly convex optimization prob-
lems (3.58), for fixed λt = (λtp)
P
p=1, resulting in the optimal solutions
(Q ν, ti )
I
i=1.
ii) Then, given the new interference levels
∑I
i=1 tr(G
H
piQ
ν, t
i Gpi), the prices
λ are updated in parallel via (3.59), resulting in λt+1 = (λt+1p )
P
p=1.
The loop terminates when {λt} meets the termination criterion in (S.2b).
Outer loop: It consists in updating Qνi ’s according to (S.3).
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Algorithm 3.5: DC-based Algorithm for (3.55).
Data: τ , (τi)Ii=1 ≥ 0, {γν} > 0, {αt} > 0 and Q0i ∈ Qi for all i. Set ν = 0.
(S.1): If Qν,(Qνi )Ii=1 satisfies a termination criterion, STOP.
(S.2a): Choose λ0 , (λ0p)Pp=1 ≥ 0. Set t = 0.
(S.2b): If λt , (λtp)Pp=1 satisfies a termination criterion, set Q̂ (Qν) ,
(Qν, ti )
I
i=1 and go to (S.3).
(S.2c): The SUs solve in parallel the following strongly convex optimization
problems: for all i = 1, . . . , I,
Q ν, ti , argmax
Qi∈Qi
{
θ˜i(Qi; Q
ν)−
P∑
p=1
λtp tr(G
H
piQiGpi)
}
. (3.58)
(S.2d): Update λ , (λp)Pp=1: for all p = 1, . . . , P ,
λt+1p ,
[
λtp + α
t
(
I∑
i=1
tr(GHpiQ
ν, t
i Gpi)− Imaxp
)]+
. (3.59)
(S.2e): Set t← t+ 1 and go back to (S.2b).
(S.3): Set Qν+1 = Qν + γν
(
Q̂ (Qν)−Qν
)
.
(S.4): ν ← ν + 1 and go to (S.1).
Communication overhead : The proposed algorithm is fairly distributed.
Indeed, given the interference generated by the other users (the covariance
matrix Ri(Q−i), which can be locally measured), and the interference price
Πi(Q
ν), each SU can efficiently and locally compute the optimal covariance
matrix Q ν, ti by solving (3.58). Note that, for some specific structures of
the feasible sets Qi and channels (e.g., Zi = ∅, full-column rank channel
matrices Hii, and τi = 0), a solution of (3.58) is available in closed form (up
to the multipliers associated with the power budget constraints) [51]. The
estimation of the prices Πi(Q
ν) requires some signaling exchange but only
among nearby users. Interestingly, the pricing expression (3.57) as well as
the signaling overhead necessary to compute it coincides with that of pricing
schemes proposed in the literature to solve related problems [51, 94, 93].
The natural candidates for updating the prices in the inner loop are the
primary users, after measuring locally the current overall interference given
by
∑I
i=1 tr(G
H
piQ
ν, t
i Gpi) from the SUs. Note that this update is computation-
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ally inexpensive (it is a projection onto R+), it can be performed in parallel
among PUs, and does not require any signaling exchange with the SUs. The
new value of the prices is then broadcast to the SUs. In CR scenarios where
the PUs cannot participate in the updating process, the SUs themselves can
perform the price update, at the cost of more signaling, e.g., using consensus
algorithms. Alternatively, if the primary receivers have a fixed geographi-
cal location, it might be possible to install some monitoring devices close
to each primary receiver having the functionality of price computation and
broadcasting.
As a final remark note that, since Algorithm 3.5 is a dual-based scheme,
it is scalable with the number of SUs. However, for the same reasons, there
might happen that the interference constraints are not satisfied during the
intermediate iterations. This issue can be alleviated in practice by choosing
a “large” λ0 as initial price. An alternative distributed scheme which does
not suffer from this issue can be readily obtained using the primal-based
decomposition approach introduced in Subsection 3.4.2.
3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we proposed a novel decomposition framework to compute
stationary solutions of nonconvex (possibly DC) sum-utility minimization
problems with coupling convex constraints. We developed a class of (in-
exact) best-response-like algorithms, where all the users iteratively solve in
parallel a suitably convexified version of the original DC program. To the
best of our knowledge, this is the first set of distributed algorithms with
provable convergence for multiuser DC programs with coupling constraints.
Finally, we tested our methodology on two problems: i) a novel secrecy rate
game, for which we developed algorithms to compute its QGNE based on
a nontrivial DC reformulation; and ii) the sum-rate maximization problems
over CR MIMO networks, for which we provided (for the first time) provable
convergent distributed algorithms. Experiments show that our distributed
algorithms reach performance comparable (and sometimes better) than cen-
tralized schemes.
As a future research topic, we suggest the extension of the results in this
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chapter to nonconvex constraints. Furthermore, we have also assumed the
differentiability of both the objective functions and the constraints. There are
diverse applications in this field that violate the aforementioned assumptions,
hence this topic is worth to be explored.
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Chapter 4
Maximization of the Sum of Max Functions
and its Applications1
4.1 Introduction
Consider a resource allocation problem in a multiuser system composed of I
users. Each user i = 1, . . . , I makes his decision on an ni-dimensional real
strategy vector xi ∈ Rni subject to some private and coupling constraints.
Let x , (xi)Ii=1 ∈ Rn, where n =
∑I
i=1 ni, be the strategy profile vector of
all the users in the system; the vector x−i , (x`)` 6=i denotes the strategies
of all the users except user i. The local constraints are given by the sets
Xi ⊆ Rni i = 1, . . . , I; and, the ns side constraints are represented by s(x) ,
(sk(x))
ns
k=1 ≤ 0. The joint strategy set is denoted by X , ΠIi=1Xi; and
X−i , Π` 6=iX`. We are interested in studying a sum-utility function of a
particular kind, namely, the utility function θi of each user i is a continuous
max function of the form:
θi(x) , maximum
λi∈Λi
J∑
j=1
hi,j(λi)fi,j(x). (4.1)
Hence, the system design is formulated as an optimization problem of the
following kind, which for shortness, we call MSM (Maximization of the Sum
of Max functions):
maximize
x,(xi)Ii=1
θ(x) ,
I∑
i=1
(
maximum
λi∈Λi
J∑
j=1
hi,j(λi)fi,j(x)
)
subject to xi ∈ Xi ∀ i = 1, . . . , I (private constraints)
s(x) , (sk(x))nsk=1 ≤ 0 (coupling constraints).
(4.2)
1This chapter is adapted from a manuscript in preparation for submission (Co-authors:
Jong-Shi Pang, Gesualdo Scutari and Meisam Razaviyayn).
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Assumptions. We consider the MSM problem in (4.2) under the following
assumptions:
A1) Each set Xi for i = 1, . . . , I is (nonempty) closed and convex.
A2) Each set Λi ⊂ Rmi for i = 1, . . . , I is (nonempty) compact and convex.
A3) Each function fi,j for i = 1, . . . , I and j = 1, . . . , J , defined on an
open convex set Ω containing X , is continuously differentiable on Ω.
Moreover, each fi,j is either convex or concave on X .
A4) Each function hi,j for i = 1, . . . , I and j = 1, . . . , J , defined on an open
convex set Ωi containing Λi, is continuously differentiable on Ωi, with
the property that the product hi,j(λi)fi,j(x) is concave in λi for fixed
x ∈ X .
A5) Each function sk for k = 1, . . . , ns is continuously differentiable and
convex on X .
Clearly, under A1 and A5 the feasible set of the optimization problem (4.2)
i.e. Ξ , {x ∈ X : s(x) ≤ 0} is convex. The MSM problem has some special
features that make it challenging, namely:
1. The objective function of the MSM problem is in general nonconcave,
and nondifferentiable.
2. The MSM problem can be cast as a Mathematical Program with Equi-
librium Constraints (MPEC) [66]. Specifically, it is not difficult to see
that the problem in (4.2) is equivalent to:
maximize
x,λ
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
hi,j(λi)fi,j(x)
subject to x ∈ Ξ
λi ∈ argmax
λ̂i∈Λi
J∑
j=1
hi,j(λ̂i)fi,j(x) ∀ i = 1, . . . , I.
(4.3)
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Notice that, under the assumptions above, given any x ∈ Ξ the opti-
mization problems
maximize
λ̂i∈Λi
J∑
j=1
hi,j(λ̂i)fi,j(x)
are concave for every i = 1, . . . , I. Thus, the last set of constraints in
(4.3) is equivalent to each λi, i = 1, . . . , I, belonging to the solution
set of a (parametrized) Variational Inequality (VI) [28]; giving rise to a
MPEC. In general, the MPECs are considered NP-hard (see e.g., [8]).
This fact is noted only to highlight the challenge of the problem (4.3)
and it is not used in the subsequent discussion.
Due to the characteristics of the MSM problem mentioned above, it is clear
that finding a (globally) optimal solution of (4.2) is intrinsically hard. We
then devote the first part of this chapter to study such a class of nonconcave
and nondifferentiable maximization problem focusing on finding solutions of
practical interest, that is, points satisfying the first order optimality condi-
tions of “simpler” optimization problems but still associated with the MSM.
It is important to mention that, diverse resource allocation problems in the
emerging field of physical layer based security (see, e.g., [47] for a recent
survey on this topic) serve as the main motivation for us to study the MSM
problem. Hence, the main objectives of this chapter are twofold. First, derive
easily implementable iterative algorithms (with provable convergence) that
attempt to find a solution of (4.2); and second, apply this general problem
formulation to signal processing applications.
In pursuance of the first objective stated above, we propose two different
approaches. The first one is based on a nontrivial Difference of Concave
(DC)2 representation of the MSM problem; thus, we rely on the widely stud-
ied area of DC-Programming (see, e.g., [43, 5] and the references therein).
The second approach capitalizes on a (smooth) reformulation of the original
problem built upon the joint optimization of the variables present in such a
program. Then, we study the relation between the MSM problem and such
reformulations. Namely, we carefully define the concepts of stationary points
2In this chapter and unless stated the contrary, since we deal with maximization prob-
lems, DC stands for Difference of Concave regardless of the fact that a difference of concave
functions is also a difference of convex functions.
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of the original problem and those for the associated programs, and estab-
lish connections between them. Finally, we capitalize on the aforementioned
MSM problem’s reformulations to derive iterative algorithms with provable
convergence to points satisfying the first order optimality conditions of those
programs associated with the MSM. More precisely, the DC reformulation of
the MSM problem leads naturally to adopt the well-known DCA (Difference
of Convex Algorithm), see, e.g., [108, 109, 5, 122, 53, 103]; while, for the
smooth reformulation, it is possible to devise iterative algorithms based on
Successive Convex Approximation (SCA) techniques (see, e.g., [72, 90, 94, 4]).
We remark that the work presented in this chapter contains a rigorous and
novel treatment of resource allocation problems in multiuser systems where
the utility function is a continuous max function of the form (4.1).
In the second part of this chapter, we apply the aforementioned meth-
ods to dynamic spectrum management problems in the context of physical
layer based security. Different from current cryptographic techniques used to
guarantee security among the network users, the main objective of physical
layer security is to exploit the physical characteristics of the communication
channel in pursuance of secure transmissions. This idea was introduced by
Aaron Wyner in [116] where he showed that there exists a non-zero trans-
mission rate, the so-called secrecy rate, at which the source and destination
can exchange perfectly secure messages, whenever the eavesdropper’s channel
is a degraded version of the transmitter-receiver’s channel. In this chapter,
similar to the application considered in Chapter 3, we are interested in the
Cooperative Jamming (CJ) paradigm (see, e.g., [24, 39, 59]), where addi-
tional entities, named friendly jammers, are introduced into the system with
the objective of reducing the eavesdroppers’ ability to decode the confiden-
tial information transmitted between intended nodes by creating judicious
interference.
Different approaches have been proposed in the literature to allocate re-
sources in the aforementioned context; for example, in [115, 104, 36, 119, 4]
the interactions between the source and the friendly jammers are investi-
gated within the framework of game theory or auction theory. A common
characteristic among the cited references is that the communication between
the legitimate parties occurs over a single subchannel, and except from [4],
the system models considered are composed of either one source-destination
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link and (possibly) multiple jammers or multiple source-destination links but
one friendly jammer. It is worth mentioning that, in [48, 114], the authors
consider the resource allocation problem in the context of physical layer se-
curity over multi-carrier broadband wireless networks. Different from the
models described above, we are interested in the secrecy sum-rate maxi-
mization problem for a wireless communication system composed of multiple
legitimate users, multiple friendly jammers and a single eavesdropper, where
the legitimate parties communicate over multiple subchannels. We study
such a problem and its extensions for both the cases of non-orthogonal and
orthogonal subchannels. Interestingly, the resulting family of resource al-
location problems can be cast into the MSM form in (4.2), and thus we
can apply the iterative algorithms developed in the first part of this chapter
to attempt their solution. Even though most of our discussion deals with
SISO (Single-Input-Single-Output) systems, our results are easily extended
to study MIMO (Multiple-Input-Multiple-Output) systems.
The main contributions of this chapter can be summarized as follows.
First, we find a nontrivial DC-decomposition for the sum of continuous max
functions having the structure given in the objective function of (4.2). Such a
DC-decomposition leads directly to the development of a class of algorithms
with provable convergence for resource allocation problems of the form (4.2).
A different approach based on the joint optimization of the variables in the
problem (4.2) permits the design of a second class of algorithms for addressing
the MSM problem. The third main contribution is a rigorous treatment of the
secrecy sum-rate maximization problem in a multi-user, multi-jammer and
multi-channel network, and consequent centralized algorithms to attempt its
solution. Moreover, for the case of OFDMA (Orthogonal Frequency Division
Multiple Access) transmissions, the resulting algorithms are distributed and
can be applied to compute relaxed equilibrium points of a game theoretical
model [76] used to allocate resources in this setting; thus extending the results
in Chapter 3. Finally, iterative algorithms for alternative system designs,
such as those involving quality of service constraints or the well-known Max-
Min fairness, are also developed in this chapter.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 introduces the
DC-Programming approach, while Section 4.3 proposes the joint optimiza-
tion reformulation technique. Each of these two main sections is divided
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in two parts: first, Subsections 4.2.1 and 4.3.1 define the stationarity con-
cepts for both the MSM problem and its reformulation; and second, Subsec-
tions 4.2.2 and 4.3.2 describe the proposed algorithms and their convergence
properties. In order to encompass more applications, Subsection 4.2.3 ex-
tends the problem formulation in (4.2) to the case of coupling constraints
that are of the DC-type, giving rise to a nonconvex feasible set. The the-
oretical part of this chapter concludes with Section 4.4, where we contrast
both of the approaches proposed to address the MSM program. Section 4.5
presents some applications of the theoretical results to the area of physical
layer based security. More precisely, Subsection 4.5.1 deals with the multiple
non-orthogonal subchannels scenario, and Subsection 4.5.2 presents a game
theoretical model for the case of OFDMA transmissions. Subsection 4.5.3
capitalizes on the theory in Subsection 4.2.3 to derive iterative algorithms
for alternative system designs, such as those involving quality of service con-
straints. Numerical experiments that validate our theoretical findings are
presented in Subsection 4.5.4. Finally, Section 4.6 draws the conclusions and
discusses future research directions.
4.2 A DC-Programming Approach
With the objective of deriving an iterative algorithm that attempts to find
a solution of the MSM problem in (4.2), we introduce the first proposed
approach that depends on a nontrivial DC reformulation of such a problem.
This gives rise to the first main result of this section, which is stated formally
in Proposition 4.1. It is worth mentioning that a well-known result in the DC
literature states that the point-wise maximum of a finite set of DC functions
is also a function of the DC-type; see, e.g., [42, Thm. 4.1(ii)]. In what follows,
we show that θ, a sum of continuous max functions, is of the DC-type. Even
though, this result relies critically on the structure of each summand within
the maximand in θi, our constructive proof below appears to be new in the
related literature.
In order to find the aforementioned DC-decomposition of θ, we start by
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introducing some definitions. For every i = 1, . . . , I and j = 1, . . . , J let
ρmaxi,j , maximum
λi∈Λi
hi,j(λi) and ρ
min
i,j , minimum
λi∈Λi
hi,j(λi). (4.4)
Note that, by Weierstrass’ Theorem [11, Prop. 2.1.1], the quantities above
are well-defined since each function hi,j is continuous on Λi, and each set Λi
is compact (see assumptions A2 and A4). Using these definitions, we rewrite
each product hi,j(λi)fi,j(x) by distinguishing the following two cases:
(i) if fi,j(x) is convex (cvx) then
hi,j(λi)fi,j(x) = ρ
min
i,j fi,j(x) +
(
hi,j(λi)− ρmini,j
)
fi,j(x);
(ii) if fi,j(x) is concave (cve) then
hi,j(λi)fi,j(x) = ρ
max
i,j fi,j(x) +
(
ρmaxi,j − hi,j(λi)
)
(−fi,j(x)).
Therefore, each θi(x) [cf. (4.1)] for i = 1, . . . , I can be rewritten equivalently
as
θi(x) =
∑
j:fi,j cvx
ρmini,j fi,j(x) +
∑
j:fi,j cve
ρmaxi,j fi,j(x)
+ maximum
λi∈Λi
 ∑
j:fi,j cvx
(
hi,j(λi)− ρmini,j
)
fi,j(x)+
∑
j:fi,j cve
(
ρmaxi,j − hi,j(λi)
)
(−fi,j(x))
.
(4.5)
Remark 4.1. (On the Properties of the Decomposition of θi). It is important
to highlight the following facts with regard to the decomposition of each
function θi(x) given in (4.5):
1. If ρmini,j ≤ 0 for some j such that fi,j is convex, then ρmini,j fi,j(x) is a concave
function on X . Of course, if ρmini,j > 0 such product is a convex function
on X .
2. If ρmaxi,j ≥ 0 for some j such that fi,j is concave, then ρmaxi,j fi,j(x) is a
concave function on X . Of course, if ρmaxi,j < 0 such product is a convex
function on X .
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3. For i = 1, . . . , I, let
gi(x) , maximum
λi∈Λi
Gi(x,λi), (4.6)
where
Gi(x,λi),
∑
j:fi,j cvx
(
hi,j(λi)− ρmini,j
)
fi,j(x)+
∑
j:fi,j cve
(
ρmaxi,j − hi,j(λi)
)
(−fi,j(x)). (4.7)
Note that, the function Gi has the following two properties: first, Gi(•,λi)
is convex on X for all λi ∈ Λi; and second, Gi(x, •) is concave on Λi for all
x ∈ X (refer to assumption A4). As a consequence of the former property
of Gi, it is not difficult to show that the function gi is convex on X (see,
[11, Prop. 4.5.1(a)]).
The observations in Remark 4.1 pave the way to derive a DC-decomposition
of each function θi(x). In favor of obtaining such decomposition, let us in-
troduce the following index sets: for every i = 1, . . . , I
J cvxi , {j : fi,j is convex and ρmini,j ≤ 0}
J cvxi , {j : fi,j is convex and ρmini,j > 0}; and
J cvei , {j : fi,j is concave and ρmaxi,j ≥ 0}
J cvei , {j : fi,j is concave and ρmaxi,j < 0}.
(4.8)
Based on the partition generated by these sets of indices, it is not difficult
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to observe that (4.5) can be rewritten as follows:
θi(x) =
∑
j∈J cvxi
ρmini,j fi,j(x) +
∑
j∈J cvxi
ρmini,j fi,j(x) +
∑
j∈J cvei
ρmaxi,j fi,j(x)
+
∑
j∈J cvei
ρmaxi,j fi,j(x) + gi(x)
=
 ∑
j∈J cvxi
ρmini,j fi,j(x) +
∑
j∈J cvei
ρmaxi,j fi,j(x)

︸ ︷︷ ︸
, ui(x)
−
−∑
j∈J cvxi
ρmini,j fi,j(x)−
∑
j∈J cvei
ρmaxi,j fi,j(x)− gi(x)

︸ ︷︷ ︸
, vi(x)
(4.9)
where ui and vi are clearly concave functions on X . Hence, we have obtained a
DC-decomposition of the functions θi(x) for every i = 1, . . . , I. Consequently,
since the sum of DC functions is also DC [42, Thm. 4.1(i)], the objective
function of the MSM problem in (4.2)
θ(x) = u(x)− v(x), (4.10)
where
u(x) ,
I∑
i=1
ui(x) =
I∑
i=1
 ∑
j∈J cvxi
ρmini,j fi,j(x) +
∑
j∈J cvei
ρmaxi,j fi,j(x)
 (4.11)
v(x) ,
I∑
i=1
vi(x) = −
I∑
i=1
 ∑
j∈J cvxi
ρmini,j fi,j(x) +
∑
j∈J cvei
ρmaxi,j fi,j(x) + gi(x)
 (4.12)
is a function of the DC-type, where the function u is differentiable on X ,
while v is not. In other words, we have found a nontrivial DC-decomposition
of the summation of continuous max functions of the form (4.1). This obser-
vation yields the main result of this section, which is summarized in the next
proposition and whose proof follows readily from the previous construction.
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Proposition 4.1. Under assumptions A1-A5, the objective function θ(x)
of the MSM problem in (4.2) is a DC-type function with DC-decomposition
u(x) − v(x), where the concave functions u and v are defined in (4.11) and
(4.12), respectively.
A direct consequence of the proposition above is that the MSM problem
can be rewritten as the following DC program:
(MSMDC) : maximize
x∈Ξ
u(x)− v(x). (4.13)
This result is key in the derivation of an iterative algorithm for attempting the
solution of the nonconvex and nondifferentiable optimization problem (4.2)
via its DC-reformulation (4.13). However, it remains to explore in depth
the relation between these two problems; we address this issue in the next
section and, in Subsection 4.2.2, we construct the aforementioned iterative
algorithm.
4.2.1 Stationarity Concepts
In this section, we establish some connections between the MSM problem
(4.2) and its DC reformulation (4.13), in terms of (globally and locally) opti-
mal solutions and stationary points. Let us start by introducing the concept
of stationary solution for the MSM problem. Note that, a careful definition of
this term is required due to the nondifferentiability of the objective function
that prevents the use of this classical notion in terms of the gradient; and, the
nonconcavity of the objective function restricts also the use of the stationary
solution concept in terms of subgradients of concave functions. Under as-
sumptions A1-A5 and by invoking Danskin’s Theorem [34, Thm. 1.29], the
objective function of the MSM problem is directionally differentiable i.e. in
every direction d ∈ Rn the directional derivative of θ is given by
θ′(x; d) ,
I∑
i=1
(
maximum
λi ∈Λ?i (x)
J∑
j=1
hi,j(λi)∇fi,j(x)Td
)
, (4.14)
113
where, for every i = 1, . . . , I, Λ?i (x) denotes the set of maximizing points
Λ?i (x) ,
{
λ?i ∈ Λi : θi(x) =
J∑
j=1
hi,j(λ
?
i ) fi,j(x)
}
. (4.15)
Notice that, by Weierstrass’ theorem [11, Prop. 2.1.1], the sets Λ?i (x) 6= ∅ for
all i = 1, . . . , I. Consequently, we are now able to introduce the concept of
stationary solutions for the MSM problem in terms of the directional deriva-
tive of θ; for shortness, we call them d -stationary solutions. The following
definition formalizes this idea.
Definition 4.1. A point x? ∈ Ξ is a d -stationary solution of the MSM
problem in (4.2) if for all x ∈ Ξ
θ′(x?; x− x?) =
I∑
i=1
(
maximum
λi ∈Λ?i (x?)
J∑
j=1
hi,j(λi)∇fi,j(x?)T (x− x?)
)
≤ 0,
where the sets Λ?i (x) for i = 1, . . . , I are defined in (4.15).
It is clear that the objective function of the DC problem (4.13) has di-
rectional derivatives in every direction d ∈ Rn given by u′(x; d) − v′(x; d)
where
u′(x; d) =
I∑
i=1
 ∑
j∈J cvxi
ρmini,j ∇fi,j(x)Td +
∑
j∈J cvei
ρmaxi,j ∇fi,j(x)Td
 (4.16)
and,
v′(x; d)=−
I∑
i=1
 ∑
j∈J cvxi
ρmini,j ∇fi,j(x)Td +
∑
j∈J cvei
ρmaxi,j ∇fi,j(x)Td + g′i(x; d)
. (4.17)
Therefore, we can also define a d-stationary solution of the DC problem in
(4.13) as follows.
Definition 4.2. A point x? ∈ Ξ is a d -stationary solution of the DC maxi-
mization problem in (4.13) if
u′(x?; x− x?)− v′(x?; x− x?) ≤ 0 ∀x ∈ Ξ.
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where the directional derivatives u′ and v′ are defined in (4.16) and (4.17),
respectively.
It is worth remarking that, invoking the properties of a DC function (see,
e.g., [42, Sec. 4.2] or [40, Eq. 1.1]) we have that the directional derivative of
the DC function θ(x) = u(x) − v(x) exists everywhere, i.e. at every x ∈ Ξ
and in each direction d ∈ Rn, it holds
θ′(x; d) = u′(x; d)− v′(x; d). (4.18)
A concept widely used in the DC-Programming literature (for uncon-
strained problems) is that of critical points (see, e.g., [40, 5, 74] and the ref-
erences therein). A vector x? is said to be a critical point of the DC function
u(x)−v(x) (or generalized KKT point of the problem maximize
x∈Rn
u(x)−v(x))
if ∂u(x?)∩∂v(x?) 6= ∅, where ∂u(x?) and ∂v(x?) denote the subdifferentials3
of the functions u and v at x?, respectively. This definition is an extension
to that one used in the case of differentiable functions u and v and thus, the
subdifferentials are a singleton corresponding to the gradients i.e. x? is a
critical point of u(x)− v(x) if ∇u(x?)−∇v(x?) = 0. Since we are interested
in constrained optimization problems, a natural extension of the aforemen-
tioned concept for constrained DC programs is given below (see, e.g. [40]).
Definition 4.3. A vector x? ∈ Ξ is a critical point of the DC maximization
problem in (4.13) if
0 ∈ ∇u(x?)− ∂v(x?)−NΞ(x?),
where NΞ(x?) denotes the normal cone to the convex set Ξ at x?, that is
NΞ(x?) ,
{
d ∈ Rn : dT (x− x?) ≤ 0 ∀x ∈ Ξ}.
Before proceeding with our analysis, it is worth stressing some observations
with respect to the subdifferentials of the function v; we summarize those
observations in the following remark.
3 Technically speaking, since we are refering to concave functions, the term used should
be superdifferential instead of subdifferential. However, as done in many sources and
without loss of precision, we use subdifferential (and subgradient) for both convex and
concave functions.
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Remark 4.2. (On the subdifferential ∂v(x)). In order to characterize ∂v(x)
for the concave function v [cf. (4.12)], we only need to focus on each term gi
[cf. (4.6)], since the rest of summands in v are differentiable by assumption.
Hence, with the objective of finding the subdifferential of each gi, we observe
that: first, from assumption A3 it follows that for every i the functions
Gi(•,λi) are differentiable on X for each λi ∈ Λi; and second, we introduce
the following blanket assumption:
A6) For every i = 1, . . . , I, ∇xGi(x, •) is continuous on Λi for each x ∈ Ξ.
Thus, under assumptions A1-A6, by invoking Danskin’s theorem [11, Prop.
4.5.1(b)] we have that: for every i = 1, . . . , I
∂gi(x) = conv {∇xGi(x,λi) : λi ∈ Λ?i (x)} ∀x ∈ Ξ, (4.19)
where conv denotes the convex hull of the corresponding set, and the sets
Λ?i (x) are defined in (4.15).
Based on the definitions and observations introduced above, we are now
ready to provide an insight into the relation between the MSM problem and
its DC-reformulation. Moreover, at this point in the discussion, a natural
question to ask is: can we establish any relation between the d-stationary
solutions of (4.2) and the critical points of its associated DC program (4.13)?
The next proposition gives an answer to this question, and it also summarizes
some connections between the problems MSM and MSMDC. See Figure 4.1
for an illustration of those relations.
Proposition 4.2. Under assumptions A1-A6,
(a) The MSM problem in (4.2) is equivalent to the DC maximization prob-
lem (4.13) in terms of globally optimal and d-stationary solutions.
(b) If x? is a local maximum of the MSM problem in (4.2), then x? is a
d -stationary solution.
(c) If x? is a d -stationary solution of the MSM problem in (4.2), then x?
is a critical point of the DC program in (4.13).
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(d) If x? is a critical point of the DC program in (4.13) such that, for every
i = 1, . . . , I, ∇xGi(x?,λ?i ) is constant for all λ?i ∈ Λ?i (x?), then x? is a
d -stationary solution of the MSM problem in (4.2).
Proof. (a) The first assertion follows readily from Proposition 4.1; while, the
second claim is a direct consequence of (4.18).
(b) This is clear.
(c) Suppose that x? ∈ Ξ is a d -stationary solution of the optimization
problem (4.2), i.e. for all x ∈ Ξ
0 ≥ θ′(x?; x− x?) (a)= u′(x?; x− x?)− v′(x;? x− x?)
(b)
= ∇u(x?)T (x− x?)− min
µv(x?)∈ ∂v(x?)
µv(x
?)T (x− x?)
(c)
≥ ∇u(x?)T (x− x?)− µ̂v(x?)T (x− x?)
= [∇u(x?)− µ̂v(x?)]T (x− x?),
where in (a) we invoked (4.18); in (b) we applied the differentiability of u,
and invoked [91, Thm. 23.4]; while in (c) we took any µ̂v(x
?) ∈ ∂v(x?). As
a result,
[∇u(x?)− µ̂v(x?)]T (x− x?) ≤ 0 ∀x ∈ Ξ ⇒ ∇u(x?)− µ̂v(x?) ∈ NΞ(x?)
i.e. x? is a critical point of the DC program in (4.13).
(d) Let x? ∈ Ξ be a critical point of the DC program (4.13). By as-
sumption, we have that for every i = 1, . . . , I the gradients ∇xGi(x?,λ?i ) are
constant for all λ?i ∈ Λ?i (x?), then from (4.19) it follows that the subdiffer-
ential of ∂gi(x
?) = {∇xGi(x?,λ?i )}, hence, by the differentiability of the rest
of summands in v, we have that ∂v(x?) = {∇v(x?)}. Since x? is a critical
point of (4.13), then 0 ∈ ∇u(x?)−∇v(x?)−NΞ(x?), that is, for all x ∈ Ξ
0 ≥ [∇u(x?)−∇v(x?)]T (x− x?)
= u′(x?; x− x?)− v′(x?; x− x?)
= θ′(x?; x− x?)
where the last equality follows from (4.18). Therefore, x? is a d -stationary
solution of (4.2).
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Figure 4.1: Connections between the problems MSM, introduced in (4.2), and MSMDC defined in (4.13).
Proposition 4.2(c) states that every d-stationary solution of the MSM prob-
lem is a critical point of its corresponding DC-reformulation. Nevertheless,
the converse is not always true as stated in Proposition 4.2(d). This state-
ment requires that, for every i = 1, . . . , I, the gradients ∇xGi(x?,λ?i ) are
constant for all λ?i ∈ Λ?i (x?) so that a critical point x? ∈ Ξ of the DC prob-
lem (4.13) is a d -stationary solution of the MSM problem. Notice that this
condition is trivially satisfied when the sets Λ?i (x
?) are a singleton. Clearly,
this condition implies that each gi, for all i = 1, . . . , I, is differentiable at x
?;
thus, the function v is differentiable at x?. A sufficient condition for this to
hold is that each Gi(x
?, •) is strongly concave on Λi for every i = 1, . . . , I.
It is worth mentioning, that for those applications that do not satisfy the
conditions required by Proposition 4.2(d), it may still be possible to derive
some connections between critical points of the DC program and d-stationary
solutions of the MSM problem by exploiting the problem’s structure; see, for
example, the result in Proposition 4.8.
4.2.2 DC-based Algorithm
As already explained, in general, computing a globally optimal solution of
the MSM problem (4.2) is challenging. Therefore, in this section, we turn our
attention to derive an algorithm that attempts the computation of critical
points (in the sense of Definition 4.3) of the MSMDC. The main implication
of Proposition 4.1 is that DCA-based schemes, (see, e.g., [108, 109, 5, 122,
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53, 103] and the references therein) can be constructed in order to achieve
our objective.
The concepts of DC programming and DCA were introduced by Pham (re-
fer to [108, 109, 5]) and have been used extensively in the nonconvex/nonsmooth
optimization field. Due to its wide scope, the authors of [56] do not consider
the DCA as an algorithm but rather as a philosophy that can be adopted for
deriving a range of algorithms applicable in the solution of different problems.
In what follows, we adopt this technique towards attempting the solution of
the MSM problem.
The main idea of the DCA-based frameworks is to solve a sequence of
(strongly) concave problems, wherein the DC-type objective function θ(x) =
u(x) − v(x) is replaced by a concave minorand constructed at the current
iteration xν ∈ Ξ, which we denote by θ˜(x; xν). Essentially, this approximat-
ing function θ˜(x; xν) is obtained by keeping the concave part unchanged and
linearizing at xν the convex part. More specifically, we construct θ˜(x; xν) by
following the three steps outlined next:
1. The concave function u [cf. (4.11)] remains unchanged.
2. Each function vi, for i = 1, . . . , I, is replaced by a linear approximation.
In particular, for fixed i and for every j ∈ J cvxi ∪ J cvei we define the
following linear approximation of fi,j at a given x
ν ∈ Ξ,
fi,j(x) ≈ f˜i,j(x; xν) , fi,j(xν) +∇fi,j(xν)T (x− xν).
Similarly, given xν ∈ Ξ, let µgi(xν) ∈ ∂gi(xν) be a subgradient of the
convex functions gi at x
ν for all i = 1, . . . , I, then consider the following
linear approximation of gi at x
ν ,
gi(x) ≈ g˜i(x; xν) , gi(xν) + µgi(xν)T (x− xν).
Thus, for every i = 1, . . . , I, each function vi can be approximated by
v˜i(x; x
ν) , −
∑
j∈J cvxi
ρmini,j f˜i,j(x; x
ν)−
∑
j∈J cvei
ρmaxi,j f˜i,j(x; x
ν)− g˜i(x; xν).
3. From the two previous steps, it follows that the candidate approxi-
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mation of each function θi at a given iteration x
ν ∈ Ξ is the concave
function
θ˜i(x; x
ν) , ui(x)− v˜i(x; xν)
=
∑
j∈J cvxi
ρmini,j fi,j(x) +
∑
j∈J cvei
ρmaxi,j fi,j(x) +
∑
j∈J cvxi
ρmini,j f˜i,j(x; x
ν)+
+
∑
j∈J cvei
ρmaxi,j f˜i,j(x; x
ν) + g˜i(x; x
ν). (4.20)
Finally, it is not difficult to show that θ(x) is minorized at xν over the
set Ξ by the following strongly concave function
θ˜(x; xν) ,
I∑
i=1
θ˜i(x; x
ν)− τ
2
‖x− xν‖2. (4.21)
where we added a regularization term with τ > 0, whose benefits are
well-understood (see, e.g., [12]).
As a result, the proposed DC-based scheme consists in solving iteratively
the following sequence of strongly concave problems: given xν ∈ Ξ
x̂(xν) , argmax
x∈Ξ
θ˜(x; xν). (4.22)
The formal description of the proposed scheme is given in Algorithm 4.1,
and its convergence properties are stated in Proposition 4.3.
Algorithm 4.1: DC-based Algorithm for the MSM Problem
Data: τ > 0 and x0 ∈ Ξ. Set ν = 0.
(S.0): For every i = 1, . . . , I and j = 1, . . . , J compute ρmini,j and ρ
max
i,j .
(S.1): If xν satisfies a termination criterion, STOP.
(S.2): For i = 1, . . . , I compute any µgi(x
ν) ∈ ∂gi(xν).
(S.3): Compute x̂(xν) [cf. (4.22)].
(S.4): Set xν+1 , x̂(xν).
(S.5): ν ← ν + 1 and go to (S.1).
Remark 4.3. (On Algorithm 4.1). A practical termination criterion in Step
(S.1) of Algorithm 4.1 is to stop the iterates when |θ(xν) − θ(xν−1)| ≤ δ,
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where δ is a prescribed accuracy. Notice that, Step (S.2) of Algorithm 4.1
requires the computation of µgi(x
ν) ∈ ∂gi(xν) for every i = 1, . . . , I, refer
to equation (4.19) where these subdifferential sets are characterized. From
(4.19), it follows that this step implicitly requires the solution of the following
concave maximization problems: given xν ∈ Ξ, for i = 1, . . . , I
λ?,νi ∈ argmax
λi∈Λi
Gi(x
ν ,λi). (4.23)
We emphasize that the difficulty associated with solving these subproblems
depends on the particular application of interest. For example, in the cases
considered in Section 4.5, the problem in (4.23) reduces to solving a scalar
linear maximization program whose closed form solution is given in (4.55).
Hence, in these applications, Step (S.2) is computationally inexpensive.
The next lemma summarizes some important properties of the map Ξ 3
y 7→ x̂(y) ∈ Ξ defined in (4.22), that are instrumentals to the convergence
proof of Algorithm 4.1 as stated in Proposition 4.3 below. In essence, this
lemma shows the well-definiteness and continuity of the aforementioned map,
as well as a correspondence between the critical points of (4.13) and the fixed
points of this single-valued map.
Lemma 4.1. Under assumptions A1-A6, the map Ξ 3 y 7→ x̂(y) ∈ Ξ
defined in (4.22) has the following properties:
(a) The map x̂(•) is well-defined;
(b) The map x̂(•) is continuous on Ξ; and,
(c) The set of fixed points of the map x̂(•) coincides with the set of critical
points of the DC problem in (4.13).
Proof. (a) Given any y ∈ Ξ, x̂(y) is the unique solution of the strongly
concave problem (4.22), as a result the map x̂(•) is well-defined.
(b) This is a consequence of Berge’s Maximum Theorem [9].
(c) Suppose that x? is a fixed point of the map x̂(•) i.e. x? = x̂(x?), by
definition we have:
(x− x̂(x?))T ∇θ˜(x̂(x?); x?) ≤ 0 ∀x ∈ Ξ, (4.24)
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where
∇θ˜(x̂(x?); x?) =
I∑
i=1
∇ui(x̂(x?))−∇v˜i(x̂(x?); x?)− τ(x̂(x?)− x?),
and
∇ui(x̂(x?)) =
∑
j∈J cvxi
ρmini,j ∇fi,j(x̂(x?)) +
∑
j∈J cvei
ρmaxi,j ∇fi,j(x̂(x?))
∇v˜i(x̂(x?); x?) = −
∑
j∈J cvxi
ρmini,j ∇fi,j(x?)−
∑
j∈J cvei
ρmaxi,j ∇fi,j(x?)− µgi(x?).
By using the fact that x̂(x?) = x? in (4.24), we get: ∀x ∈ Ξ
0 ≥ (x− x?)T
[
I∑
i=1
∇ui(x?)−∇v˜i(x?; x?)
]
= (x− x?)T
 I∑
i=1
∇ui(x?)−
−∑
j∈J cvxi
ρmini,j ∇fi,j(x?)−
∑
j∈J cvei
ρmaxi,j ∇fi,j(x?)−µgi(x?)

Invoking [91, Thm. 23.8] and letting, for every i = 1, . . . , I,
µvi(x
?) , −
∑
j∈J cvxi
ρmini,j ∇fi,j(x?)−
∑
j∈J cvei
ρmaxi,j ∇fi,j(x?)− µgi(x?),
it is easy to see that µvi(x
?) ∈ ∂vi(x?). Thus, for all x ∈ Ξ
0 ≥ (x− x?)T
[
I∑
i=1
∇ui(x?)− µvi(x?)
]
= (x− x?)T [∇u(x?)− µv(x?)] . (4.25)
where ∇u(x?) ,
I∑
i=1
∇ui(x?) and µv(x?) ,
I∑
i=1
µvi(x
?). Following the same
argument as above, it is clear that µv(x
?) ∈ ∂v(x?). As a result, from (4.25)
it follows that ∇u(x?)−µv(x?) ∈ NΞ(x?) i.e. x? is a critical point of (4.13).
For the converse argument, suppose that x? is a critical point of (4.13).
It suffices to observe that: first, x̂(x?) is the unique solution of (4.22) where
we take y = x?; and, second x? is also an optimal solution of (4.22) since
it satisfies the variational principle. Therefore, x? = x̂(x?) i.e. x? is a fixed
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point of the map x̂(•).
The next proposition summarizes the convergence of Algorithm 4.1 to a
critical point of the DC-representation of the MSM problem given in (4.13).
We refer the reader to [108, 109, 5] for the convergence properties and cor-
responding proof of the generic DCA. Under some conditions, the DCA is
shown to be (globally) convergent to a critical point of an unconstrained DC
problem. Basically, this convergence proof is based on DC duality theory.
The convergence proof of the Concave-Convex Procedure (CCCP) [122], a
variant of the DCA applied to the case where v is assumed to be differentiable
(and thus not applicable to our case), can be found in [53, 103]. This proof
is based on the Zangwill’s global convergence theory [123]. In the proof of
the following proposition, we deviate from these approaches and rather ex-
ploit the particular structure and characteristics of the MSM problem under
consideration. It is important to emphasize that our convergence results are
in accordance with those in the related literature, see e.g., [89]. As a side
note, we refer the interested reader to [106, 75, 70] where other approaches,
different from the DCA and CCCP, are proposed to address unconstrained
DC programs, such as proximal point like algorithms.
Proposition 4.3. Under assumptions A1-A6, for every initial point x0 ∈ Ξ,
the sequence {xν} produced by Algorithm 4.1 is well-defined. Moreover, if θ
is bounded above on Ξ and for any τ > 0, then every accumulation point of
{xν}, if it exists, is a critical point of the DC problem (4.13).
Proof. The first assertion of the proposition is clear (see, Lemma 4.1(a)).
For the second part, by induction, since xν ∈ Ξ, we have
θ(xν) = θ˜(xν ; xν)
(a)
≤ θ˜(xν+1; xν)
=
I∑
i=1
ui(x
ν+1)− v˜i(xν+1; xν)− τ
2
‖xν+1 − xν‖2
(b)
≤
I∑
i=1
ui(x
ν+1)− vi(xν+1)− τ
2
‖xν+1 − xν‖2
= θ(xν+1)− τ
2
‖xν+1 − xν‖2
where (a) follows from the definition of xν+1 and (b) by using the fact that
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each −v˜i is an affine minorand of each function −vi at xν over Ξ. Therefore,
under the assumption that θ is bounded above on Ξ and τ > 0, the sequence
{θ(xν)} converges and
lim
ν→∞
‖xν+1 − xν‖2 = 0. (4.26)
Finally, if x∞ ∈ Ξ is an accumulation point of the sequence {xν}. Invoking
the continuity of x̂(•) [see, Lemma 4.1(b)], and from (4.26) using the fact that
xν+1 = x̂(xν) i.e. lim
ν→∞
‖x̂(xν) − xν‖ = 0, we must have that x̂(x∞) = x∞.
By Lemma 4.1(c), we have that the set of fixed points of x̂(•) coincides with
the set of critical points of (4.13); hence x∞ is a critical point of the DC
problem (4.13).
To conclude this section, we highlight the importance of the DC reformu-
lation of the MSM problem. Namely, the benefits of such a reformulation
are twofold: first, it simplifies the analysis of the MSM problem because it
permits the application of the concept of critical points (in Definition 4.3),
which is not directly applicable to the original formulation; and second, it
leads directly to the construction of Algorithm 4.1, a DC-based iterative
scheme, with provable convergence to those critical points. Furthermore,
under the conditions of Proposition 4.2(d), the critical points produced by
Algorithm 4.1 coincide with the d-stationary solutions of the original MSM
problem.
4.2.3 An Extension to the MSMDC Problem
So far, we have considered the MSM problem in (4.2) under the assumption
that the set of constraints is convex. Nevertheless, in some applications this
assumption is not fulfilled; refer to Subsection 4.5.3 for some examples. As a
result, in this subsection we briefly consider a version of the MSM problem
under a more general setting. Namely, we drop the convexity assumption of
the coupling constraints s(x) ≤ 0, that is, we replace assumption A5 with:
A5′) Each function sk is of the DC-type, with DC-decomposition given by:
sk(x) , ûk(x)− v̂k(x) for every k = 1, . . . , ns.
In Section 4.2, we found a DC-decomposition for the objective function of
the MSM problem, i.e. θ(x) = u(x) − v(x), where the functions u and v
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are defined in (4.11) and (4.12), respectively. This result gave rise to the
problem MSMDC defined in (4.13). Hence, throughout this section, we turn
our attention to the MSMDC problem under A5
′, i.e.
maximize
x,(xi)Ii=1
u(x)− v(x)
subject to xi ∈ Xi ∀ i = 1, . . . , I (convex private constraints)
(ûk(x)− v̂k(x))nsk=1 ≤ 0 (DC-type coupling constraints).
(4.27)
Clearly, we are in presence of a nonconcave and nondifferentiable optimiza-
tion problem where both the objective function and the coupling constraints
are of the DC-type, while the convex constraints are retained in the set X .
This category of problems are referred in the DC literature as general DC
programs. For the sake of notational simplicity, let
ΞDC , {x ∈ X : ûk(x)− v̂k(x) ≤ 0 k = 1, . . . , ns}
denote the nonconvex feasible set of (4.27).
The main objective of this section is to devise an iterative algorithm con-
verging to critical points of (4.27). The concept of critical point for the
maximization problem (4.27) is introduced formally in the next definition,
where the complementarity notation 0 ≤ a ⊥ b ≥ 0 means a · b = 0, a ≥ 0
and b ≥ 0. This concept is taken directly from the literature for general DC
programs; see, e.g., [32, 89].
Definition 4.4. If the pair
(
x?,pi? , (pi?k)
ns
k=1
)
is such that:
0 ∈ ∇u(x?)− ∂v(x?)−
ns∑
k=1
pi?k [∂ûk(x
?)− ∂v̂k(x?)]−NX (x?),
0 ≤ pi?k ⊥ v̂k(x?)− ûk(x?) ≥ 0 k = 1, . . . , ns,
where NX (x?) is the normal cone to the set X at x?. Then, x? is a crit-
ical point of the DC problem (4.27) and pi? is the corresponding vector of
multipliers for the DC-type coupling constraints.
General DC programs have been studied extensively in the literature. Ba-
sically, two approaches have been proposed to attempt the solution of these
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sort of problems. First, in [108, 55, 5, 57] (exact) penalty functions are used
to deal with the DC constraints, and then, the DCA is applied to the result-
ing (unconstrained) penalized problem. However, some drawbacks of this
approach are that the penalty parameter is in general unknown [56] and, in
terms of performance, it may lead to a slow convergence of the resulting iter-
ative scheme [89]. A different approach is based on SCA techniques; see, e.g.,
[122, 101, 53, 89] for some results dealing with the application of this idea
to general DC programs. The objective of SCA techniques is to solve a se-
quence of concave problems obtained by linearizing (at the current iteration)
the convex part of the DC function. In the case of a DC constrained prob-
lem, this affine approximation is also used to “convexify” such constraints.
Toward finding critical points of (4.27) in the sense of Definition 4.4, we fol-
low the latter approach. In particular, the sequence of concave problems is
obtained by: given xν ∈ ΞDC
1. The objective function of (4.27) is approximated by the strongly con-
cave function θ˜(x; xν) defined in (4.21).
2. Each DC-type constraint sk is replaced by a linear approximation. Let
µûk(x
ν) ∈ ∂ûk(xν) be a subgradient of the concave function ûk at xν ,
then for k = 1 . . . , ns
sk(x) ≈ s˜k(x; xν) , ûk(xν) + µûk(xν)T (x− xν)− v̂k(x).
As a result, the SCA-based algorithm attempting to compute critical points
of (4.27) consists in solving iteratively the following sequence of strongly
concave optimization problems: given xν ∈ ΞDC
x̂DC(xν) , argmax
x∈ Ξ˜DC(xν)
θ˜(x; xν), (4.28)
where Ξ˜DC(xν) , {x ∈ X : s˜k(x; xν) ≤ 0 ∀ k = 1, . . . , ns}.
The description of the proposed scheme is given in Algorithm 4.2, and its
convergence properties are stated formally in Proposition 4.4.
Proposition 4.4. Under assumptions A1-A6 with A5 replaced by A5 ′, for
every initial point x0 ∈ ΞDC the following statements hold:
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(a) Iterates feasibility − Under a suitable constraint qualification, the se-
quence {(xν ,piν)} produced by Algorithm 4.2, is well-defined. More-
over, Ξ˜DC(xν) ⊆ ΞDC i.e. the sequence {xν} is feasible to the MSMDC
problem with DC constraints (4.27).
(b) Convergence − If θ is bounded above on ΞDC and for any τ > 0 then,
under a suitable constraint qualification, every accumulation point of
the sequence {(xν ,piν)}, if it exists, corresponds to a critical point of
the MSMDC problem in (4.27) and to a multiplier of the DC constraints,
respectively.
Proof. (a) The well-definiteness of the sequence {(xν ,piν)} is clear. For the
second assertion, given any xν ∈ ΞDC and for every k = 1, . . . , ns, since
µûk(x
ν) ∈ ∂ûk(xν) then ûk(xν) + µûk(xν)T (x − xν) ≥ ûk(x) for all x ∈ X .
This implies that sk(x) ≤ s˜k(x; xν) for all x ∈ X and xν ∈ ΞDC, where the
desired result follows immediately.
(b) Follows readily by applying [89, Thm. 2] to our problem formulation
in (4.27).
It is worth stressing that the regularity condition required by Proposi-
tion 4.4 is to guarantee the existence of Lagrange multipliers associated with
the (convex) coupling constraints of the optimization problem (4.28). An
example of a regularity condition is the well-known Slater’s constraint qual-
ification (CQ), we refer the reader to [28, Sec. 3.2] for a detailed discussion
on this topic.
Algorithm 4.2 : SCA-based Algorithm for the MSMDC Problem with DC-
type Coupling Constraints (4.27)
Data: τ > 0 and x0 ∈ ΞDC. Set ν = 0.
(S.0): For every i = 1, . . . , I and j = 1, . . . , J compute ρmini,j and ρ
max
i,j .
(S.1): If xν satisfies a termination criterion, STOP.
(S.2): For i = 1, . . . , I compute µgi(x
ν) ∈ ∂gi(xν), and for k = 1, . . . , ns
compute µv̂k(x
ν) ∈ ∂v̂k(xν).
(S.3): Compute x̂DC(xν) [cf. (4.28)] and the corresponding multiplier piν of
the DC-constraints.
(S.4): Set xν+1 , x̂DC(xν).
(S.5): ν ← ν + 1 and go to (S.1).
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4.3 A Joint Optimization Approach
In this section, we deviate from the DC-Programming approach, developed
throughout Section 4.2, and we propose an alternative set of techniques to
attempt the solution of the MSM problem (4.2). The main idea of the ap-
proach proposed here lies in the simple observation of optimizing jointly the
variables of the MSM problem x and λ , (λi)Ii=1. More precisely, we refor-
mulate the MSM problem as the following joint optimization (JO) program
i.e.
(MSMJO) :
maximize
x,λ
θJ(x,λ) ,
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
hi,j(λi)fi,j(x)
subject to x ∈ Ξ
λ ∈ Λ ,∏Ii=1 Λi.
(4.29)
For the sake of notational simplicity, let ΞJ , {(x,λ) : x ∈ Ξ,λ ∈ Λ} denote
the convex feasible set of (4.29). It is worth emphasizing that, in this section,
we are attaching the superscript J in some of the notation to distinguish it
from the definitions introduced in the previous section.
A great advantage of the joint optimization reformulation (4.29) is that it
removes the nondifferentiability issue of the objective function θ of the MSM
problem, however θJ is still a nonconcave function.
4.3.1 Stationarity Concepts
At this point in the discussion, it is worth asking: what is the relation be-
tween the MSM problem and its joint optimization reformulation MSMJO
in (4.29)? Proposition 4.5 answers this question by summarizing some con-
nections between these problems in terms of globally optimal solutions and
stationary points. For the sake of clarity, Figure 4.2 illustrates these results.
Since the objective function of the problem (4.29) is differentiable, the usual
definition of stationary solution in terms of the gradient applies, thus we omit
it. We recall that the concept of d-stationary solution for the MSM problem
was introduced in Definition 4.1. As a side note, in the following discussion,
we let λ? , (λ?i )
I
i=1 and Λ
?(x?) ,
∏I
i=1 Λ
?
i (x
?).
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Figure 4.2: Connections between the problems MSM, introduced in (4.2), and MSMDC defined in (4.29).
Proposition 4.5. Under assumptions A1-A5,
(a) The vector x? is a globally optimal solution of the MSM problem in
(4.2) if and only if there exists λ? ∈ Λ such that the pair (x?,λ?) is a
globally optimal solution of the joint optimization problem in (4.29).
(b) The vector x? is a d-stationary solution of the MSM problem in (4.2) if
and only if, for all λ? ∈ Λ?(x?), the pair (x?,λ?) is a stationary solution
of the joint optimization problem in (4.29).
Proof. (a) This assertion is clear.
(b) First, suppose that x? ∈ Ξ is a d-stationary solution of (4.2), i.e. for
all x ∈ Ξ
I∑
i=1
(
maximum
λi ∈Λ?i (x?)
J∑
j=1
hi,j(λi)∇fi,j(x?)T (x− x?)
)
≤ 0
First, from assumptions A2 and A4, it is clear that, given x? ∈ Ξ, the sets
Λ?i (x
?) [cf. (4.15)] are non-empty for every i = 1, . . . , I. Therefore, for every
i = 1, . . . , I and for all λ?i ∈ Λ?i (x?), by definition it must hold that
J∑
j=1
fi,j(x
?)∇hi,j(λ?i )T (λi − λ?i ) ≤ 0 ∀λi ∈ Λi. (4.30)
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Second, it is easy to see that: for all x ∈ Ξ and for all λ? ∈ Λ?(x?)
0 ≥
I∑
i=1
(
maximum
λi ∈Λ?i (x?)
J∑
j=1
hi,j(λi)∇fi,j(x?)T (x− x?)
)
≥
I∑
i=1
(
J∑
j=1
hi,j(λ
?
i )∇fi,j(x?)T (x− x?)
)
. (4.31)
Finally, combining (4.30) and (4.31), it is clear that: for all x ∈ Ξ, all λ ∈ Λ
and all λ? ∈ Λ?(x?) it holds that
0 ≥
I∑
i=1
(
J∑
j=1
hi,j(λ
?
i )∇fi,j(x?)T(x− x?) +
J∑
j=1
fi,j(x
?)∇hi,j(λ?i )T(λi − λ?i )
)
= (x− x?)T∇xθJ(x?,λ?) + (λ− λ?)T∇λθJ(x?,λ?)
= [(x,λ)− (x?,λ?)]T∇θJ(x?,λ?), (4.32)
i.e. the pair (x?,λ?) is a stationary solution of (4.29) for all λ? ∈ Λ?(x?).
For the converse argument, suppose that, for all λ? ∈ Λ?(x?), the pair
(x?,λ?) ∈ ΞJ is a stationary solution of (4.29) i.e. the inequality in (4.32)
holds for any pair (x,λ) ∈ ΞJ . Thus, if we let λ = λ? in (4.32) it follows
that: for all x ∈ Ξ and all λ? ∈ Λ?(x?)
I∑
i=1
(
J∑
j=1
hi,j(λ
?
i )∇fi,j(x?)T (x− x?)
)
≤ 0.
Hence, since the inequality above holds for all λ?i ∈ Λ?i (x?) and all i =
1, . . . , I, it is not difficult to see that
θ′(x?; x− x?) =
I∑
i=1
(
maximum
λi ∈Λ?i (x?)
J∑
j=1
hi,j(λi)∇fi,j(x?)T (x− x?)
)
≤ 0
i.e. x? is a d-stationary solution of (4.2).
It is important to emphasize some aspects with regard to Proposition 4.5(b).
First, it follows that if x? is a d-stationary solution of the MSM problem in
(4.2), then there must exist λ? ∈ Λ such that the pair (x?,λ?) is a stationary
solution of the joint optimization problem in (4.29). However, notice that
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the converse is more stringent, the pair (x?,λ?) must be a stationary solution
of (4.29) for all λ? ∈ Λ?(x?) in order to coincide with a d-stationary solu-
tion solution of the MSM problem. The aforementioned condition is readily
satisfied when the sets Λ?i (x
?) are a singleton for all i = 1, . . . , I.
4.3.2 SCA-based Algorithm
The smooth joint optimization reformulation of the MSM problem in (4.29)
leads directly to the design of an iterative algorithm attempting the solution
of the MSM problem. More precisely, we extend the results in Chapter 3
toward the construction of such schemes converging to stationary solutions
of the MSMJO.
Using the definitions of the scalars ρmaxi,j and ρ
min
i,j given in (4.4), and those
of the index sets J cvxi , J cvei and their respective complements in (4.8), it is
not difficult to observe that
θJi (x,λi) ,
J∑
j=1
hi,j(λi)fi,j(x)
=
 ∑
j∈J cvxi
ρmini,j fi,j(x) +
∑
j∈J cvei
ρmaxi,j fi,j(x)

︸ ︷︷ ︸
concave on X
+
 ∑
j∈J cvxi
ρmini,j fi,j(x) +
∑
j∈J cvei
ρmaxi,j fi,j(x)

︸ ︷︷ ︸
convex on X
+ Gi(x,λi),︸ ︷︷ ︸
concave on Λi, convex on X
(4.33)
where Gi is defined in (4.7). Here we propose a SCA-based algorithm.
This scheme consists in solving a sequence of (strongly) concave problems,
wherein the objective function θJ is replaced by an approximating function
constructed at the current iteration
(
xν ,λν , (λνi )Ii=1
)
∈ ΞJ , defined as
θ˜J(x,λ ; xν ,λν) ,
I∑
i=1
θ˜Ji (x,λi ; x
ν ,λνi )−
τ
2
(‖x− xν‖2 + ‖λ− λν‖2) ,
where τ > 0 is a regularization constant, and for every i = 1, . . . , I each θ˜Ji
is constructed by following the steps outlined next:
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1. The concave term in (4.33) remains unchanged.
2. The convex term in (4.33) is replaced by a linear approximation. More
precisely, for fixed i and for every j ∈ J cvxi ∪ J cvei we define the fol-
lowing linear approximation of fi,j at a given x
ν ∈ Ξ,
fi,j(x) ≈ f˜i,j(x; xν) , fi,j(xν) +∇fi,j(xν)T (x− xν).
3. For the remaining term Gi notice that
Gi(x,λi) = Gi(x
ν ,λi) + [Gi(x,λi)−Gi(xν ,λi)] ,
where the term in brackets can be approximated using a first order
Taylor expansion at (xν ,λνi ) ∈ ΞJ , that is
Gi(x,λi)−Gi(xν ,λi) ≈ ∇xGi(xν ,λνi )T (x− xν).
Hence, we approximate Gi as
Gi(x,λi) ≈ G˜i(x,λi ; xν ,λν) , Gi(xν ,λi) +∇xGi(xν ,λνi )T (x− xν).
From the three steps above, we define: for every i = 1, . . . , I
θ˜Ji (x,λi ; x
ν ,λνi ) ,
 ∑
j∈J cvxi
ρmini,j fi,j(x) +
∑
j∈J cvei
ρmaxi,j fi,j(x)

+
 ∑
j∈J cvxi
ρmini,j f˜i,j(x; x
ν) +
∑
j∈J cvei
ρmaxi,j f˜i,j(x; x
ν)

+Gi(x
ν ,λi) +∇xGi(xν ,λνi )T (x− xν).
(4.34)
An interesting feature of the approximation function above is that it exploits
any “degree” of concavity present in every θJi . For example, note that G˜i
preserves the concavity of Gi(x, •) on Λi for fixed x ∈ Ξ, as opposed to
classical approximation techniques that would simply linearize the function
Gi in both variables, thus ignoring that level of concavity.
The description of the proposed iterative scheme is given in Algorithm 4.3.
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We remark that a suitable practical termination criterion to be used in Step
(S.1) of the mentioned algorithm is to stop iterating when |θJ(xν ,λν) −
θJ(xν−1,λν−1)| ≤ δ for some prescribed accuracy δ. The convergence prop-
erties of Algorithm 4.3 are stated formally in Proposition 4.6 below. It is
worth mentioning that the proof of this proposition is an adaptation of the
results in Chapter 3 to the MSMJO problem.
Algorithm 4.3: SCA-based Algorithm for the MSM Problem
Data: τ > 0 and (x0,λ0) ∈ ΞJ . Set ν = 0.
(S.0): For every i = 1, . . . , I and j = 1, . . . , J compute ρmini,j and ρ
max
i,j .
(S.1): If (xν ,λν) satisfies a termination criterion, STOP.
(S.2): Compute
(xν+1,λν+1) , argmax
x∈Ξ,λ∈Λ
θ˜J(x,λ ; xν ,λν). (4.35)
(S.3): ν ← ν + 1 and go to (S.1).
Proposition 4.6. Under assumptions A1-A5, for every initial point (x0,λ0) ∈
ΞJ , the sequence {(xν ,λν)} produced by Algorithm 4.3 is well-defined. More-
over, if θJ is bounded above on ΞJ and the following two conditions hold:
(a) for every i = 1, . . . , I and j = 1, . . . , J there exists constants Li,j > 0
such that ‖(hi,j(λi)− hi,j(λ˜i))∇fi,j(x)‖ ≤ Li,j ‖λi − λ˜i‖ for any x ∈ Ξ
and λi, λ˜i ∈ Λi; and,
(b) the regularization constant is such that τ > 2
∑I
i=1
∑J
j=1 Li,j;
then every accumulation point of {(xν ,λν)}, if it exists, is a stationary solu-
tion of the joint optimization problem (4.29).
Proof. The first assertion of the proposition is clear.
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For the second result, by induction, since (xν ,λν) ∈ ΞJ , we have
θJ(xν ,λν) = θ˜J(xν ,λν ; xν ,λν)
≤ θ˜J(xν+1,λν+1 ; xν ,λν)
=
I∑
i=1
 ∑
j∈J cvxi
ρmini,j fi,j(x
ν+1) +
∑
j∈J cvei
ρmaxi,j fi,j(x
ν+1)

+
 ∑
j∈J cvxi
ρmini,j f˜i,j(x
ν+1; xν) +
∑
j∈J cvei
ρmaxi,j f˜i,j(x
ν+1; xν)

+
(
Gi(x
ν ,λν+1i ) +∇xGi(xν ,λνi )T (xν+1 − xν)
)
− τ
2
(‖xν+1 − xν‖2 + ‖λν+1 − λν‖2) .
It is not difficult to see that ρmini,j f˜i,j(x
ν+1; xν) ≤ ρmini,j fi,j(xν+1) and similarly
ρmaxi,j f˜i,j(x
ν+1; xν) ≤ ρmaxi,j fi,j(xν+1) for every j ∈ J cvxi ∪J cvei . Applying this
observation and the definition of Gi [cf. (4.7)] in the expression above, we
obtain
θJ(xν ,λν)
≤
I∑
i=1
 ∑
j:fi,j cvx
ρmini,j fi,j(x
ν+1) +
∑
j:fi,j cve
ρmaxi,j fi,j(x
ν+1)

+
 ∑
j:fi,j cvx
(
hi,j(λ
ν+1
i )− ρmini,j
)
fi,j(x
ν) +
∑
j:fi,j cve
(
ρmaxi,j − hi,j(λν+1i )
)
(−fi,j(xν))

+
 ∑
j:fi,j cvx
(
hi,j(λ
ν
i )−ρmini,j
)∇fi,j(xν)−∑
j:fi,j cve
(
ρmaxi,j −hi,j(λνi )
)∇fi,j(xν)
T(xν+1−xν)
− τ
2
(‖xν+1 − xν‖2 + ‖λν+1 − λν‖2) .
(4.36)
For every i and all j such that fi,j is convex, we add and subtract the terms
(hi,j(λ
ν+1
i )− ρmini,j )∇fi,j(xν)T (xν+1 − xν)
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in the right hand side of (4.36). Thus, it follows that
(hi,j(λ
ν+1
i )− ρmini,j )fi,j(xν) + (hi,j(λν+1i )− ρmini,j )∇fi,j(xν)T (xν+1 − xν)
≤ (hi,j(λν+1i )− ρmini,j )fi,j(xν+1).
Similarly, for every i and all j such that fi,j is concave, we add and subtract
the terms
(ρmaxi,j − hi,j(λν+1i ))(−∇fi,j(xν))T (xν+1 − xν)
obtaining
(ρmaxi,j − hi,j(λν+1i ))(−fi,j(xν)) + (ρmaxi,j − hi,j(λν+1i ))(−∇fi,j(xν))T (xν+1 − xν)
≤ (ρmaxi,j − hi,j(λν+1i ))(−fi,j(xν+1)).
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Therefore, from (4.36), we obtain
θJ(xν ,λν)
≤
I∑
i=1
 ∑
j:fi,j cvx
ρmini,j fi,j(x
ν+1) +
∑
j:fi,j cve
ρmaxi,j fi,j(x
ν+1)

+
∑
j:fi,j cvx
[ (hi,j(λ
ν+1
i )− ρmini,j )fi,j(xν+1)
+ (hi,j(λ
ν
i )− hi,j(λν+1i ))∇fi,j(xν)T (xν+1 − xν) ]∑
j:fi,j cve
[ (ρmaxi,j − hi,j(λν+1i ))(−fi,j(xν+1))
+ (hi,j(λ
ν+1
i )− hi,j(λνi ))(−∇fi,j(xν))T (xν+1 − xν) ]
− τ
2
(‖xν+1 − xν‖2 + ‖λν+1 − λν‖2)
=
I∑
i=1
(
J∑
j=1
hi,j(λ
ν+1
i )fi,j(x
ν+1)
)
+
(
J∑
j=1
(hi,j(λ
ν
i )− hi,j(λν+1i ))∇fi,j(xν)T (xν+1 − xν)
)
− τ
2
(‖xν+1 − xν‖2 + ‖λν+1 − λν‖2)
= θJ(xν+1,λν+1) +
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
(hi,j(λ
ν
i )− hi,j(λν+1i ))∇fi,j(xν)T (xν+1 − xν)
− τ
2
(‖xν+1 − xν‖2 + ‖λν+1 − λν‖2) .
Invoking Cauchy-Schwartz inequality along with assumption (a), from the
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expression above, it follows that
θJ(xν ,λν) ≤ θJ(xν+1,λν+1) +
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
Li,j‖λν+1i − λνi ‖ ‖xν+1 − xν‖
− τ
2
(‖xν+1 − xν‖2 + ‖λν+1 − λν‖2)
≤ θJ(xν+1,λν+1) +
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
Li,j
(‖λν+1i − λνi ‖2 + ‖xν+1 − xν‖2)
− τ
2
(‖xν+1 − xν‖2 + ‖λν+1 − λν‖2)
≤ θJ(xν+1,λν+1) +
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
Li,j
(‖λν+1 − λν‖2 + ‖xν+1 − xν‖2)
− τ
2
(‖xν+1 − xν‖2 + ‖λν+1 − λν‖2)
= θJ(xν+1,λν+1)−
(
τ
2
−
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
Li,j
)
‖(xν+1,λν+1)− (xν ,λν)‖2.
Thus, under the assumptions that θJ is bounded above on ΞJ and choosing
τ > 2
∑I
i=1
∑J
j=1 Li,j, the sequence {(xν ,λν)} converges and
lim
ν→∞
‖(xν+1,λν+1)− (xν ,λν)‖2 = 0.
By the variational principle, for every ν ≥ 0 and for all (x,λ) ∈ ΞJ
0 ≥ [(x,λ)− (xν+1,λν+1)]T ∇θ˜J(xν+1,λν+1 ; xν ,λν)
= (x− xν+1)T ∇xθ˜J(xν+1,λν+1 ; xν ,λν)
+ (λ− λν+1)T ∇λθ˜J(xν+1,λν+1 ; xν ,λν)
(4.37)
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where
∇xθ˜J(xν+1,λν+1 ; xν ,λν)
=
I∑
i=1
 ∑
j∈J cvxi
ρmini,j ∇fi,j(xν+1) +
∑
j∈J cvei
ρmaxi,j ∇fi,j(xν+1)

+
 ∑
j∈J cvxi
ρmini,j ∇fi,j(xν) +
∑
j∈J cvei
ρmaxi,j ∇fi,j(xν)

+
 ∑
j:fi,j cvx
(
hi,j(λ
ν
i )− ρmini,j
)∇fi,j(xν) +∑
j:fi,j cve
(
ρmaxi,j − hi,j(λνi )
)
(−∇fi,j(xν))

− τ(xν+1 − xν),
and
∇λθ˜J(xν+1,λν+1 ; xν ,λν)
=
I∑
i=1
 ∑
j:fi,j cvx
∇hi,j(λν+1i )fi,j(xν) +
∑
j:fi,j cve
∇hi,j(λν+1i )fi,j(xν)
−τ(λν+1 − λν).
Finally, if (x∞,λ∞) ∈ ΞJ is an accumulation point of the sequence {(xν ,λν)},
then passing the limit along an appropriate subsequence in (4.37) we obtain:
for all (x,λ) ∈ ΞJ
0 ≥ (x− x∞)T
[
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
hi,j(λ
∞
i )∇fi,j(x∞)
]
+ (λ− λ∞)T
[
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
∇hi,j(λ∞i ) fi,j(x∞)
]
= (x− x∞)T∇xθJ(x∞,λ∞) + (λ− λ∞)T∇λθJ(x∞,λ∞)
= [(x,λ)− (x∞,λ∞)]T∇θJ(x∞,λ∞)
i.e. (x∞,λ∞) is a stationary solution of (4.29).
We remark that a sufficient condition guaranteeing assumption (a) of
Proposition 4.6 is the Lipschitz continuity of the functions hi,j on Λi along
with the uniform boundedness of the gradients of the functions fi,j over X ,
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for every i = 1, . . . , I and j = 1, . . . , J . Of course, if each function fi,j is
Lipschitz continuous on X , the latter condition is readily satisfied. Note also
that Algorithm 4.3 is shown to be convergent to stationary solutions of the
MSMJO problem, which under the conditions of Proposition 4.5(b) coincide
with d-stationary solutions of the MSM problem.
4.4 Unwrapping the Algorithms
In the previous sections we have proposed two different approaches for at-
tempting the computation of a solution for the MSM problem in (4.2). More
precisely, the two approaches are: (i) a DC-based approach, discussed in
Section 4.2, and (ii) a (smooth) Joint Optimization approach, developed in
Section 4.3. These techniques gave rise to Algorithms 4.1 and 4.3, respec-
tively. In this section, we explore in depth both algorithms and contrast
them, highlighting their advantages and disadvantages if any.
An obvious difference between Algorithms 4.1 and 4.3 is that the former
treats the variable λ implicitly, while the latter manages it explicitly. This
fact translates into Algorithm 4.1 requiring the use of subgradients to treat
the nondifferentiable term v [cf. (4.12)] of the DC-type function θ, while
the smooth reformulation of the MSM problem translates into Algorithm 4.3
avoiding the use of subgradients. Hence, computationally speaking, Algo-
rithm 4.1 requires the computation of I subgradients (see, Step 2 of the
mentioned scheme), while Algorithm 4.3 increases the dimensions of the sub-
problems solved at each iteration by introducing I more variables and con-
straints (in comparison with the DC-based algorithm) into each of them. In
order to contrast both schemes, let us unwrap them carefully by analyzing
how the variables xν and λν are updated at every iteration ν > 0 for each
approach.
(i) DC-based Approach − Algorithm 4.1. At any iteration ν > 0 and
given xν ∈ Ξ, Step 2 requires the computation of µgi(xν) ∈ ∂gi(xν) for
every i = 1, . . . , I. Hence, as previously discussed in Remark 4.3, this
step needs the update of the variable λν , which from (4.23), it is easily
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seen to be equivalent to: for every i = 1, . . . , I
λ?,νi ∈ argmax
λi∈Λi
J∑
j=1
hi,j(λi)fi,j(x
ν). (4.38)
Then, after λν is updated accordingly to (4.38), Step 2 concludes by
choosing any µgi(x
ν) ∈ ∂gi(xν) for every i where ∂gi(xν) is given in
(4.19).
In Step 3, we set xν+1 , x̂(xν). Thus, from (4.22), it follows easily that
the variable xν is updated by
xν+1 , argmax
x∈Ξ
I∑
i=1
ui(x) + ∑
j∈J cvxi
ρmini,j ∇fi,j(xν)Tx
+
∑
j∈J cvei
ρmaxi,j ∇fi,j(xν)Tx + µgi(xν)Tx
− τ
2
‖x− xν‖2.
(4.39)
(ii) JO-based Approach − Algorithm 4.3. In this case, the update of
the variables xν and λν is performed jointly in Step 2. However, notice
that the optimization problem in (4.35) is separable in its respective
variables. As a result, at any iteration ν > 0 and given (xν ,λν) ∈ ΞJ
the variables are updated accordingly to:
λν+1i , argmax
λi∈Λi
J∑
j=1
hi,j(λi)fi,j(x
ν)− τ
2
‖λi − λνi ‖2, (4.40)
and
xν+1 , argmax
x∈Ξ
I∑
i=1
ui(x) + ∑
j∈J cvxi
ρmini,j ∇fi,j(xν)Tx
+
∑
j∈J cvei
ρmaxi,j ∇fi,j(xν)Tx +∇xGi(xν ,λνi )Tx
− τ
2
‖x− xν‖2.
(4.41)
Contrasting the problems in (4.38) and (4.40), it is clear that the update
of the variable λν differs only on the regularization term used in the JO-
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based approach. Thus, in the JO-based approach this update requires the
solution of a strongly concave problem generating a unique choice for λν+1.
It is worth mentioning that, in the applications considered in Section 4.5 the
problem in (4.38) simplifies to a scalar linear program, while (4.40) gives rise
to a scalar quadratic problem, where both problems are solvable in closed
form, and thus, these updates are computationally inexpensive.
With respect to the update of the variable xν , from (4.39) and (4.41) it
follows that the only difference occurs in the last term in the summation
of the objective functions of such problems. Such terms correspond to the
approximations of the nondifferentiable (but convex) functions gi in θ, and
to the differentiable functions Gi in θ
J . Notice that, the DC-based scheme
chooses any µgi(x
ν) ∈ ∂gi(xν) for every i = 1, . . . , I to linearize such terms,
while the JO-based scheme uses the unique choice of the gradient (with re-
spect to x) of the function Gi to deal with them. Hence, roughly speaking,
the update of xν in the JO-based scheme can be viewed as a particular case
of the one used in the DC-based algorithm. Finally, it is important to remark
that in Algorithm 4.3 the pair (xν ,λν) is updated simultaneously, while in
Algorithm 4.1 those variables are update sequentially.
Let us turn our attention to the convergence properties of Algorithms 4.1
and 4.3. Notice that the conditions required for the convergence of Algo-
rithm 4.3, stated in Proposition 4.6, are more stringent than those needed
for the convergence of Algorithm 4.1 (refer to Proposition 4.3). In particular,
the DC-based algorithm is shown to be convergent for any τ > 0, while the
JO-based scheme requires a particular choice of this regularization constant
to ensure sufficient decrease (refer to Proposition 4.6, condition (b)). Thus,
whenever this condition is difficult to evaluate or leads to “large” values of
τ that may slow down the convergence of Algorithm 4.3, the DC scheme is
always a choice. Refer to Chapter 3 for more details with regard to the choice
of the parameters in the smooth joint optimization approach.
It is important to emphasize that Proposition 4.3 guarantees the conver-
gence of Algorithm 4.1 to critical points of the MSMDC problem in (4.13),
while Proposition 4.6 states that Algorithm 4.3 converges to stationary so-
lutions of the MSMJO problem in (4.29). Note that, such first order points
(stationary solutions or critical points) coincide with d-stationary solutions
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of the MSM problem in (4.2) if the conditions in the respective Proposi-
tions 4.2(d) or 4.5(b) are satisfied. Thus, it is clear that, given x? ∈ Ξ
produced by either Algorithm 4.1 or 4.3, if the sets Λ?i (x
?) are a single-
ton for every i = 1, . . . , I, then the concepts of stationary solutions, critical
points and d-stationary solutions are all equivalent. Unfortunately, this is
not always the case and the connections of the critical points and stationary
solutions back to the d-stationary solutions of the original MSM problem are
generally in jeopardy.
For the case where the functions hi,j are linear for every i = 1, . . . , I and all
j = 1, . . . , J more can be said. In particular, the next proposition establishes
that the concepts of critical points of the MSMDC and stationary solutions
of the MSMJO are equivalent under this assumption. It is worth mentioning,
that this case is of our particular interest, since in the physical layer based
security applications discussed in Section 4.5 the functions hi,j are linear.
Proposition 4.7. Assume that the functions hi,j are linear for all i = 1, . . . , I
and every j = 1, . . . , J . The vector x? ∈ Ξ is a critical point of the MSMDC
problem in (4.13) if and only if there exists λ? ∈ Λ such that the pair (x?,λ?)
is a stationary solution of the MSMJO problem in (4.29).
Proof. First, suppose that x? ∈ Ξ is a critical point of (4.13) i.e. 0 ∈
∇u(x?)− ∂v(x?)−NΞ(x?) if and only if, for every i = 1, . . . , I, there exists
µgi(x
?) ∈ ∂gi(x?) such that: for all x ∈ Ξ
I∑
i=1
 ∑
j:fi,j cvx
ρmini,j ∇fi,j(x?)T (x− x?) +
∑
j:fi,j cve
ρmaxi,j ∇fi,j(x?)T (x− x?) + µgi(x?)T (x− x?)
 ≤ 0.
(4.42)
From (4.19), for every i = 1, . . . , I, there must exist families {λi,`}Li`=1 ⊂
Λ?i (x
?) and non-negative weights {wi,`}Li`=1 satisfying
Li∑
`=1
wi,` = 1, such that
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any element µgi(x
?) of ∂gi(x
?) is of the form:
µgi(x
?) =
Li∑
`=1
wi,`
 ∑
j:fi,j cvx
(
hi,j(λi,`)− ρmini,j
)∇fi,j(x?) +
∑
j:fi,j cve
(
ρmaxi,j − hi,j(λi,`)
)
(−∇fi,j(x?))
 .
(4.43)
Replacing (4.43) for every i = 1, . . . , I in (4.42) and after some manipulations
we obtain: for all x ∈ Ξ
0 ≥
I∑
i=1
(
Li∑
`=1
wi,`
J∑
j=1
hi,j(λi,`)∇fi,j(x?)T (x− x?)
)
=
I∑
i=1
(
J∑
j=1
hi,j(λ
?
i )∇fi,j(x?)T (x− x?)
)
, (4.44)
where, in the last equality, we invoked the linearity of each function hi,j
and set λ?i ,
Li∑
`=1
wi,` λi,` for all i = 1, . . . , I. It is clear that, for every i,
λ?i ∈ Λ?i (x?), hence:
J∑
j=1
fi,j(x
?)∇hi,j(λ?i )T (λi − λ?i ) ≤ 0 ∀λi ∈ Λi. (4.45)
Adding inequalities (4.44) and (4.45) over i, we obtain the desired result,
that is, the pair
(
x?,λ? , (λ?i )Ii=1
)
is a stationary solution of the smooth
maximization problem (4.29).
For the converse argument, suppose that the pair (x?,λ?) ∈ ΞJ is a sta-
tionary solution (4.29). Thus, for all x ∈ Ξ and all λ ∈ Λ it holds that
I∑
i=1
(
J∑
j=1
hi,j(λ
?
i )∇fi,j(x?)T(x− x?) +
J∑
j=1
fi,j(x
?)∇hi,j(λ?i )T(λi − λ?i )
)
≤ 0.
Letting λi = λ
?
i for every i = 1, . . . , I in the inequality above the desired
results follows readily.
Finally, from the overall analysis presented above, it follows that both
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Algorithms 4.1 and 4.3 are expected to perform similarly in practice. In the
next section, we apply such schemes to concrete resource allocation problems
and test both of them numerically (refer to, Subsection 4.5.4).
4.5 Applications in Physical Layer Based Security
In this section, we apply the methods developed in Sections 4.2 and 4.3 to
resource allocation problems in the context of physical layer based security.
In the applications below, we consider a SISO system, i.e. a communica-
tion network with transmitter-receiver pairs’ equipped with a single antenna,
where the spectrum is managed dynamically. Based on the secrecy rate con-
cept (see, e.g., [47]), the main problem is to allocate the power budget of
the network entities so that their transmissions are kept secure. We study
this problem under two different assumptions: first, we deal with the case
where the users communicate over multiple non-orthogonal subchannels (see,
Subsection 4.5.1); and second, we consider OFDMA transmissions (see, Sub-
section 4.5.2). For the first setting, we model the system design as a single
optimization problem, leading to centralized algorithms; while for the second
case, we formulate the system design as a noncooperative game [76] leading
to distributed schemes. In Subsections 4.5.3, we present some possible ex-
tensions of the aforementioned problems. Subsection 4.5.4 presents some
numerical experiments.
4.5.1 SISO Secrecy Sum-Rate Maximization Problem
4.5.1.1 System Model and Notation
We consider a wireless communication system composed of Q transmitter-
receiver pairs (denoted by q = 1, . . . , Q) which correspond to the legitimate
users of the system, J friendly jammers (denoted by j = 1, . . . , J) and a
single eavesdropper (denoted by e); see Figure 4.3. In this setting, each
legitimate user’s transmitter wants to communicate (in a secure way) with
its corresponding legitimate receiver over a set of N parallel subchannels
(denoted by k = 1, . . . , N). The friendly jammers are entities willing to
cooperate with the legitimate parties by introducing judicious interference
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such as to impair the eavesdroppers ability to decode the messages between
intended nodes.
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HQq (k)
H1e(k)
HQe(k)
Figure 4.3: System model composed of the legitimate users, the friendly jammers, and one eavesdropper.
The arrows illustrate the interference perceived by the q-th user and the eavesdropper over the k-th
subchannel.
In the following discussion, let:
• pq(k) denotes the power allocation of transmitter q over subchannel k.
• p̂j(k) denotes the power allocation of the friendly jammer j over sub-
channel k.
• Pmaxq denotes the power budget of the q-th transmitter.
• P̂maxj denotes the power budget of the j-th friendly jammer.
• Hqq(k) represents the channel gain between the transmitter of user q
and its corresponding receiver over subchannel k. Similarly, Hqe(k)
represents the channel gain coefficient for the k-th subchannel between
the transmitter of user q and the eavesdropper.
• Hrq(k) represents the channel gain between the transmitter of user r
and the receiver of user q over subchannel k. Similarly, Hre(k) repre-
sents the channel gain coefficient for the k-th subchannel between the
transmitter of user r and the eavesdropper.
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• Ĥjq(k) represents the channel gain between the transmitter of the
friendly jammer j and the receiver of user q along subchannel k. Like-
wise, Ĥje(k) represents the channel gain coefficient for the k-th sub-
channel between the transmitter of the friendly jammer j and the eaves-
dropper.
• σ2q (k) denotes the variance of the noise at the receiver of user q along
subchannel k.
We assume that Channel State Information (CSI) of the eavesdropper’s
(cross-)channels is available. We remark that this is a common assumption
in the physical layer based security literature; see, e.g., [47, 24, 39, 59, 115,
104, 119, 36, 60]. There are practical situations in which the CSI can be
obtained, see Chapter 3 - Section 3.5 and the references therein for some
examples.
Under basic information theoretical assumptions, the maximum achiev-
able rate on link q over subchannel k for a given power profile, defined by(
p , (pq , (pq(k))Nk=1)
Q
q=1, p̂ , (p̂j , (p̂j(k))Nk=1)Jj=1
)
, is given by [22]
rqqk(p, p̂) , log
(
1 +
Hqq(k) pq(k)
σ2q (k) +
∑
r 6=qHrq(k) pr(k) +
∑J
j=1 Ĥjq(k) p̂j(k)
)
.
Similarly, the rate on the link between the transmitter of user q and the
eavesdropper’s receiver along subchannel k is
rqek(p, p̂) , log
(
1 +
Hqe(k) pq(k)
σ2q (k) +
∑
r 6=qHre(k) pr(k) +
∑J
j=1 Ĥje(k) p̂j(k)
)
.
Then, the secrecy rate on link q along subchannel k is (see, e.g., [47])
rsqk(p, p̂) , [rqqk(p, p̂)− rqek(p, p̂)]+ , (4.46)
where [•]+ denotes the Euclidean projection onto R+ i.e. [x]+ , max(0, x).
4.5.1.2 Problem Formulation
We formulate the system design as a single optimization problem that seeks
to maximize the system’s utility, which we take as the secrecy sum-rate (de-
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noted by rs) i.e. the sum of the secrecy rate of all users along all subchan-
nel. Assuming that each transmitter q has a limited power budget, that is∑N
k=1 pq(k) ≤ Pmaxq , and likewise each jammer j i.e.
∑N
k′=1 p̂j(k
′) ≤ P̂maxj ,
then the system design corresponds to the following maximization problem:
maximize
(p,p̂)≥0
rs(p, p̂) ,
Q∑
q=1
N∑
k=1
rsqk (p, p̂)
subject to:
N∑
k=1
pq(k) ≤ Pmaxq ∀ q = 1, . . . , Q (private constraints)
N∑
k′=1
p̂j(k
′) ≤ P̂maxj ∀ j = 1, . . . , J (coupling constraints).
(4.47)
For the sake of simplicity, let the polyhedral feasible set of (4.47) be denoted
by
P ,
{
(p, p̂) ≥ 0 :
N∑
k=1
pq(k) ≤ Pmaxq ∀ q and
N∑
k′=1
p̂j(k
′) ≤ P̂maxj ∀ j
}
.
Notice that, for every q = 1, . . . , Q and every k = 1, . . . , N , rsqk [cf. (4.46)]
can be rewritten as
rsqk(p, p̂) = [fqk,1(p, p̂) + fqk,2(p, p̂)]
+ , (4.48)
where
fqk,1(p, p̂) , log
(
σ2q (k) +
Q∑
r=1
Hrq(k) pr(k) +
J∑
j=1
Ĥjq(k) p̂j(k)
)
(4.49)
+ log
(
σ2q (k) +
∑
r 6=q
Hre(k) pr(k) +
J∑
j=1
Ĥje(k) p̂j(k)
)
fqk,2(p, p̂) , − log
(
σ2q (k) +
Q∑
r=1
Hre(k) pr(k) +
J∑
j=1
Ĥje(k) p̂j(k)
)
(4.50)
− log
(
σ2q (k) +
∑
r 6=q
Hrq(k) pr(k) +
J∑
j=1
Ĥjq(k) p̂j(k)
)
.
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Clearly, each fqk,1 is a concave function and each fqk,2 is a convex function.
Let us rewrite the secrecy sum-rate maximization problem in (4.47) as fol-
lows:
maximize
(p,p̂)∈P
Q∑
q=1
N∑
k=1
maximum
λqk∈[0,1]
(λqk fqk,1(p, p̂) + λqk fqk,2(p, p̂)) , (4.51)
where each discrete max-function [•]+ in (4.48) is replaced by a continuous
equivalent form. It is important to highlight the following three key ob-
servations about the SISO secrecy sum-rate maximization reformulation in
(4.51):
i) It is not difficult to show that the optimizations problems in (4.47)
and (4.51) are equivalent in terms of globally optimal solutions and
d-stationary points;
ii) Furthermore, the maximization problem (4.51) is an instance of the
MSM problem introduced in (4.2); and,
iii) It is easy to verify that assumptions A1-A6 are readily satisfied by the
application in consideration.
Thus, capitalizing on these observations, we can apply either Algorithm 4.1
to find critical points of the DC-reformulation of (4.51) or Algorithm 4.3 to
find stationary solutions of the joint optimization reformulation of such a
problem. In what follows, we customize both schemes to the aforementioned
problem.
4.5.1.3 DC-Programming Approach
Following the ideas of Section 4.2, lets start by finding an equivalent DC-
decomposition of the secrecy sum-rate rs. For that, it suffices to focus on
each of its summands
rsqk(p, p̂) = maximum
λqk∈[0,1]
(λqk fqk,1(p, p̂) + λqk fqk,2(p, p̂)) .
Notice that, for this application, the constants defined in equation (4.4) be-
come ρmaxqk = 1 and ρ
min
qk = 0 for every q = 1, . . . , Q and every k = 1, . . . , N .
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Therefore, the expression in (4.5) simplifies to: for every q = 1, . . . , Q and
k = 1, . . . , N
rsqk(p, p̂)=fqk,1(p, p̂)+maximum
λqk∈[0,1]
[λqkfqk,2(p, p̂)+(λqk − 1)fqk,1(p, p̂)]. (4.52)
From the equation above, it is clear that the expression in (4.6) simplifies to
the particular form
gqk(p, p̂) , maximum
λqk∈[0,1]
Gqk(p, p̂, λqk), (4.53)
where
Gqk(p, p̂, λqk) , λqk fqk,2(p, p̂) + (λqk − 1) fqk,1(p, p̂).
From this discussion, the desired DC-decomposition of rs follows readily.
We highlight that this nontrivial decomposition will also lead us to derive
iterative algorithms for more complex system designs as those studied in
Subsection 4.5.3.
Under the observations above, Algorithm 4.4 specializes Algorithm 4.1 to
the SISO secrecy sum-rate maximization problem. For notational conve-
nience, when needed, we will denote each tuple (p, p̂) by x , (p, p̂). For any
τ > 0, Algorithm 4.4 converges (in the sense of Proposition 4.3) to a critical
point of the DC-reformulation of (4.51), which is simply:
maximize
(p,p̂)∈P
Q∑
q=1
N∑
k=1
fqk,1(p, p̂)− (−gqk(p, p̂)) . (4.54)
We remark that the feasible set P of the problem above is bounded, conse-
quently the existence of an accumulation point of the sequence {xν} produced
by Algorithm 4.4 is guaranteed as required by the general convergence result
in Proposition 4.3.
Let us highlight two aspects regarding the computation of a subgradient
of gqk [cf. (4.53)]. First, notice that the computation of (4.23), which cor-
responds to step (S.2) of Algorithm 4.4, is computationally inexpensive for
this particular case. Namely, it only requires the solution of a scalar linear
problem which reduces to the closed form expression in (4.55). Second, step
(S.3) requires the computation of ∇xGqk(x, λqk), which by the differentia-
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Algorithm 4.4: DC-based Algorithm for the SISO Secrecy Sum-Rate Max-
imization Problem
Data: τ > 0 and x0 , (p0, p̂0) ∈ P . Set ν = 0.
(S.1): If xν , (pν , p̂ν) satisfies a termination criterion, STOP.
(S.2): For q = 1, . . . , Q and k = 1, . . . , N compute
λ?,νqk ∈

{0} if fqk,1(xν) + fqk,2(xν) < 0
{1} if fqk,1(xν) + fqk,2(xν) > 0
[0,1] if fqk,1(x
ν) + fqk,2(x
ν) = 0.
(4.55)
(S.3): For q = 1, . . . , Q and k = 1, . . . , N compute
µgqk(x
ν)=

−∇fqk,1(xν) if λ?,νqk = 0
∇fqk,2(xν) if λ?,νqk = 1
λ?,νqk ∇fqk,2(xν) + (λ?,νqk − 1)∇fqk,1(xν) if λ?,νqk ∈ (0, 1).
(4.56)
(S.4): Compute
xν+1 , argmax
x∈P
Q∑
q=1
N∑
k=1
(
fqk,1(x) + µgqk(x
ν)Tx
)− τ
2
‖x− xν‖2. (4.57)
(S.5): ν ← ν + 1 and go to (S.1).
bility of each function fqk,1(x) and fqk,2(x), is given by: for all q = 1, . . . , Q
and all k = 1, . . . , N
∇xGqk(x, λqk) = λqk∇fqk,2(x) + (λqk − 1)∇fqk,1(x), (4.58)
where
∇fqk,1(x) ,

(
∇pqfqk,1(x) ,
(
∂fqk,1(x)
∂pq(k)
)N
k=1
)Q
q=1(
∇p̂jfqk,1(x) ,
(
∂fqk,1(x)
∂p̂j(k)
)N
k=1
)J
j=1
 ∈ RN(Q+J) (4.59)
∇fqk,2(x) ,

(
∇pqfqk,2(x) ,
(
∂fqk,2(x)
∂pq(k)
)N
k=1
)Q
q=1(
∇p̂jfqk,2(x) ,
(
∂fqk,2(x)
∂p̂j(k)
)N
k=1
)J
j=1
 ∈ RN(Q+J), (4.60)
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and the corresponding partial derivatives are given by:
∂fqk,1(x)
∂pq(k)
=
Hqq(k)
σ2q (k) +
Q∑
r=1
Hrq(k) pr(k) +
J∑
j=1
Ĥjq(k) p̂j(k)
∂fqk,1(x)
∂pr(k)
=
Hrq(k)
σ2q (k) +
Q∑
r=1
Hrq(k) pr(k) +
J∑
j=1
Ĥjq(k) p̂j(k)
+
Hre(k)
σ2q (k) +
∑
r 6=q
Hre(k) pr(k) +
J∑
j=1
Ĥje(k) p̂j(k)
(∀ r 6= q)
∂fqk,1(x)
∂p̂j(k)
=
Ĥjq(k)
σ2q (k) +
Q∑
r=1
Hrq(k) pr(k) +
J∑
j=1
Ĥjq(k) p̂j(k)
+
Ĥje(k)
σ2q (k) +
∑
r 6=q
Hre(k) pr(k) +
J∑
j=1
Ĥje(k) p̂j(k)
(∀ j = 1, . . . , J).
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Similarly,
∂fqk,2(x)
∂pq(k)
=
−Hqe(k)
σ2q (k) +
Q∑
r=1
Hre(k) pr(k) +
J∑
j=1
Ĥje(k) p̂j(k)
∂fqk,2(x)
∂pr(k)
=
−Hre(k)
σ2q (k) +
Q∑
r=1
Hre(k) pr(k) +
J∑
j=1
Ĥje(k) p̂j(k)
− Hrq(k)
σ2q (k) +
∑
r 6=q
Hrq(k) pr(k) +
J∑
j=1
Ĥjq(k) p̂j(k)
(∀ r 6= q)
∂fqk,2(x)
∂p̂j(k)
=
−Ĥje(k)
σ2q (k) +
Q∑
r=1
Hre(k) pr(k) +
J∑
j=1
Ĥje(k) p̂j(k)
− Ĥjq(k)
σ2q (k) +
∑
r 6=q
Hrq(k) pr(k) +
J∑
j=1
Ĥjq(k) p̂j(k)
(∀ j = 1, . . . , J).
Notice that Algorithm 4.4 is centralized i.e. it requires a level of coordina-
tion among the entities in the network. An example of a natural application
of this scheme occurs in broadband wireless networks, where the base station
can act as the central authority. In this case, the base station is capable
of estimating the users’ channels. After the CSI is available, the base sta-
tion executes Algorithm 4.4 and assigns the resources, both the power and
subchannels, in accordance to the output obtained form the scheme.
To conclude this section, we examine the relation between the critical
points of (4.54) (produced by Algorithm 4.4) and the d-stationary solutions
of the maximization problem (4.47). Recall that, from Proposition 4.2(c) it
follows that every d-stationary solution of the secrecy sum-rate maximization
problem is a critical point of its DC-reformulation. However, the converse is
not always true since the conditions of Proposition 4.2(d) are not satisfied
by our application. Therefore, in the following discussion, we exploit the
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particular structure of our problem in order to derive some results connecting
those concepts. For that, let us start by calculating the directional derivative
of rs(x) along any direction d ∈ Rn, i.e.
rs ′(x; d) =
Q∑
q=1
N∑
k=1
rs ′qk(x; d) (4.61)
where from [13, Eq. 2.124] we have that: for all q = 1, . . . , Q and k =
1, . . . , N
rs ′qk(x; d),

0 if fqk,1(x) + fqk,2(x) < 0
(∇fqk,1(x) +∇fqk,2(x))T d if fqk,1(x) + fqk,2(x) > 0(
(∇fqk,1(x) +∇fqk,2(x))T d
)+
if fqk,1(x) + fqk,2(x) = 0.
(4.62)
Suppose that x? is a critical point of the DC program (4.54) produced by
Algorithm 4.4, i.e.
0 ∈
Q∑
q=1
N∑
k=1
∇fqk,1(x?) + ∂gqk(x?)−NP(x?). (4.63)
Lets evaluate (4.63) element-wise, that is, for any pair (q, k) the following
three cases can happen at a critical point x?.
• Case I − fqk,1(x?) + fqk,2(x?) < 0.
In this case µgqk(x
?) = −∇fqk,1(x?), thus for all x ∈ P(∇fqk,1(x?) + µgqk(x?))T (x− x?) = 0 = rs ′qk(x?; x− x?),
where in the last equality we invoked (4.62).
• Case II − fqk,1(x?) + fqk,2(x?) > 0.
In this case µgqk(x
?) = ∇fqk,2(x?), thus for all x ∈ P(∇fqk,1(x?) + µgqk(x?))T (x− x?) = rs ′qk(x?; x− x?),
where, again, the equality above follows from (4.62).
• Case III − fqk,1(x?) + fqk,2(x?) = 0.
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As expected, this is the case that puts in jeopardy the equivalence
between a critical point and a d-stationary solution of the respective
problems. Note that, under this setting, in Step (S.3) of Algorithm 4.4
the subgradient of gqk at x
? can be any
µgqk(x
?) ∈ {λ?qk∇fqk,2(x?) + (1− λ?qk) (−∇fqk,1(x?)) : λ?qk ∈ [0, 1]} .
Besides, it is not difficult to see that fqk,1(x
?) + fqk,2(x
?) = 0 if and
only if either p?q(k) = 0 or
Hqq(k)
σ2q (k) +
∑
r 6=q
Hrq(k) p
?
r(k) +
J∑
j=1
Ĥjq(k) p̂
?
j (k)
=
Hqe(k)
σ2q (k) +
∑
r 6=q
Hre(k) p
?
r(k) +
J∑
j=1
Ĥje(k) p̂
?
j (k)
,
which is equivalent to
Mqk(x
?) = 0
where, for notational simplicity, we define
Mqk(x
?) ,
∑
r 6=q
(Hqq(k)Hre(k)−Hqe(k)Hrq(k)) p ?r (k)
+
J∑
j=1
(
Hqq(k)Ĥje(k)−Hqe(k)Ĥjq(k)
)
p̂ ?j (k)
+ (Hqq(k)−Hqe(k))σ2q (k).
(4.64)
This observation lead us to consider the following four possible situa-
tions.
(a) If p?q(k) = 0 and Mqk(x
?) = 0, using the expressions in (4.59) and
(4.60), it is not difficult to show that: for all x ∈ P
(∇fqk,1(x?) +∇fqk,2(x?))T (x− x?) = 0.
Therefore, from (4.62) it follows that: for all x ∈ P
rs ′qk(x
?; x− x?) = (∇fqk,1(x?) +∇fqk,2(x?))T (x− x?) = 0.
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Note that, if λ?qk = 1 (or λ
?
qk = 0) then the subgradient is µgqk(x
?) =
∇fqk,2(x?) (or µgqk(x?) = −∇fqk,1(x?)); and, from the equation
above, we obtain the desired correspondence between the value of
the (q, k)-th directional derivative and that of the respective term(∇fqk,1(x?) + µgqk(x?))T (x− x?) of (4.63).
(b) If p?q(k) = 0 and Mqk(x
?) > 0, from the expressions in (4.59) and
(4.60), it is easy to show that
(∇fqk,1(x?) +∇fqk,2(x?))T (x− x?) =(
∂fqk,1(x
?)
∂pq(k)
− ∂fqk,2(x
?)
∂pq(k)
)
pq(k) ≥ 0
for all pq(k) ≥ 0. Hence (∇fqk,1(x?) +∇fqk,2(x?))T (x − x?) ≥ 0
for all x ∈ P . As a result, from (4.62) it is clear that: for all
x ∈ P
rs ′qk(x
?; x− x?) = (∇fqk,1(x?) +∇fqk,2(x?))T (x− x?) ≥ 0.
Note that, if λ?qk = 1 then µgqk(x
?) = ∇fqk,2(x?), and from the
equation above we obtain the desired correspondence between the
value of the (q, k)-th directional derivative and that of the term(∇fqk,1(x?) + µgqk(x?))T (x− x?) of (4.63).
(c) If p?q(k) = 0 and Mqk(x
?) < 0, following the same argument of the
previous case, from (4.59) and (4.60) it is clear that: for all x ∈ P
(∇fqk,1(x?) +∇fqk,2(x?))T (x− x?) ≤ 0.
Again, from (4.62) it follows that: for all x ∈ P
rs ′qk(x
?; x− x?) = 0.
Note that, if λ?qk = 0 then µgqk(x
?) = −∇fqk,1(x?), and from the
equation above we obtain the desired correspondence between the
value of the (q, k)-th directional derivative and that of the term(∇fqk,1(x?) + µgqk(x?))T (x− x?) of (4.63).
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(d) Finally, if p?q(k) > 0 and Mqk(x
?) = 0, unfortunately not much
can be said. After simplification, it follows from (4.59) and (4.60)
that
(∇fqk,1(x?) +∇fqk,2(x?))T (x− x?) =∑
r 6=q
(
(Hqq(k)Hre(k)−Hqe(k)Hrq(k))p?q(k)
Iqq(k)(Hqe(k)pq(k) + Iqe(k))
)
(pr(k)− p?r(k))
+
J∑
j=1
(
(Hqq(k)Ĥje(k)−Hqe(k)Ĥjq(k))p?q(k)
Iqq(k)(Hqe(k)pq(k) + Iqe(k))
)
(p̂j(k)− p̂ ?j (k))
where
Iqq(k) , σ2q (k) +
∑
r 6=q
Hrq(k) p
?
r(k) +
J∑
j=1
Ĥjq(k) p̂
?
j (k)
Iqe(k) , σ2q (k) +
∑
r 6=q
Hre(k) p
?
r(k) +
J∑
j=1
Ĥje(k) p̂
?
j (k).
As a result, no sharp conclusion can be established regarding
rs ′qk(x
?; x−x?). Nevertheless, notice that in this case, without loss
of optimality, we can set p?q(k) = 0 whenever no other main user is
allocating power on subchannel k since the secrecy sum-rate is not
affected. For example, in a system with orthogonal subchannels
(see, Subsection 4.5.2) setting p?q(k) = 0 when Mqk(x
?) = 0 does
not affect the secrecy rate of the corresponding user-subchannel
pair (q, k).
The observations above lead to the following result establishing some con-
nections between the critical points of the DC problem (4.54) (obtained from
Algorithm 4.4) and the d-stationary solutions of the SISO secrecy sum-rate
maximization problem (4.47). The proof of the next proposition is a direct
consequence of the cases (I) - (III) outlined above.
Proposition 4.8. Suppose that x? is a critical point of the DC program
(4.54),
(a) If fqk,1(x
?)+fqk,2(x
?) 6= 0 for all q = 1, . . . , Q and all k = 1, . . . , N , then
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x? is a d-stationary solution of the SISO secrecy sum-rate maximization
problem (4.47).
(b) If x? is such that for every pair (q, k) satisfying fqk,1(x
?)+fqk,2(x
?) = 0
the following conditions hold:
(i) p?q(k) = 0 whenever Mqk(x
?) = 0; and,
(ii) the corresponding (q, k)-th subgradient µgqk(x
?) ∈ ∂gqk(x?) satis-
fies
µgqk(x
?) =
{
−∇fqk,1(x?) if p?q(k) = 0 and Mqk(x?) ≤ 0
∇fqk,2(x?) if p?q(k) = 0 and Mqk(x?) ≥ 0,
then x? is a d-stationary solution of the SISO secrecy sum-rate maxi-
mization problem (4.47).
4.5.1.4 Joint Optimization Approach
In the following discussion, we apply the joint optimization approach intro-
duced in Section 4.3 to the SISO secrecy sum-rate maximization problem.
We start by rewriting such a problem [cf. (4.51)] as a (smooth) joint opti-
mization problem in the variables (p, p̂) and λ ,
(
(λqk)
Q
q=1
)N
k=1
, that is
maximize
(p,p̂)∈P, λqk∈[0,1] ∀q,k
Q∑
q=1
N∑
k=1
(λqk fqk,1(p, p̂) + λqk fqk,2(p, p̂)) . (4.65)
Let us customize Algorithm 4.3 to the program (4.65). From the approximat-
ing function introduced in equation (4.34), we define: given xν , (pν , p̂ν) ∈
P and λνqk ∈ [0, 1]
r˜ s,Jqk (x, λqk : x
ν , λνqk) , fqk,1(x) + λqk(fqk,1(xν) + fqk,2(xν))
+ λνqk∇fqk,2(xν)Tx + (λνqk − 1)∇fqk,1(xν)Tx,
for all q = 1, . . . , Q and k = 1, . . . , N . Then, from (4.35) the JO-based
algorithm consists in solving iteratively the following sequence of strongly
concave problems: given the vectors xν ∈ P and λν ,
(
(λνqk)
Q
q=1
)N
k=1
with
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each λνqk ∈ [0, 1]
(
xν+1,λν+1
)
, argmax
x∈P, λqk∈[0,1] ∀q,k
Q∑
q=1
N∑
k=1
r˜ s,Jqk (x, λqk : x
ν , λνqk)
− τ
2
‖(x,λ)− (xν ,λν)‖2.
(4.66)
In Algorithm 4.5 we introduce formally this approach. Notice that, in Step
2 of this iterative scheme we exploited the separability of the problem (4.66)
in the variables x and λ, as already pointed out in Section 4.4 for the general
case. As a result, the update of the variable λ in (4.67) requires the solution
of a scalar quadratic maximization problem for each q = 1, . . . , Q and k =
1, . . . , N , whose solution can be found in closed form. Similarly, we recall
that, for the DC-based algorithm, the update of this variable requires the
solution of a scalar linear program, see equation (4.55).
It is easy to check that the requirements in part (a) of Proposition 4.6 are
readily satisfied by our application, and if τ is chosen accordingly to condi-
tion (b) of the aforementioned proposition, then Algorithm 4.5 converges to
stationary solutions of (4.65).
Algorithm 4.5: JO-based Algorithm for the SISO Secrecy Sum-Rate Max-
imization Problem
Data: τ > 0, x0 , (p0, p̂0) ∈ P , and λ0qk ∈ [0, 1] for all q = 1, . . . , Q and
k = 1, . . . , N . Set ν = 0.
(S.1): If (xν ,λν) satisfies a termination criterion, STOP.
(S.2): Compute: for all q = 1, . . . , Q and all k = 1, . . . , N
λν+1qk , argmax
λqk∈[0,1]
[
λqk (fqk,1(x
ν) + fqk,2(x
ν))− τ
2
‖λqk − λνqk‖2
]
, (4.67)
xν+1 , argmax
x∈P
Q∑
q=1
N∑
k=1
[ fqk,1(x) + λ
ν
qk∇fqk,2(xν)Tx
+ (λνqk − 1)∇fqk,1(xν)Tx ]−
τ
2
‖x− xν‖2. (4.68)
(S.3): ν ← ν + 1 and go to (S.1).
We conclude this section by briefly discussing the relation between a sta-
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tionary solution of the maximization problem (4.65) and a d-stationary solu-
tion of (4.47). This relation is summarized in Proposition 4.9, whose proof is
very similar to that of its counterpart in Proposition 4.8, thus it is omitted.
Proposition 4.9. Suppose that
(
x?, λ? ,
(
(λ?qk)
Q
q=1
)N
k=1
)
is a stationary
solution of the joint optimization problem (4.65),
(a) If fqk,1(x
?)+fqk,2(x
?) 6= 0 for all q = 1, . . . , Q and all k = 1, . . . , N , then
x? is a d-stationary solution of the SISO secrecy sum-rate maximization
problem (4.47).
(b) If x? is such that for every pair (q, k) satisfying fqk,1(x
?)+fqk,2(x
?) = 0
the following conditions hold:
(i) p?q(k) = 0 whenever Mqk(x
?) = 0; and,
(ii) λ?qk satisfies
λ?qk =
{
0 if p?q(k) = 0 and Mqk(x
?) ≤ 0
1 if p?q(k) = 0 and Mqk(x
?) ≥ 0,
then x? is a d-stationary solution of the SISO secrecy sum-rate maxi-
mization problem (4.47).
4.5.2 Multi-orthogonal Subchannels Secrecy Rate Game
This section presents an extension to the secrecy rate game considered in
Chapter 3 - Subsection 3.5.1. The system model studied in the cited refer-
ence considers the scenario where each legitimate user communicates over a
single orthogonal subchannel. In the forthcoming discussion, we consider the
more general setting where the legitimate users communicate along multiple
orthogonal subchannels.
4.5.2.1 System Model and Notation
Unless stated the contrary, throughout this section, we follow the same nota-
tion of Subsection 4.5.1. Similarly, we consider the same wireless communi-
cation system, but here we assume OFDMA transmissions for the legitimate
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users. More precisely, we introduce the following orthogonal subchannels as-
sumption: each legitimate transmitter-receiver pair q communicates over a
set of assigned subchannels denoted by Kq. For every q = 1, . . . , Q, the
subchannels assignment sets Kq satisfy the properties:
(i) Kq 6= ∅ for all q = 1, . . . , Q,
(ii) Kq ∩ Kr = ∅ for all r 6= q, and
(iii)
Q⋃
q′=1
Kq′ = {1, . . . , N}.
It is worth mentioning that orthogonal transmissions in the form of OFDMA
is the most used standard in current and future wireless communications sys-
tems; examples are: WiMaX (IEEE 802.16), MBWA (IEEE 802.20), WRAN
(IEEE 802.22), and 4G (LTE). Hence, a deep study of the power allocation
problem in the OFDMA setting is of great importance.
Under the OFDMA assumption and letting pq , (pq(k))k∈Kq and p̂q ,(
p̂q(k) , (p̂j(k))Jj=1
)
k∈Kq
, the secrecy rate of user q is given by
rsq (pq, p̂q) ,
∑
k∈Kq
rsqk(pq(k), p̂q(k))
=
∑
k∈Kq
[rqqk(pq(k), p̂q(k))− rqek(pq(k), p̂q(k))]+
where for every k ∈ Kq
rqqk(pq(k), p̂q(k)) , log
(
1 +
Hqq(k) pq(k)
σ2q (k) +
∑J
j=1 Ĥjq(k) p̂j(k)
)
rqek(pq(k), p̂q(k)) , log
(
1 +
Hqe(k) pq(k)
σ2q (k) +
∑J
j=1 Ĥje(k) p̂j(k)
)
Notice that in the equation above the interference terms of the legitimate
users r 6= q are no longer present in comparison with the scenario studied in
the previous section [refer to Equation (4.46)].
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4.5.2.2 Problem Formulation
The system design is formulated as a noncooperative game [76] where the
main users are the players who aim to maximize their own secrecy rate with
the help of the friendly jammers. Formally, each legitimate user q, anticipat-
ing (p̂r)r 6=q solves the following maximization problem:
G :
maximize
(pq ,p̂q)≥0
rsq (pq, p̂q)
subject to: ∑
k∈Kq
pq(k) ≤ Pmaxq ,
N∑
k′=1
p̂j(k
′) ≤ P̂maxj , ∀ j = 1, . . . , J.
 , Pq(p̂−q)
(4.69)
The game whose q-th optimization problem is given by (4.69) will be referred
as the multi-orthogonal subchannels secrecy rate game G. It is worth stressing
some characteristics of G that make it challenging:
i) the players’ objective functions are nondifferentiable and nonconcave;
and,
ii) the feasible set Pq of the optimization problem above depends on p̂−q ,
(p̂r)r 6=q, i.e. the friendly jammers’ power allocation over the rest of
legitimate users’ subchannels.
This last feature of G, classifies it as an instance of the well-known Gen-
eralized Nash Equilibrium Problems (GNEP) with shared constraints [27].
A solution of G is the Generalized Nash Equilibrium (GNE); the following
definition formalizes this concept.
Definition 4.5. A strategy profile x? ,
(
x?q , (p?q, p̂?q)
)Q
q=1
is a GNE of the
GNEP G if, for all q = 1, . . . , Q, the following holds: x?q ∈ Pq(p̂?−q) and
rsq(x
?
q) ≥ rsq(xq), ∀xq ∈ Pq(p̂?−q).
It is not difficult to check that the game G is of the potential type [31].
Let p , (pq)Qq=1 and p̂ , (p̂q)
Q
q=1 then, the potential function of G is given
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by
rs(p, p̂) ,
Q∑
q=1
rsq (pq, p̂q) .
Consider the associated social problem
(P ) : maximize
(p,p̂)∈Port
rs(p, p̂), (4.70)
where the feasible set is given by
Port ,
(p, p̂) ≥ 0 : ∑
k∈Kq
pq(k) ≤ Pmaxq ∀ q and,
N∑
k′=1
p̂j(k
′) ≤ P̂maxj ∀ j
 .
For this type of games, it is well-known that any optimal solution of (P ) is
a GNE of G. It is clear that (P ) has a solution, therefore a GNE of G must
exist. The following proposition summarizes this result.
Proposition 4.10. A GNE of the multi-orthogonal channels secrecy rate
game G always exists.
Due to the intrinsic characteristics of G, the computation of a GNE of
this game is challenging. Thus, toward deriving a distributed algorithm for
finding practical solutions of such a game, we focus on a relaxed equilibrium
concept. Namely, we rely on the concept of B-Quasi GNE (B-QGNE) intro-
duced in Chapter 3. Roughly speaking, a B-QGNE is a stationary solution
of the GNEP based on the B(ouligand)-derivative [28]. The next definition
gives a formal description of this concept.
Definition 4.6. A strategy profile x? ,
(
x?q , (p?q, p̂?q)
)Q
q=1
is a B-QGNE of
the GNEP G if, for all q = 1, . . . , Q, the following holds: x?q ∈ Pq(p̂?−q) and
rsq
′(x?q; xq − x?q) ≤ 0, ∀xq ∈ Pq(p̂?−q).
In the remaining discussion, we turn our attention to the distributed com-
putation of a B-QGNE of G. In pursuance of this goal, we capitalize on the
potential structure of G. The next proposition establishes the existence of a
B-QGNE of G and summarizes some connections between the game G and
the multiplayer maximization problem (P ) defined in (4.70).
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Proposition 4.11. Given the multi-orthogonal channels secrecy rate game
G [cf. (4.69)] and the social problem (P ) [cf. (4.70)], the following hold:
(a) A B-QGNE of the multi-orthogonal channels secrecy rate game G al-
ways exists.
(b) If x? is an optimal solution of (P ), then x? is a GNE of G.
(c) If x? is a d-stationary solution of (P ), then x? is a B-QGNE of G.
(d) If x? is a B-QGNE of G and there exists common multipliers of the
shared constraints
∑N
k=1 p̂j(k) ≤ P̂maxj j = 1, . . . , J for all players, then
x? is a d-stationary solution of (P ).
Proof. (a) Since the players’ optimization problems of the game G have feasi-
ble sets of the polyhedral type, every GNE of this game is a B-QGNE. From
Proposition 4.10, a GNE of G always exists, thus the existence of a B-QGNE
follows readily.
(b) This follows immediately since G is an exact potential game.
(c) The proof of this statement is similar to that of Proposition 3.6(c) in
Chapter 3, and thus we omit further details.
(d) This follows readily under the common multipliers assumption.
Proposition 4.11(c) along with the observation that the social problem (P )
is an instance of the MSM problem (4.2) pave the way on deriving iterative
algorithms for attempting the computation of a B-QGNE of G. Either Algo-
rithm 4.4 or 4.5 can be applied toward achieving that goal. In what follows,
we focus on the DC-Programming based approach, nevertheless a similar
analysis can be done for the JO-based scheme. Algorithm 4.4 is shown to be
convergent to critical points of the DC-reformulation of (P ) given by
(PDC) : maximize
(p,p̂)∈Port
Q∑
q=1
∑
k∈Kq
fqk,1(pq(k), p̂q(k)) + gqk(pq(k), p̂q(k)), (4.71)
where fqk,1 and gqk are defined similarly as those in (4.50) and (4.53) respec-
tively, by imposing the orthogonality assumption. As a side note, in what
follows we omit these sort of definitions since they are easily obtained from
those in Subsection 4.5.1 by setting to zero the legitimate users’ interference
terms. We emphasize that the relation between the problems (P ) and (PDC)
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has been deeply explored in previous sections. It is clear that, (P ) and (PDC)
are equivalent in terms of globally optimal and d-stationary solutions, hence
from Proposition 4.11(b) any optimal solution of (PDC) is GNE of the game
G. Additionally, a critical point of (PDC) satisfying either conditions (a) or
(b) of Proposition 4.8 is a d-stationary solution of (P ), thus from Proposi-
tion 4.11(c) this point corresponds to a B-QGNE of G. We remark that, in
practice, such conditions are easily satisfied. As a result, practically speaking,
we can apply Algorithm 4.4 to compute a B-QGNE of the multi-orthogonal
channels secrecy game G. For the sake of clarity, Figure 4.4 summarizes the
connections between the game G and the multiuser optimization problems
(P ) and (PDC).
G
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Figure 4.4: Connections between the multi-orthogonal secrecy rate game G, the social problem (P ) and
its DC-reformulation (PDC).
4.5.2.3 Algorithmic Design
Algorithm 4.4 is centralized, that is, its implementation requires coordination
among the different entities in the network. An important implication of the
OFDMA assumption is that the objective function of the optimization prob-
lem (4.70) is separable in the legitimate users’ variables i.e. the secrecy rate
of user q (rsq) depends on his private variables xq , (pq, p̂q) alone. However,
the presence of coupling constraints (i.e. the friendly jammers’ power budget)
complicates the design of distributed algorithms. Following the approach in
Chapter 3, we cope with this issue by noticing that the subproblems in step
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(S.4) of Algorithm 4.4 i.e. given xν ,
(
xνq ,
(
pνq , p̂
ν
q
))Q
q=1
∈ Port
xν+1 , argmax
x,(xq)Qq=1∈Port
Q∑
q=1
∑
k∈Kq
[ fqk,1(pq(k), p̂q(k))
+ µgqk(p
ν
q (k), p̂
ν
q (k))
T (pq(k), p̂q(k))− τq
2
‖xq − xνq‖2 ],
(4.72)
can be solved in a fairly distributed way if the friendly jammers’ power budget
constraints are dualized. Let the set of private constraints be denoted by
Xq ,
{
(pq, p̂q) ≥ 0 :
∑
k∈Kq pq(k) ≤ Pmaxq
}
for every q = 1, . . . , Q, and let
X , ΠQq=1Xq. Then, the dual problem associated with (4.72) i.e. given
xν ∈ Port
minimize
pi,(pij)Jj=1≥0
d (pi; xν) , (4.73)
where the dual function is defined as
d (pi; xν) , maximum
(p,p̂)∈X
Q∑
q=1
∑
k∈Kq
( fqk,1(pq(k), p̂q(k))
+ µgqk(p
ν
q (k), p̂
ν
q (k))
T (pq(k), p̂q(k)) )
− τq
2
‖xq − xνq‖2 −
J∑
j=1
pij
(
N∑
k=1
p̂j(k)− P̂maxj
)
,
can be solved using, for example, gradient projection algorithms [11]. Notice
that, the dual function d is differentiable on RJ+ (as a direct consequence of
[11, Prop. 4.5.1]). From the cartesian structure of the set X , the strongly
concave optimization problem above is separable in the legitimate users’ vari-
ables. Let its unique solution be denoted by x̂(pi; xν) ,
(
x̂q(pi; x
ν
q )
)Q
q=1
, where
for every q = 1, . . . , Q
x̂q(pi; x
ν
q ) , argmax
xq ∈Xq
∑
k∈Kq
[ fqk,1(pq(k), p̂q(k))
+ µgqk(p
ν
q (k), p̂
ν
q (k))
T (pq(k), p̂q(k)) ]
− τq
2
‖xq − xνq‖2 −
J∑
j=1
pij
∑
k∈Kq
p̂j(k).
(4.74)
Then, the proposed distributed algorithm is a double loop scheme with com-
munication between them. In essence, the inner loop consists in solving prob-
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lem (4.72) via a dual approach. An instance of the resulting scheme, based
on gradient projection algorithms, is given in Algorithm 4.6. We remark that
this dual approach makes possible the decentralization of the computations
at the expense of introducing an additional loop into the algorithm.
The convergence of Algorithm 4.6 to critical points of the problem (PDC)
can be established as follows. Given any τ , (τq)Qq=1 > 0 and if the step-size
sequence {αt} is chosen accordingly to Theorem 3.4 in Chapter 3 then the
sequence {pit} converges to a solution of the dual problem (4.73). Since there
is no duality gap (recall that, the feasible set Port is polyhedral), then the
sequence {(pν,t, p̂ν,t)} converges to the unique solution of (4.72). Therefore,
the outer loop must converge to a critical point of (PDC) in the sense of
Proposition 4.3.
Algorithm 4.6 : Distributed DC-based Algorithm for the OFDMA SISO
Secrecy Sum-Rate Maximization Problem
Data: τ , (τq)Qq=1 > 0, {αt} > 0 and x0 , (p0, p̂0) ∈ P . Set ν = 0.
(S.1): If xν , (pν , p̂ν) satisfies a termination criterion, STOP.
(S.2): The main users q = 1, . . . , Q compute in parallel λ?,νqk for every k ∈ Kq
as in (4.55).
(S.3): The main users q = 1, . . . , Q compute in parallel µgqk(p
ν
q (k), p̂
ν
q (k))
for every k ∈ Kq as in (4.56).
(S.4a): Choose any pi0 , (pi0j )Jj=1 ≥ 0. Set t = 0.
(S.4b): If pit , (pitj)Jj=1 is a solution of (4.73), set x̂(xν) =
(
pν,tq , p̂
ν,t
q
)Q
q=1
, and
go to (S.5).
(S.4c): The main users q = 1, . . . , Q compute in parallel
(
pν,tq , p̂
ν,t
q
)
by solv-
ing (4.74).
(S.4d): The friendly jammers j = 1, . . . , J update in parallel pi , (pij)Jj=1 by
computing
pit+1j ,
[
pitj + α
t
(
N∑
k=1
p̂ ν,tj (k)− P̂maxj
)]+
. (4.75)
(S.5): Set xν+1 = x̂(xν).
(S.6): ν ← ν + 1 and go to (S.1).
Remark 4.4. (On the Implementation of Algorithm 4.6). Provided that the
CSI is available at the main users’s sides, Algorithm 4.6 can be implemented
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in a fairly distributed way as follows. At any inner loop iteration t ≥ 0,
given the multiplier pit , (pitj)Jj=1 ≥ 0, all the legitimate users update in
parallel their power allocation vectors
(
pν,tq , p̂
ν,t
q
)
by solving the strongly con-
cave subproblem (4.74). Notice that, the computations of the subgradients
µgqk(p
ν
q (k), p̂
ν
q (k)) are local and thus, steps (S.2) and (S.3) do not require
any signaling between the network users. After updating their power profiles,
each legitimate user q communicates to the friendly jammers the fraction of
power required to secure his transmission. Then, each friendly jammer j
updates in parallel and independently the multiplier pitj via the inexpensive
scalar projection in (4.75), where αt > 0 denotes a step size. Finally, the
updated price vector pit+1 is broadcasted to the main users. This terminates
one cycle of execution of the inner loop. After a successful termination of
this loop, in the outer loop each main user updates his corresponding power
allocation by replacing the current one with the inner loop’s output.
To conclude the discussion, it is important to highlight that the theory
developed to analyze the MSM problem leads to an analysis of the secrecy
rate game for a more general system model than the one presented in Chap-
ter 3. In particular, by following the MSM approach we were able to get rid
of the smooth game formulation used in Chapter 3 to derive a distributed
algorithm computing a (restricted) B-QGNE of the single channel case game.
Nevertheless, the approach followed in this section relies on two aspects: (i)
a second optimization problem, namely on the DC-reformulation of the op-
timization problem (P ), rather than on another game formulation; and, (ii)
the computation of a relaxed equilibrium point of the multi-orthogonal se-
crecy rate game depends on the critical points (produced by the DC-based
Algorithm 4.6) satisfying either conditions (a) or (b) of Proposition 4.8. Fi-
nally, it is worth mentioning that the smooth game approach used in the
cited chapter is suitable for the single channel case, but too restrictive for
the multi-orthogonal subchannels setting.
4.5.3 Alternative System Designs
The SISO secrecy sum-rate maximization problem may lead to unfair power
allocations with possibly some users not transmitting at all. There are certain
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communication systems where a minimum Quality of Service (QoS) needs
to be guaranteed. Consequently, the aforementioned system design is not
feasible in those particular situations. In this section, we briefly consider two
different designs that aim to overcome these difficulties. First, we consider
the well-known Max-Min fairness case, and second, we extend the design
in (4.47) by introducing QoS constraints into this model. Interestingly, the
optimization problems associated with these models can be cast into the
general DC program (4.27), thus we can easily derive iterative algorithms
converging to critical points of these problems.
4.5.3.1 Max-Min Fairness in SISO Secrecy Sum-Rate
Given a secrecy rate profile vector β , (βq)Qq=1 satisfying the conditions
β > 0 and
∑Q
q=1 βq = 1, the Max-Min fairness system design is given by the
following maximization problem:
maximize
r, (p,p̂)∈P
r
subject to:
N∑
k=1
rsqk(p, p̂) ≥ βq r ∀ q = 1, . . . , Q.
(4.76)
Invoking the DC-decomposition of rsqk obtained in (4.52), it is clear that
the constraints in the problem above can be easily rewritten as DC functions.
Namely, the DC-reformulation of the Max-Min fairness problem is:
maximize
r, (p,p̂)∈P
r
subject to:
N∑
k=1
fqk,1(p, p̂)− (−gqk(p, p̂)) ≥ βq r ∀ q = 1, . . . , Q,
(4.77)
where the functions fqk,1 and gqk are defined in (4.50) and (4.53), respectively.
Clearly, the maximization problem above is an instance of (4.27), thus, Al-
gorithm 4.2 can be used to compute critical points of this DC program.
Algorithm 4.7 customizes Algorithm 4.2 to the Max-Min fairness problem;
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where, following the approach described in Subsection 4.2.3, the nonconvex
feasible set of (4.76), denoted by
Pmm ,
{
r, (p, p̂) ∈ P :
N∑
k=1
rsqk(p, p̂) ≥ βq r ∀ q = 1, . . . , Q
}
,
is approximated at every xν , (pν , p̂ν) ∈ Pmm by the following convex set
P˜mm(xν) ,{
r, (p, p̂) ∈ P : −
(
N∑
k=1
fqk,1(x) + gqk(x
ν) + µgqk(x
ν)T (x− xν)
)
+βqr ≤ 0, ∀q
}
.
Note that, the strongly concave problem (4.78) in step (S.4) of Algorithm 4.7
has a simple objective function, namely, a scalar quadratic function. Besides,
we emphasize that the convergence of Algorithm 4.7 to critical points of the
maximization problem (4.77) is due to Proposition 4.4.
Algorithm 4.7 : DC-based Algorithm for the Max-Min Fairness in SISO
Secrecy Sum-Rate
Data: τ > 0 and
(
r0,x0 , (p0, p̂0)
)
∈ Pmm. Set ν = 0.
(S.1): If
(
rν ,xν , (pν , p̂ν)
)
satisfies a termination criterion, STOP.
(S.2): For q = 1, . . . , Q and k = 1, . . . , N compute λ?,νqk as in (4.55).
(S.3): For q = 1, . . . , Q and k = 1, . . . , N compute µgqk(x
ν) as in (4.56).
(S.4): Compute
(rν+1,xν+1) , argmax
(r,x)∈ P˜mm(xν)
r − τ
2
(r − rν)2 . (4.78)
(S.5): ν ← ν + 1 and go to (S.1).
4.5.3.2 SISO Secrecy Sum-Rate Maximization with QoS constraints
An alternative solution to the possibly unfair solutions obtained from (4.47) is
to incorporate QoS constraints into this model. In this system design, given
the secrecy rate profile s? , (s?q)Qq=1 ≥ 0 where s?q denotes the minimum
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secrecy rate required by user q, we consider the maximization problem:
maximize
(p,p̂)∈P
Q∑
q=1
N∑
k=1
rsqk(p, p̂)
subject to:
N∑
k=1
rsqk(p, p̂) ≥ s?q ∀ q = 1, . . . , Q.
(4.79)
It is worth stressing that the secrecy rate profile is such that s?q ≥ 0 for
all q = 1, . . . , Q, thus we left open the possibility of having s?q = 0 for
some q. The latter case implies that the corresponding user q does not have
a minimum QoS requirement. This is important in those communication
systems where some legitimate users do not demand a minimum secrecy rate
while others do, and, in the case where, due to the physical characteristics
of the network, the secrecy rate of some users cannot be greater than zero.
Once again, from the nontrivial DC-decomposition of rsqk obtained in (4.52),
it follows that the multiuser optimization problem (4.79) can be reformulated
as a general DC program. This DC-reformulation is given by:
maximize
(p,p̂)∈P
Q∑
q=1
N∑
k=1
fqk,1(p, p̂)− (−gqk(p, p̂))
subject to:
N∑
k=1
fqk,1(p, p̂)− (−gqk(p, p̂)) ≥ s?q ∀ q = 1, . . . , Q,
(4.80)
where the functions fqk,1 and gqk are defined in (4.50) and (4.53), respec-
tively. Clearly, (4.80) is an instance of the optimization problem (4.27).
Consequently, Algorithm 4.2 can be used to compute critical points of the
above DC program. Algorithm 4.8 customizes Algorithm 4.2 to the secrecy
sum-rate maximization problem with QoS constraints. Basically, the only
variant from Algorithm 4.4 is in step (S.4). In this case, the nonconvex set
of constraints in (4.79), denoted by
PQoS ,
{
(p, p̂) ∈ P :
N∑
k=1
rsqk(p, p̂) ≥ s?q ∀ q = 1, . . . , Q
}
,
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is approximated at every xν , (pν , p̂ν) ∈ PQoS by the convex set
P˜QoS(xν) ,{
(p, p̂) ∈ P : −
(
N∑
k=1
fqk,1(x) + gqk(x
ν) + µgqk(x
ν)T (x− xν)
)
+ s?q ≤ 0, ∀q
}
.
This gives rise to the strongly concave problem in (4.81), where both the ob-
jective function and the constraints are nonlinear, as opposed to the linearly
constrained optimization problem in Step (S.4) of Algorithm 4.4. Finally, it
is worth mentioning that the convergence of Algorithm 4.8 to critical points
of (4.80) can be established by Proposition 4.4.
Algorithm 4.8: DC-based Algorithm for the SISO Secrecy Sum-Rate Max-
imization Problem with QoS Constraints
Data: τ > 0 and x0 , (p0, p̂0) ∈ PQoS. Set ν = 0.
(S.1): If xν , (pν , p̂ν) satisfies a termination criterion, STOP.
(S.2): For q = 1, . . . , Q and k = 1, . . . , N compute λ?,νqk as in (4.55).
(S.3): For q = 1, . . . , Q and k = 1, . . . , N compute µgqk(x
ν) as in (4.56).
(S.4): Compute
xν+1 , argmax
x∈P˜QoS(xν)
Q∑
q=1
N∑
k=1
(
fqk,1(x) + µgqk(x
ν)Tx
)− τ
2
‖x− xν‖2. (4.81)
(S.5): ν ← ν + 1 and go to (S.1).
4.5.4 Numerical Results
In this section, we present some numerical experiments in order to study
the performance of the algorithms developed above for the power allocation
problem in a physical layer based security model for the SISO system. More
specifically, we compare these algorithms in terms of the secrecy sum-rate
attained and the number of iterations required to achieved it. We also con-
trast our algorithms with other applicable schemes existing in the literature
adapted to our formulations. At the same time, we analyze the impact that
the introduction of friendly jammers has into the communication system’s
performance, as well as the secrecy sum-rate gain obtained by adopting the
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proposed schemes versus fixed power allocation policies. We start the anal-
ysis by describing the system setup and the algorithms’ parameters used in
all the experiments presented below.
System Setup. Unless stated the contrary, all the experiments were
obtained under the following system settings. We assumed that all the legit-
imate users and friendly jammers are endowed with the same power budget
i.e. Pmaxq = P̂
max
j = P for all q = 1, . . . , Q and all j = 1, . . . , J . Similarly,
the noise variances are such that σ2q (k) = σ
2 for all q = 1, . . . , Q and all
k = 1, . . . , N . We set the signal-to-noise ratio snr , P/σ2 = 3 dB. Addi-
tionally, the positions of the main users, friendly jammers and eavesdropper
were randomly generated within a square of unit area. The main users’ chan-
nels were simulated as Finite Impulse Response (FIR) filters of order L = 10,
whose taps are independent and identically distributed zero mean complex
Gaussian random variables with variance 1/(d γrq (L+ 1)
2), where drq denotes
the distance between the transmitter of user r and the receiver of user q, and
γ = 1.8 is the path loss exponent. The same approach was used to simulate
the rest of channels in the system.
Recall that, in the OFDMA case, a set of subchannels Kq is assigned to
every user q = 1, . . . , Q (refer to Subsection 4.5.2). In the results below deal-
ing with this particular case, we generate 10 random subchannel assignments
for each set of channel realizations, and then, we took the corresponding av-
erage over them. The cardinal of every set Kq is equal to Q/N whenever
the remainder ρ after this division is equal to zero, otherwise ρ users will be
assigned bQ/Nc + 1 subchannels, while the rest Q − ρ users will have sets
with cardinal bQ/Nc.
Algorithms Setup. For Algorithm 4.4 we set the regularization constant
τ = 1/2, and for Algorithm 4.6 we used τq = 1/2 for all q = 1, . . . , Q. All
the algorithms were initialized using a uniform power allocation vector for
both the legitimate users and the friendly jammers, and their execution is
terminated when the absolute value of the difference of their corresponding
objective values in two consecutive iterations becomes smaller than 1e − 5.
For Algorithm 4.6, which is a double loop scheme, the inner loop is terminated
when the difference of the norm of the price vectors in two consecutive rounds
is less than 1e− 4.
172
Example 4.1. DC-Programming versus Joint Optimization Aproach.
In Figure 4.5 we compare the two approaches proposed in this chapter to ad-
dress the SISO secrecy sum-rate maximization problem under the general
setting in (4.47) (blue line curves), and under the OFDMA model in (4.70)
(red line curves). In these experiments, we fixed the number of subchannels
to N = 16 and increase the number Q of legitimate users, while there are
J = Q/2 friendly jammers. This comparison is done in terms of average se-
crecy sum-rate achieved and average number of iterations required to attain
it. For the double loop algorithms, the average total number of iterations
(including inner and outer loop iterations) is reported. Such averages were
calculated over 50 independent channel realizations. The plots indicate that
the average secrecy sum-rate achieved by the joint optimization approach
(Algorithm 4.5, and its variant for the OFDMA case) is very similar to the
one obtained from the DC-Programming based schemes (Algorithm 4.4, and
Algorithm 4.6 for the OFDMA case); see Figure 4.5(a). Moreover, both
approaches require (on average) almost the same number of iterations to
converge; refer to Figure 4.5(b). As a result, these numerical experiments
suggest that no significant performance difference (both in terms of achieved
objective value and number of iterations) is observed between the DC and
JO based schemes, at least for the resource allocation problem under con-
sideration. This conclusion is in accordance with the observations made in
Section 4.4.
Example 4.2. Secrecy Sum-Rate Gain. In Figure 4.6, we plot the
average secrecy sum-rate (taken over 50 independent channel realizations)
achieved by Algorithm 4.4 for the SISO secrecy sum-rate maximization prob-
lem [cf. (4.47)] (blue line curves), and by Algorithm 4.6 for the orthogonal
subchannels case [cf. (4.70)] (red line curves), under the following three
different scenarios:
(a) the number of subchannels is fixed to N = 16 while the number of main
users and friendly jammers increases; when present there are J = Q/2
jammers (see, Figure 4.6(a));
(b) the number of main users is fixed to Q = 4 and when present there are
J = 2 friendly jammers, while the number of subchannels is increased
(see, Figure 4.6(b));
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Figure 4.5: Comparison between the DC-Programming and the Joint Optimization (JO) based algorithms
in terms of (a) average secrecy sum-rate (SSR), and (b) average number of iterations.
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(c) the snr is increased, and the number of legitimate users, friendly jam-
mers and subchannels are fixed to Q = 4, J = 2 and N = 16, respec-
tively (see, Figure 4.6(c)).
For each of these tree scenarios, Figure 4.6 also shows the case J = 0 i.e.
where no friendly jammers are present in the communication system (dashed
line curves), and the simple situation where the uniform power policy is used
to allocate the resources in the system (dotted line curves).
From these plots, it is clear that Algorithm 4.4 yields much higher se-
crecy sum-rates than those achievable by Algorithm 4.6 for the orthogonal
subchannels case. The aforementioned behavior was expected since Algo-
rithm 4.6 only optimizes the power allocation while the subchannels are ran-
domly assigned, nevertheless the main advantage of this scheme is that it is
distributed. Furthermore, the secrecy sum-rates obtained by the proposed
system designs are significantly better than those coming from the fixed uni-
form power allocation policy. These plots also show that the introduction of
friendly jammers into the communication system is beneficial for its perfor-
mance, since the secrecy sum-rates obtained are higher than those attained
for the J = 0 case. Notice that this gain becomes more significant for the
case of orthogonal subchannels than for the general model; this is because,
in the latter case, the legitimate users may also act as friendly jammers. As
expected, this secrecy sum-rate gain is also more significant when the snr is
increased (see, Figure 4.6(c)).
Example 4.3. Convergence Speed. Figure 4.7 shows the average num-
ber of iterations (taken over 50 independent channel realizations) required
by Algorithm 4.4 and 4.6 to converge for the scenarios (a) and (b) described
in Example 2. For Algorithm 4.6, a double loop scheme, we report the av-
erage number of iterations including both the inner and outer loop. Clearly,
Algorithm 4.6 outperforms Algorithm 4.4 in terms of number of iteration,
even more, the former algorithm is also distributed; however this improved
performance comes at the expense of significantly smaller secrecy sum-rates
achieved than those obtained from the centralized approach (see, Figure 4.6).
Example 4.4. Comparison Between our Algorithms 4.4, 4.6 and
Other Available Schemes. Algorithms 4.4 and 4.6 are provable con-
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Figure 4.6: Average secrecy sum-rate (SSR) versus (a) number of legitimate users Q, (b) number of
subchannels N , and (c) snr.
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Q, and (b) number of subchannels N .
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Figure 4.8: Comparison between the proposed algorithms versus other available schemes (adapted to our
problem formulations) in terms of average secrecy sum-rate (SSR) achieved.
vergent to critical points of the DC-reformulation of (4.51) and (4.70), re-
spectively. Hence, a good benchmark for our algorithms is to compare their
achieved SSR with those attained by generic available methods attempt-
ing to compute locally or globally optimal solutions of such problems (but
without rigorously verifying their optimality). In particular, we consider
the algorithms KNITRO [16] and PSwarm [112] run over NEOS server [23].
It is worth mentioning that KNITRO is designed for smooth optimization,
thus, in this case, we cast the SISO secrecy sum-rate maximization problem
into the differentiable joint optimization reformulation introduced in Sub-
section 4.5.1.4. On the other side, PSwarm is suitable for both smooth and
non-smooth optimization. In Figure 4.8 we report the average SSR achieved
by the aforementioned algorithms (computed for 100 independent experi-
ments) versus the number Q of main users (J = Q/2 and N = 16). This
figure shows that our centralized and easily implementable Algorithm 4.4
outperforms KNITRO and has the same performance of the computationally
very demanding PSwarm. Similarly, from Figure 4.8, it is also clear that
Algorithm 4.6 achieves SSR that are comparable (and sometimes better) to
those obtained from KNITRO and PSwarm; this means that, at least for this
set of experiments, Algorithm 4.6 provides in a distributed way SSR that are
very close to those obtained by centralized methods.
Finally, despite its simplicity, a case that is worth mentioning is that of zero
friendly jammers and orthogonal subchannels. For this particular scenario, it
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Figure 4.9: Comparison between Algorithm 4.6 and the approach proposed in [48] for the case of orthogonal
subchannels and zero friendly jammers.
happens that we can adapt the results in [48] to our formulation in (4.70) and
apply the iterative-waterfilling-like algorithm proposed in the cited reference
to find an optimal power allocation for this optimization problem. Figure 4.9
shows that our Algorithm 4.6 (with Q = 4 main users) converges to such
optimal power allocations, therefore it has the same performance (in terms
of average secrecy sum-rates achieved) of the approach introduced in [48].
We recall that these averages were calculated over 50 independent channel
realizations and 10 random channels assignments per channel realization.
4.5.5 The MIMO Case
We conclude the applications section showing that the spectrum management
algorithms proposed for the SISO system implementing physical layer based
security (see, Subsections 4.5.1 and 4.5.2) can be readily extended to the
case where the network nodes are endowed with multiple antennas, that is,
a MIMO communication system; see, e.g., [62, 79, 60].
Let us consider a wireless communication system composed ofQ transmitter-
receiver pairs (denoted by q = 1, . . . , Q), J friendly jammers (denoted by
j = 1, . . . , J) and one eavesdropper (denoted by e). Different from the set-
ting considered in the previous sections, we study a MIMO system where each
legitimate transmitter, equipped with nTq antennas, aims to communicate a
secrete message with its corresponding receiver (equipped with nRq anten-
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nas) in the presence of an eavesdropper that is also enabled with multiple
nRe antennas. Furthermore, invoking the CJ paradigm, there are J friendly
jammers equipped with n̂Tj antennas willing to help the legitimate users to
secure their corresponding transmissions. In Figure 4.10, we illustrate this
system for the simple case of a single legitimate pair, one friendly jammer
and the eavesdropper. This figure also serves as an illustration of the channel
gain matrices introduced below.
!
…!Txq!
…! Rxq!
…! FJj!!
…! E!!
Hqq
Hqe
bHjq
bHjenTq
nRq
nRe
bnTj
Figure 4.10: MIMO system composed of one legitimate pair, a single friendly jammer, and the eavesdrop-
per. The arrows illustrate the channel matrices between the different entities in the network.
In the following discussion, we let:
• Qq ∈ CnTq×nTq denotes the transmit covariance matrix of the legitimate
user q. It is worth emphasizing that, since Qq is a covariance matrix
then it is positive semidefinite i.e. Qq  0.
• Q̂j ∈ Cn̂Tj×n̂Tj denotes the transmit covariance matrix of the friendly
jammer j.
• Pmaxq denotes the power budget of the q-th transmitter.
• P̂maxj denotes the power budget of the j-th friendly jammer.
• Hqq ∈ CnRq×nTq represents the channel matrix between the q-th legiti-
mate transmitter and its intended receiver.
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• Hrq ∈ CnRq×nTr denotes the cross-channel matrix between the trans-
mitter of the legitimate user r and the receiver of the legitimate user
q. Likewise, Hre ∈ CnRe×nTr denotes the cross-channel matrix between
the transmitter of the legitimate user r and the receiver of the eaves-
dropper.
• Ĥjq ∈ CnRq×n̂Tj represents the cross-channel matrix between the trans-
mitter of the friendly jammer j and the receiver of the legitimate user
q. Similarly, Ĥje ∈ CnRe×n̂Tj denotes the cross-channel matrix between
the transmitter of the friendly jammer j and the eavesdropper’s re-
ceiver.
• Rnq ∈ CnRq×nRq represents the covariance matrix of the noise at the
receiver of the legitimate user q, assumed to be positive definite.
As done in the previous section and in the related literature, we assume
that CSI is available.
Using the notation introduced above, under basic information theoretical
assumptions, the maximum achievable rate on link q for a given transmit
covariance matrix profile
(
Q , (Qq)Qq=1, Q̂ , (Q̂j)Jj=1
)
with each Qq  0
and Q̂j  0, is given by [22]
rqq(Q, Q̂) = log det
(
I + HHqq R
−1
−q(Q−q, Q̂) Hqq Qq
)
,
where Q−q , (Qr)r 6=q denotes the covariance matrices of all users except the
q-th one; and
R−q(Q−q, Q̂) , Rnq +
∑
r 6=q
HrqQrH
H
rq +
J∑
j=1
ĤjqQ̂jĤ
H
jq.
Similarly, the rate on the link between the transmitter of the legitimate user
q and the eavesdropper’s receiver is
rqe(Q, Q̂) = log det
(
I + HHqe R̂
−1
−q(Q−q, Q̂) Hqe Qq
)
,
where
R̂−q(Q−q, Q̂) , Rne +
∑
r 6=q
HreQrH
H
re +
J∑
j=1
ĤjeQ̂jĤ
H
je.
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Thus, the secrecy rate on link q is
rsq(Q, Q̂) ,
[
rqq(Q, Q̂)− rqe(Q, Q̂)
]+
(4.82)
where [•]+ denotes the Euclidean projection onto R+.
Among the different system designs considered for the SISO case in the
previous sections, let us focus here only on the secrecy sum-rate maximization
problem for the MIMO system described above. Under the assumption that,
each legitimate user q and every friendly jammer j have limited transmit
power budgets i.e. tr(Qq) ≤ Pmaxq for all q = 1, . . . , Q, and tr(Qj) ≤ P̂maxj
for every j = 1, . . . , J , the MIMO secrecy sum-rate maximization problem is
given by
maximize
Q,Q̂0
rs(Q, Q̂) ,
Q∑
q=1
rsq(Q, Q̂)
subject to tr(Qq) ≤ Pmaxq ∀ q = 1, . . . , Q,
tr(Qj) ≤ P̂maxj ∀ j = 1, . . . , J.
(4.83)
By invoking the well-known Sylvester’s Determinant Identity, it is not
difficult to see that, for every q = 1, . . . , Q, the secrecy rate on link q, rsq [cf.
(4.82)] can be re-expressed as
rsq(Q, Q̂) ,
[
fq,1(Q, Q̂) + fq,2(Q, Q̂)
]+
,
where
fq,1(Q, Q̂) , log det
(
R−q(Q−q, Q̂) + HqqQqHHqq
)
+ log det
(
R̂−q(Q−q, Q̂)
)
fq,2(Q, Q̂) , − log det
(
R̂−q(Q−q, Q̂) + HqqQqHHqq
)
− log det
(
R−q(Q−q, Q̂)
)
.
It is easy to show that each function fq,1 is concave in (Q, Q̂), and simi-
larly each fq,2 is convex in (Q, Q̂), with each Qq  0 and Q̂j  0 in both
cases. Hence, using the same argument as in the SISO secrecy sum-rate max-
imization problem (refer to Subsection 4.5.1) the problem in (4.83) can be
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rewritten equivalently as
maximize
Q,Q̂0
Q∑
q=1
maximum
λq ∈ [0,1]
(
λq fq,1(Q, Q̂) + λq fq,2(Q, Q̂)
)
subject to tr(Qq) ≤ Pmaxq ∀ q = 1, . . . , Q,
tr(Qj) ≤ P̂maxj ∀ j = 1, . . . , J,
(4.84)
which is clearly an instance of the MSM problem introduced in (4.2). As
a direct consequence, since assumptions A1-A6 are satisfied by the problem
above, we can then apply Algorithms 4.1 or 4.3 to compute critical points of
the DC-reformulation of (4.84) or stationary points of its joint optimization
reformulation, respectively. Thus, the results developed in the previous sec-
tions, for a SISO communication system, can be easily extended to allocate
resources in the more complex case of a MIMO system implementing physical
layer based security.
4.6 Conclusion
This chapter introduced a novel resource allocation problem in a multiuser
system where the sum-utility function has the particular structure of the sum
of continuous max functions, what we called the MSM problem. We proposed
two different iterative algorithms with provable convergence to critical points
(stationary points) of the DC-reformulation (JO-reformulation) of the MSM.
Furthermore, those critical points (or stationary solutions) obtained from the
proposed algorithms coincide under some conditions with d-stationary solu-
tions of the MSM problem. The aforementioned theory is suitable to deal
with resource allocation problems in the area of physical layer based security.
Therefore, this chapter develops centralized and distributed algorithms for
the secrecy sum-rate maximization problem (possibly with QoS constraints)
and for the Max-Min fairness design, for a SISO wireless system composed of
multiple legitimate users, multiple friendly jammers and a single eavesdrop-
per, where the main users communicate over multiple subchannels. Further
extensions include the MIMO system. To the best of our knowledge, these
models are the most general ones analyzed so far in the related literature.
Among the two approached proposed for addressing the aforementioned prob-
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lems, our numerical experiments suggest that both schemes perform similarly
in practice. It is worth remarking that, the DC-decomposition of the secrecy
rate leads naturally to the design of algorithms for more complex models,
such as those involving QoS constraints.
The design of distributed algorithms for the MSM problem, where the
agents iteratively update their strategies either in parallel or sequentially is
still an open question and we will continue to study it in our future work. We
are also interested in continue to analyze the relations between the MSM and
its reformulations. In particular, a more detailed study of the solution points
obtained from the algorithms devised through those reformulations and their
connection with the original MSM problem is also part of our future research.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
This dissertation provides several advances in the current literature of both
areas of resource allocation problems and in that of signal processing in
communication systems. However, most of the results presented in this work
are quite general and can be easily extended to encompass a great range of
resource allocation problems in other fields.
Chapter 2 presented an analysis based on LCP theory of the maximum
sum-utility of a communication system (i.e. the sum-rate) achieved when a
noncooperative approach is used to dynamically allocate the spectrum. In
particular, we considered the case of unbounded power budgets as an ap-
proximation of systems endowed with large but finite power constraints. It
is worth stressing that, different from other studies proposed in the litera-
ture, our results are not restricted in number of users and subchannels. The
aforementioned model led us to derive an interesting conclusion regarding
the efficiency of the NE in this context; namely, the system’s utility obtained
from the NE may be finite even when the users have infinite power budgets,
as opposed to the infinite utility achieved when a centralized approach is
used to allocate the power in the system. In simpler words, when the spec-
trum is managed through a game theoretical model, more power budget does
not necessarily translates into larger transmission rates. This suggests that
the selfish behavior of the players may not be overcome by the provision of
infinite resources. Aside from the previous observations, the LCP framework
developed in this chapter provided the tools to derive several sharper results.
Among them, we highlight the following three. First, we were able to char-
acterize the NE that yields an infinite sum-rate when the power budget is
increased toward infinity. Second, we provided sufficient conditions under
which only a finite number of NE exists. And third, we devised a case that
prohibits the presence of the Braess-type paradox in this class of systems.
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Chapter 3 introduced a class of provable convergent algorithms that are
applicable to find stationary solutions of multiuser programs characterized
by: differentiable, nonconvex and nonseparable objective function, and con-
vex coupling constraints. Even though, we focussed our analysis to objec-
tive functions of the DC type, our results can be extended to treat sum-
utility functions not necessarily in this form. Two remarkable features of our
schemes are: first, they can be implemented in a fairly distributed way, thus,
they are suitable for addressing resource allocation problems in large scale
systems; and, second, they allow inexact computations, hence the computa-
tional effort can be reduced. Among the diverse applications of the proposed
algorithms, we moved one step forward in the power allocation problem in a
DSM framework by considering this problem in an OFDMA system imple-
menting physical layer based security. This system consists of an arbitrary
number of main users and friendly jammers, and a single eavesdropper; thus,
extending the models considered so far in the literature. The system design
was formulated as a game, which is of the generalized type. Different from
previous works, we carefully addressed the nonconvexity and nondifferentia-
bility of such a game via the introduction of relaxed equilibrium concepts.
Interestingly, the proposed DC algorithms can be applied to find the afore-
mentioned equilibrium points. We also considered the sum-rate maximiza-
tion problem of MIMO CR systems, for which the algorithms developed in
the literature lack of theoretical convergence. Nevertheless, our DC schemes
can be applied to such a problem and thus, we have provided for the first
time a class of distributed algorithms with provable convergence. It is worth
mentioning that, numerically speaking, our experiments suggested that the
proposed distributed algorithms have similar performance and sometimes
better than centralized ones.
Finally, in Chapter 4 we studied a resource allocation problem in a mul-
tiuser system where the utility function is the sum of continuous max func-
tions where the maximand has a particular structure. We called this max-
imization problem MSM. Toward attempting the solution of such a prob-
lem, we followed two approaches: (i) a DC-based, and (ii) a smooth joint
optimization reformulation. These approaches led us to develop a family
of SCA-based algorithms with provable convergence to critical points of the
MSM problem’s DC reformulation and to stationary solutions of the joint op-
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timization reformulation of such a problem. We have also established some
connections between the points obtained from the proposed schemes and the
stationary solutions of the original problem. We applied our schemes to the
power allocation problem in a communication system implementing physical
layer based security, but different from the model considered in Chapter 3,
the communication between the legitimate users is over multiple subchan-
nels, for which the smooth reformulation introduced in the cited chapter is
too restrictive. For the case of multiple orthogonal subchannels, the proposed
algorithms are distributed, and for the more general case of multiple parallel
subchannels the schemes are centralized. The nontrivial DC decomposition
of the secrecy rate obtained in this chapter lead us also to devise iterative
algorithms applicable to the well-known Max-Min fairness case and to the
quality of service constrained problem. In terms of numerical results, the
experiments suggested that (for the applications under consideration) the
DC-based schemes and the joint optimization approach perform similarly
both in terms of convergence speed and achieved secrecy sum-rate. The nu-
merical experiments also indicate that our (distributed) easy-to-implement
algorithms achieve objective values that are comparable to those obtained
from (centralized) expensive approaches.
As a final overall remark, it is important to highlight that the introduction
of optimization theory in different signal processing applications has moti-
vated several advances in the former field. Figure 1.1 in Chapter 1 illustrates
this observation by showing how the power allocation problem under differ-
ent settings has created the necessity of introducing broader (but relaxed)
equilibrium concepts in the area of Game Theory, ranging from the classical
NE (in the context of convex games) to the concept of B-QNE (in the con-
text of nonconvex and nondifferentiable games) introduced in this work; all of
this with the objective of devising practical solutions for those applications.
Consequently, it is clear that the research presented in this dissertation has
provided significant advances in the aforementioned fields.
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